We Need a Steady-- Not Heavy--Hand at the LAPD’s Helm

The Los Angeles Police Commission’s three finalists for LAPD chief--John Timoney, William Bratton and Art Lopez--are widely hailed for raising officer morale, sharply reducing crime and boosting the image of departments they’ve headed.

Yet there are also troubling questions about what they did or didn’t do to reduce the overuse of excessive force by officers in their departments.

In Philadelphia, Timoney drew intense fire from black leaders and political activists after the videotaped beating of a black suspect by a swarm of officers and the manhandling of demonstrators at the Republican convention in 2000.

In New York, Bratton drew fire from black leaders and civil libertarians for the big jump in excessive-force complaints that stemmed from street stops and shakedowns of young black and Latino men, many of whom were not arrested or even accused of any criminal wrongdoing.

In Oxnard, Lopez drew fire from black and Latino leaders after the questionable shootings by police of five civilians, some of whom were mentally ill.

How a police chief handles excessive force by officers strikes at the heart of real police reform. A decade ago in Los Angeles, the Christopher Commission investigating the Rodney King beating case recognized that excessive force was the single biggest problem that poisoned relations between the police and minority communities and was a spark in the deadly racial turmoil.

The panel identified hundreds of officers who were the targets of citizen complaints of excessive force or the use of improper tactics in dealing with suspects. Even more damaging, the commission named dozens of officers who had multiple charges of excessive force against them.

It tactfully labeled them “potential problem officers.”

The commission blasted the department for doing nothing to control or discipline the officers and for not holding their supervisors accountable for their actions. It recommended firmer discipline procedures to weed out problem officers and better screening procedures to prevent troublesome applicants from ever wearing an LAPD uniform.

That didn’t happen.

A decade after the Christopher report, the city was stunned again by allegations that some officers in the Rampart Division beat, kicked and shot suspects, planted evidence and gave perjured testimony and that supervisors did little or nothing to punish them.

Further, it took years and much pressure from the Police Commission and the Justice Department to get the LAPD to drop its resistance to a computerized monitoring system to better track civilian complaints against officers, mostly involving excessive-force violations.

Without ironclad procedures to swiftly and severely discipline abusive officers, it is impossible to fully restore public confidence in the LAPD.

What it still comes down to is that the punishment of officer misconduct rests in the hands of the chief. And there is nothing that can be done to compel him to take action against an abusive officer.

In the past, city officials have absolved themselves of any responsibility for officers who brutalize suspects by giving the LAPD free rein to investigate itself. This blind faith in the department to initiate wide-ranging reforms is fraught with pitfalls.

The Los Angeles Police Department is no different from any other government agency or corporation accused of wrongdoing. Its reflexive reaction is self-protective. The officers who use excessive force and are not punished are not just a danger to the department but to the community, feeding the belief of much of the public that officials cover up officer misconduct.

Mayor James Hahn and the L.A. City Council would be well-advised to think long and hard about what a police chief can and should do to reduce or eliminate the use of excessive force as a flashpoint issue in police-minority community relations. This is a crucial litmus test they must not ignore in picking the next chief.