Get Japan, U.S. on the Same Track

The emergence of George W. Bush as the victor in the presidential election is creating an “expectation gap” between the United States and Japan. Many Japanese have greeted the Bush victory with a sigh of relief. They had feared that a Gore administration, influenced by labor unions and environmentalists, could turn protectionist on trade. And they had feared that Al Gore as president would continue the Clinton administration’s pursuit of a “strategic partnership” with China at the expense of Japan.

In some ways, the Japanese leadership is reflecting nostalgically on the 1980s, when the Reagan and Bush administrations coddled Japan as a Cold War ally. Although the 1980s were marked by intense bilateral trade tensions, many Japanese blamed this on congressional Democrats, business interests and labor unions.

The first Clinton administration was seen here as genuinely attempting to change and reform Japan and therefore was more fundamentally subversive to those in Japan who wanted to preserve the status quo. This is one reason Japan resisted the U.S.-Japan framework negotiations between 1993 and 1995 more adamantly than the bilateral trade negotiations in the 1980s during the Reagan and Bush administrations.

Yet after two years of largely futile efforts to open Japan’s market, the Clinton administration by mid-1995 had put Japan on the back burner. From the Japanese viewpoint, what began in the first Clinton term as too intense a U.S. focus on Japan had dissipated in the second term to a near-abandonment of Japan, symbolized by the president’s 10-day trip to China in 1998 that completely bypassed Japan. The Japanese felt slighted, despite the fact that President Clinton ended up visiting Japan a total of five times, more than twice that of his predecessors.

This wounding of Japanese pride has been soothed by advisors close to President-elect Bush, who have stressed both the importance of Japan as a reliable U.S. ally and the potential dangers to the world order posed by China. The Japanese expect that the new administration will restore U.S.-Japan ties to the “most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none”--U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield’s mantra throughout the 1980s.

But are these Japanese expectations justified?

First, on the economic side, the record indicates that when the U.S. economy weakens and unemployment rises, trade pressures on Japan mount. In fact, the most “results-oriented,” market-opening trade agreements with Japan over the past two decades were concluded during Republican administrations--on semiconductors (1986), tobacco (1986), beef and citrus (1988) and automobile parts (1990).

And the only time in recent history that a U.S. administration actually imposed sanctions for Japanese violations of a trade agreement was in April 1987, when the Reagan administration concluded that Japan was flouting the terms of the 1986 U.S.-Japan semiconductor agreement. Thus, trade with Japan has been a bipartisan issue.

Second, on the security side, it is likely that the new administration will emphasize Japan’s role as a close U.S. partner and ally. But precisely for this reason, the administration will expect Japan to play a greater security role commensurate with its economic power and to take more active steps to strengthen the bilateral security alliance, especially in East Asia and particularly against China.

Although some Japanese government officials and many Japanese security experts support closer security ties with the United States, the same cannot be said for the majority of political leaders, intellectuals and the general public. Of the Japanese who advocate a stronger military role for Japan, some do so because they do not trust the U.S. to come to the defense of their country.

While most Japanese support the current arrangement of the U.S. providing for the bulk of Japan’s defense, few advocate enhancing bilateral military cooperation in the face of what they view as reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula, China joining the World Trade Organization and becoming more democratic, and domestic opposition to the nearly 50,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan.

An “expectation gap” is clearly emerging on both economic and security issues. It is imperative that the world’s two largest economies maximize potential areas of cooperation and minimize unnecessary conflict. Managing mutual expectations and ensuring that each side understands accurately the other’s intentions and priorities should top the agenda for the leaders of both nations.