Commentary : Moscow Hears Footsteps in the Night : Terrorism: The Russians need to be reminded that the greater long-term danger comes from domestic overreaction.

At a meeting in Moscow more than 10 years ago, I discussed what then seemed to be a most improbable scenario--that some day Russia would be engulfed by a wave of terrorism. I was there to informally explore the possibilities of Soviet-American cooperation. I learned that our Soviet interlocutors had a much more complex view of terrorism than we had. They feared that a major incident of international terrorism might bring the two superpowers to a confrontation. Just two years earlier, the United States had bombed Libya, a Soviet protege, in retaliation for Libya’s sponsorship of terrorism against the United States. The attack had left a strong impression. The Russians also feared growing terrorism against Soviet targets abroad.

But most of all, they feared terrorism inside the Soviet Union itself, which, in their view, would come from ethnic conflicts, violent separatists, Islamic fanatics, and organized crime--a remarkably prescient description of the current threat. The Soviets candidly admitted that they were ill-equipped to combat terrorism. As one put it, “We have only heavy artillery or capitulation,” meaning that short of Stalinist repression, they were virtually impotent. They had not developed a sophisticated arsenal of policies, intelligence, tactics and technical capabilities to respond to this new mode of armed conflict.

Their darkest fears have since come true. The Soviet Union disintegrated. Russia found itself waging a brutal and seemingly unwinnable war against ethnic separatists in the Caucasus; even withdrawal from Chechnya provided no respite. Separatist sentiments spread to Dagestan. Terrorist bombings reached Moscow.

One doubts that Russia meanwhile has been able to develop the capabilities it needs. The Chechen war revealed fundamental problems: weak political leadership, absence of a clearly articulated strategy, lack of coordination among the security forces, inadequate resources, corruption, poor training, poor morale.

And Russia’s initial responses to the current bombing campaign have not been very promising either. Blatantly racist rhetoric, wholesale roundups that end in retail shakedowns, belligerent demands to seal ethnic Russia from the chaotic Caucasus and the ethnic cleansing of Moscow indicate disarray rather than crisis management. Terrorism does not always bring out the best in a nation.

Terrorist campaigns cause great stress, and the one in Moscow is especially intense. Five large-scale bombings in three weeks killing 300 persons is virtually without precedent in the annals of terrorism.

What we know about the bombers thus far indicates organization, long-range planning, pre-positioning of explosives, and an ability to operate even when security is tightened. It suggests confidence. It suggests that the campaign will continue.

Russian reactions are not unique. Widespread anger at government officials for not providing adequate security, popular demands for Draconian measures are to be expected. So are the inevitable conspiracy theories that credit the bombings to dark political plots. We had them too. Tales of black helicopters and secret explosives caches filled talk radio and the Internet after the Oklahoma City bombing. One can imagine the fractures that would occur in this country if an investigation of possible corruption in the White House, a military conflict abroad and a sustained campaign of terrorist bombings here were all to coincide. This is roughly the situation in Russia.

One also can expect the expression of popular prejudices. Many U.S. analysts and reporters wrongly leaped to the conclusion that the Middle Eastern terrorists carried out the Oklahoma bombing. Arab Americans continue to be the “usual suspects.” There have been ugly incidents.

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen has pledged that the U.S. will assist Russia. It is appropriate that we do so. Bombings of residential apartment buildings are clearly acts of terrorism, and a less-frightened, stable Russia in which normal political processes can take place is clearly in our interest. At the same time, we cannot be associated with Stalinist solutions.

We can provide some immediate technical assistance that may enhance the investigation. However, building the capabilities to effectively combat terrorism takes years. And no outside power can deliver the political prerequisites to successfully combat terrorism: legitimacy, stability efficiency.

But we can directly communicate to the people of Russia that we sympathize with their situation, that America, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Britain and Israel have gone through similar crises, that the greater long-term danger comes not from the terrorists but from overreaction to terrorism, that the Russians should be skeptical of self-proclaimed saviors, that terror can be defeated psychologically by a stubborn refusal to be terrorized.

There is a lesson in this for us as well. When we confront our next terrorist crisis, as one will doubtless occur again, this kind of conspiracy-mongering, fist-waving, racist-rousing, finger-pointing, partisan politicking is exactly what we will want to avoid.