Unlike Arafat, Sharon Won Bush’s Trust

In December 1998, shortly before he decided to run for president, then-Gov. George W. Bush made a three-day visit to Israel and came home with two indelible memories.

One was of standing on the hill in the Galilee where Jesus preached the Sermon on the Mount, and reciting the words to “Amazing Grace.” The other was of a helicopter tour over Israel’s narrow 1967 boundaries and the occupied West Bank--a tour conducted personally by then-Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon.

On the same trip, Bush also sought a meeting with Yasser Arafat, but the Palestinian Authority president turned him down, missing a priceless political opportunity.

Ever since, Bush’s relationships with the Middle East’s two bitter antagonists have followed much the same pattern. Sharon has cultivated the president and has largely won Bush’s confidence--not only by embracing the U.S. war on terrorism but also by being frank when he disagrees with U.S. policies.

Last week, for example, Sharon told Secretary of State Colin L. Powell that while he would withdraw his forces from the West Bank, it wouldn’t be as quickly as the U.S. wanted. After reports that U.S. officials were unhappy with that message, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer pointedly praised Sharon as “a man of peace.”

Arafat, in contrast, has impressed Bush as indecisive and untrustworthy.

“He never earned my trust,” Bush recently said of the Palestinian. “In order to earn my trust, somebody must keep their word. And Chairman Arafat has not kept his word. He said he would fight off terror. He hasn’t.”

Now that Bush has stepped fully into Middle East peacemaking, the president faces a paradox: To get the conflict under control, he must be cautious about endorsing the actions of Sharon, the man he trusts, and accept the need to deal with Arafat, the man he doesn’t.

As a result, statements from the White House sometimes seem to carry a mixed message: calling for Israeli restraint but praising Sharon, excoriating Arafat, but approving Powell’s decision to meet with him.

The president’s support for Israel and his distaste for Arafat are undimmed, aides say. But the lessons of his first full week of high-profile peacemaking were summed up by a weary White House official Saturday: “It’s going to be a long, hard road.”

Ten days ago, Bush stood in the White House Rose Garden and demanded a clear statement from Arafat denouncing suicide bombers and a clear commitment from Sharon for a rapid withdrawal of troops from the West Bank. He reinforced the message with telephone calls to foreign leaders and in daily conversations with Powell. But it took more than a week to persuade Arafat to comply--and Sharon still hasn’t said when he plans to end his military offensive.

Administration officials insist that Bush hasn’t been surprised by the tough going.

“We did not have high expectations for this trip,” one said. “Nobody thought we were going to get a dramatic success or a breakthrough.”

The apparent paradoxes in U.S. policy stem from the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, officials say. In the short run, they argue, Sharon is right to crack down on Palestinian terrorism; in the long run, the administration will urge him to reach out to the Palestinians and make peace. In the short run, the Palestinians have rallied around Arafat, and there is no one else Powell or Sharon can deal with; in the long run, the administration wants to encourage a new generation of more moderate Palestinians to take the lead, a goal that seems impractical in the middle of a war.

Bush’s sympathy for Sharon’s position appears undiminished despite the Israeli’s failure to withdraw his troops. Sharon and other Israeli officials have argued that their campaign against Palestinian terrorism is no different from Bush’s counter-terrorism effort after the Sept. 11 attacks, and they appear to have hit a nerve.

“On Sharon’s side, the terrorism has become unbearable,” a senior official said. “You have to understand how it is in Israel. . . . There are strategic concerns over the long run, but in the short run support for Sharon’s strategy is over 80% [among Israelis].

“When the president made his call [for withdrawal] they were in as many as 40 towns. Now they are down to four major towns and two or three minor places,” he said. “[Sharon] has actually been very responsive.”

Sharon denounced Powell’s interest in meeting with Arafat as “a tragic mistake,” but the official said Bush was not offended by the blunt disagreement. “[Sharon] said clearly that he doesn’t favor dealing with Arafat, but he also said it’s a decision Secretary Powell has to make,” the official said.

Arafat, on the other hand, has never established the same kind of link with Bush. Before Bush came to the White House, one ally said, the main thing he knew about Arafat was that the Palestinian leader backed Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Persian Gulf War--against the current president’s father.

Bush repeatedly called on Arafat to crack down on the wave of Palestinian terrorism, which began in late 2000. Bush sought to hold out an alternative path for Arafat by declaring his support for an independent Palestinian state, officials said.

But U.S. intelligence agencies reported back to the president that Arafat was encouraging some attacks against Israel and tolerating others. Last November, when Arafat sought a meeting with Bush at the United Nations to offer support in the U.S. war on terrorism, the president turned him down.

Arafat sent assurances to Bush that he was renouncing terrorism for good, officials said. But in January, Israel intercepted a shipload of weapons from Iran, and the CIA agreed with the Israeli assessment that Arafat’s closest aides were involved. “Ordering up weapons . . . is not part of fighting terror, that’s enhancing terror,” Bush complained.

Last week, Bush made clear that he would prefer to be dealing with a different Palestinian leader. But other Arab leaders and other Palestinians told Bush and Powell that there is no alternative to Arafat today. If anything, administration officials acknowledge, the Israeli offensive has made Arafat more popular.

“Arafat is a fact of life,” one official said.

As a result, the administration’s strategy is to attempt to negotiate a cease-fire between Sharon and Arafat in the short run, and then to encourage other Palestinians to step forward in the long run. But they have offered no details as to how they hope to accomplish that, beyond repeating U.S. willingness to support a new leadership if and when it arises.

The idea of dealing with Arafat is not universally popular within the administration. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and other hard-liners have argued for a clearer break with the Palestinian leader, according to some Republicans. (The Pentagon refuses to say what Rumsfeld’s advice to the president has been.) Outside the White House, conservative Republicans--and some Democrats--have called on Bush to break relations with Arafat.

“I think one of the things this president is learning is that you can’t personalize this issue,” said Sen. Charles Hagel (R-Neb.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who is close to Bush.

“Sure, he has feelings and passions and emotions. But it is very dangerous to allow those to control your decisions with the best interests of the country and the world at stake. Quite frankly, it’s irrelevant what you think of Arafat. The fact is, he’s the elected leader of the Palestinian Authority. The Arab leaders recognize him. . . . He’s a player whether you want it or not.

“It goes beyond the political dimension of ‘Oh my goodness, this will drag me and my standing into the underbrush.’ I don’t believe that will happen. I think the American people will give him credit for dealing with it; that whether he succeeds or fails, at least he tried. . . .

“Every president since Harry S. Truman has gotten consumed by it. It’s just a fact of life.”

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U.S. in the Middle East

American involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

1956: President Eisenhower pressures Israel to call off its attack on the Suez after it had been claimed by Egypt.

September 1978: Negotiations at Camp David, mediated by President Carter, lay the groundwork for a 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

June 1982: Israel invades Lebanon to eliminate Palestinian guerrilla bases. U.S. mediation results in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) moving its headquarters to Tunis, Tunisia.

December 1982: President Reagan proposes a peace initiative exchanging land for peace.

March 1988: Following a Palestinian uprising, Secretary of State George P. Shultz proposes a timetable for talks to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.

December 1988: PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat reads a statement accepting Israeleithers right to exist. U.S. begins dialogue with the PLO.

1989: Failed guerrilla raid against Israel causes U.S. to sever PLO ties.

December 1989: Secretary of State James A. Baker III fails in his attempt to arrange for Israeli-Palestinian talks in Cairo.

October 1990: Israeli Cabinet agrees to peace conference sponsored by U.S. and Soviet Union.

October 1991: Peace talks begin in Madrid under U.S.-Soviet auspices. For the first time Israel attends a conference with the Palestinians. Baker travels to the Middle East to establish Arab-Israeli peace talks.

1993: After secret peace talks, Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin shake hands at the White House.

2000: After nearly reaching a final settlement at Camp David, negotiations break down over the fate of Jerusalem. Violence erupts in the region. President Clinton tries to revive peace process before leaving office.

2001: Neither former Sen. George J. Mitchell (D-Maine) or CIA Director George J. Tenet are able to initiate a cease-fire.

April 4, 2002: After months of Israeli-Palestinian fighting, President Bush sends Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the region.

Source: News reports