All Iraqis Need a Stake in a Post-Hussein Nation

Iraqi opposition groups will meet this week in London to discuss the principles that would govern Iraq in the event the Bush administration decides to take action against Saddam Hussein. How power would be distributed among the various sectarian and ethnic groups in a new Iraq will be the point of most contention.

Since the British creation of Iraq in 1921, a Sunni Arab minority, constituting barely 20% of the population and based in central Iraq, has wielded power over the Shiite Arab majority of 55% to 60% spread over southern and central Iraq and over a Kurdish minority of some 20% in the north. The three groups have had conflicting aspirations, but they share a vital interest in keeping Iraq intact.

For the Sunni minority, Iraq’s continued existence as currently configured is a matter of survival. The Sunnis know that fragmentation would end their political hegemony and prosperity, leaving them in control of a small territory in central Iraq with access neither to the sea nor to the oil fields of the north and south.

As for the Shiites in the south, if the country splintered they would lose the capital, Baghdad (despite the fact that Shiites are half its population), and the shrine cities of Kazimiyah and Samarra in central Iraq, as well as substantial revenues from the oil wells in the north.

Unlike the Sunni and Shiite Arabs, the Kurds constitute a distinct ethnic group. For them, Iraq’s integrity is a matter of realpolitik. The Kurds understand that no Iraqi government could survive the outcry within Iraq that creation of an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq would cause. The Kurds also know that Turkey, Iran and Syria would not tolerate an independent Kurdish state for fear that it would encourage their own restive Kurdish minorities to push for cultural and political rights.

In the absence of opposition voices inside Iraq, the task of speaking for Iraqis has been left to opposition groups in exile. Other than the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Massoud Barzani, and the Popular Union of Kurdistan, led by Jalal Talabani, both of which operate within Iraqi Kurdistan, the four other major groups are the Iraqi National Congress, led by Ahmad Chalabi; the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, led by Ayatollah Muhammed Bakr Hakim; the Constitutional Monarchy Movement, led by Sharif Ali bin Hussein; and the Iraqi National Accord, led by Iyad Allawi.

The Iraqi National Congress is mostly Shiite and includes both secular and devout Muslims. The Supreme Council is Shiite Islamist while the monarchist group is Sunni. The mostly Sunni Iraqi National Accord, representing ex-military officers, includes a few Shiites. All these groups are committed to the territorial integrity of Iraq, and their members could play a role in rebuilding Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein.

For its part, the United States would need to assure all Iraqis that it is not like the first Bush administration, which ultimately was not committed to regime change during the Gulf War. The current Bush administration must also express its resolve to stand by Iraqis following the collapse of the Baath Party regime. An attempt to replace Hussein with a “nice” Sunni general amenable to U.S. interests, and to those of the neighboring countries, would backfire because Shiites would oppose a state in which they were again assigned a marginal political role. Instead, the U.S. and the international community would need to guarantee the emergence of a federal republic in Iraq in which the Shiites can gain access to power and the Kurds can continue to enjoy a degree of self-rule.

By virtue of being the majority, the Shiites are likely to play the leading political role in a new Iraq. Yet they would need to set aside their grievances over historical mistreatment by the ruling Sunni minority and assure the Sunnis that a change of regime would not expose them to Shiite revenge and tyranny. Iraq’s Sunnis might not be easily persuaded to relinquish their political hegemony, and so, to allay their fears, a power-sharing formula must be developed by Iraqis soon after the U.S. liberation of Iraq.

In the longer run, Iraq’s Shiites will need to develop a political leadership that can unite observant Shiites and secularists, rural and urban dwellers, Shiites living inside Iraq as well as those in exile. The Islamists among them will need to reconcile Western ideas of democracy with Islamic concepts of freedom and justice. Accomplishing these tasks might enable a Shiite to emerge as a national leader recognized by the majority of Iraqis.

Arab Shiites and Sunnis are meshed, as evident from the large number of mixed marriages in Iraq. The two groups share social codes and cultural attributes that could form the basis of an Iraqi nationalism drawing on the ideas of the literary figure Ali Sharqi, who died in 1964. Sharqi offered a vision of Iraq that built on the strong Arab tribal character of its people. He advocated the development of a nationalist ideology that combined Arab and other Eastern elements with Iraqi values and heritage. Sharqi argued that only an authentic Iraqi nationalism that drew on Iraq’s Babylonian past and the tribal customs and traditions governing Iraqi society would yield a government that served its people. His ideas could be further developed in the course of rebuilding Iraq after the collapse of Hussein’s regime.

As the largest ethnic group, Arabs (both Shiites and Sunnis) would need to offer the Kurds a pact recognizing their culture and safeguarding their rights within a reunified Iraq. The 1970 accord between Hussein and Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani has been referred to over the years by Iraqi Arabs and Kurds as a basis for settling the Kurdish problem in Iraq. The accord acknowledged the distinct national identity of the Kurds. It permitted the Kurds to develop special educational and cultural programs, and it recognized Kurdish, alongside Arabic, as an official language in areas where Kurds formed a majority. The accord also promised the Kurds participation in the Iraqi government and predominance in the local administration.

In return for a similar offer backed by the U.S. and the United Nations following the war, the Kurds would have to forge new links with the Iraqi state and demonstrate a commitment to sharing power in an Iraqi state.

In a new Iraq, power should not be monopolized by Baghdad but shared among the central, southern and northern parts of the country.

Nevertheless, Baghdad would probably remain the locus of Iraqi national politics. Iraq’s foreign and defense policy, and its economic budget and oil fields, should be controlled by the federal government in Baghdad. A good part of the proceeds from oil, however, should be reinvested in the north and south where oil is found.

The United States would need to encourage Iraqis to develop a strong parliamentary system composed of regional assemblies and a national parliament in Baghdad. The latter should serve as a major arena for public debate and should be capable of checking the executive’s decisions. Seats should be distributed among Iraq’s various social and ethnic groups (including Turkomans, Assyrians and Chaldeans) in proportion with their size.

The composition of the federal government, like that of the national parliament, should reflect the social fabric of Iraqi society and the majority status of Shiites. To maintain the credibility of the new government, ministerial posts should be filled by Iraqis who are respected within the country.

Until Iraqis are ready to elect their national leader, it might be necessary for rule to be shared by a triumvirate consisting of, say, a Shiite president, a Sunni prime minister and a Kurdish speaker of parliament. It would be up to Iraqis to agree on these individuals. Their roles should be clearly defined by the constitution and endorsed by the national parliament.

To ensure Iraq’s stability, the United States would need to pressure Turkey, Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia not to interfere in Iraqi affairs, allowing Iraqis to develop their own vision of a new Iraq. That task has already begun by Iraqis in exile, and it ought to be concluded together with their compatriots inside the country after the liberation of Iraq.

The prospect of the Shiites coming to power should not raise the fear that Iraq might be swept away by Islamic radicalism, or that Iran would be able to increase its leverage in the country to a significant extent.

On the contrary, for more than a decade radical Islam in the Middle East has been largely shaped by Sunnis, many of whom have been influenced by the Wahhabi-Hanbali school dominant in Saudi Arabia. Although the Iranian revolution emboldened Arab Shiites, Iran has failed to reshape Arab Shiism in its own image.

The task of rebuilding Iraq will be a challenging one, but it might prove easier to accomplish than it has been in Afghanistan because Iraq has rich oil reserves, a strong agricultural sector, a tradition of market-oriented economy and a large secular bureaucracy.

Down the road, there could be a backlash against the wish of the majority to bring decency and tolerance to Iraqi sociopolitical life. It would be the responsibility of the United States to assure Iraqis that their desire for an Iraq that serves its people and does not threaten its neighbors will prevail.