Fewer Nukes, Better Security

President Bush and Russian President Vladimir V. Putin are both interested in making big cuts in their nuclear arsenals, and at their Genoa meeting after the G-8 summit they decided it’s time to start working toward that goal. They also agreed that coming discussions should include defensive missiles, meaning Bush’s plans for a national missile defense system, a project that Putin as well as America’s European allies find alarming. This might mean that Putin now accepts Bush’s assurance that a missile defense would not be intended to neutralize Russia’s nuclear deterrent. It could also mean that Putin is simply laying a foundation to argue that if there were major cuts in strategic weapons, Bush’s complex and costly missile defense system would be unnecessary.

Condoleezza Rice, Bush’s national security adviser, will be in Moscow this week to open what she describes as consultations, rather than negotiations, on arms reductions. The blueprint for strategic weapons cuts was prepared long ago. Under the never-implemented START II treaty, existing arsenals are to be cut by about half, to between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads for each side. Going well beyond that, Putin has proposed working toward a ceiling of 1,500.

Washington should keep an open mind about a reduction of that size. While there often is strength in numbers, the existing enormous redundancy in nuclear warheads adds nothing to real security. In Russia’s case too many warheads are a security headache. Nuclear weapons are costly to maintain and to protect from theft or sabotage. Putin is obviously eyeing the money his cash-strapped government could save. The United States too would benefit from a leaner, more effectively guarded Russian nuclear force and would save billions by shrinking its own overbuilt inventory.

There is still much to do before the two presidents’ interest in arms reduction bears fruit. But the United States and Russia may now have the chance to achieve a more mutually advantageous arms accord than anything decades of U.S.-Soviet negotiations produced. That prospect is one more reason to slow down the administration’s ill-advised rush to deploy a still unproven antimissile system.