Syria’s Door Ajar for U.S., Israel

Fortunately for both the United States and Israel, life has become more difficult and complicated for Syrian President Bashar Assad. With Saddam Hussein in custody, Yasser Arafat isolated and Moammar Kadafi making nice to Washington, Assad no doubt worries that President Bush’s impatience with terrorist paymasters may strike him next, a big reason why he’s offered to restart peace talks with Israel.

Israel and the U.S. have little to lose and much to gain by testing Assad’s intentions, but both appear to be letting the opportunity slip away.

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, after largely ignoring Assad’s overtures in December, has repeatedly said Israel would only consider talking after Syria ends its support for terrorism. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported recently, “The United States does not intend to push for or sponsor any resumption of Syrian-Israeli talks, but will not object should Israel choose to take up ... Assad’s offer.” No one has denied that.

If the Sharon government feels, for whatever reason, that it cannot seriously respond to Assad’s diplomatic overture, the U.S. should do so. But the U.S. needs to make it clear that if Syria resorted to trickery, Washington would back the Jewish state to the hilt. It’s in the U.S. interest to encourage Syria to help us stabilize Iraq, defang Lebanon-based Hezbollah and take a greater role in the global war on terror. After all, if the Bush administration fought the Iraq war to change the region’s politics, it cannot afford to ignore diplomatic openings. If it does, other unfriendly governments will have no incentive to choose the path of rational and peaceful cooperation.

There are many reasons to mistrust Assad.

He harbors terrorists whose agents commit atrocities against Israel. He actively backs Hezbollah, the terrorist group that continues to inflame Israel’s northern border, perhaps in anticipation of a Syrian-Israeli thaw. He facilitates Iranian support of terrorism. On the eve of the war, he drew closer to Hussein, and his regime has been accused of hiding Hussein’s henchmen and weapons and allowing anti-American insurgents to infiltrate into Iraq across Syria’s borders.

Some Israeli and U.S. officials feel that Assad’s offer to resume negotiations with Israel is a ruse because, if he were truly serious, he would use back channels. Others think that Assad couldn’t make necessary concessions, even if he wanted to, because of the dominance of his father’s henchmen. They may be right. But the head of Israel’s military intelligence, Maj. Gen. Aharon Zeevi-Farkash, reportedly told the Israeli Cabinet he thought the Syrian leader’s intentions were serious. Assad has publicly hinted that he would not insist on the return of all Syrian territory captured before June 4, 1967. There are additional reasons: His intelligence agents have reportedly cooperated to some extent with the U.S. in its war on terrorism, and the Syrian leader appears to have moderated his opposition to Washington since the war, exactly what Hezbollah fears.

Israel would better serve its interests if it talked directly to Assad, because it would reap enormous benefits from a diplomatic breakthrough with Syria. Even the mere resumption of negotiations would increase pressure on the Palestinians to follow suit. A deal would also mean peace with Lebanon, isolating Hezbollah and forcing it into a more traditional political role.

Refusing to talk to Arab antagonists doesn’t seem the best way to deter them from reprehensible conduct. Sharon demands that the Palestinians first obliterate their terrorist networks before he’ll talk. He’s making the same demand of Syria. The U.S. has, by and large, gone along with him. As with the Palestinians, the result is likely to be the same with the Syrians: further deterioration.

Assad’s initiative comes at an inconvenient time for Sharon: The Israeli prime minister is talking about dismantling illegal outposts and even closing some West Bank and Gaza settlements. He certainly doesn’t want another project that may require more “painful concessions,” to use one of his favorite phrases. It also comes at an inconvenient time for Bush, who believes -- mistakenly -- there are too many domestic political risks in pressing for Israeli-Arab peace during the election season.

Yet, if the U.S. and Britain had refused to test Kadafi’s intentions and talk to him seriously, there would have been no progress toward disarmament in Libya. There are even reports that Israeli officials have engaged in secret talks with the Libyans. Surely, the same open-minded approach is worth trying with Assad.