CIA inquiry finds ‘systemic breakdowns’ in Afghan bombing that killed agents

A CIA investigation into a December suicide bombing in Afghanistan that killed seven agency personnel and injured six others found “systemic breakdowns” in the field and at headquarters, but no one will be fired or disciplined, CIA Director Leon Panetta said Tuesday.

In one of the most devastating attacks in CIA history, officers failed to search an Al Qaeda double agent before he entered a meeting at their base in Khowst in a remote part of Afghanistan, and he detonated a huge bomb. Two contractors and five CIA employees were killed, including the base chief, who was one of the agency’s foremost experts on Al Qaeda. Six CIA officers were wounded, some severely.

Panetta disclosed for the first time Tuesday that, 25 days before the attack, another Jordanian intelligence officer had expressed concerns to his CIA counterpart in Jordan that the bomber, Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal Balawi, could be a double agent. But the CIA officer didn’t pass those concerns to headquarters or to CIA operatives in Afghanistan.

Asked why that person wasn’t disciplined, Panetta said the suspicions about Balawi weren’t clear enough, and the officer’s decision to not pass them on was reasonable, if wrong.

Panetta said officers, some lacking war zone experience, took risks they shouldn’t have in their zeal to recruit Balawi, a Jordanian doctor who had convinced the agency that he could lead them to Al Qaeda’s second in command, Ayman Zawahiri. Balawi had been vetted by a trusted Jordanian intelligence operative, and the CIA didn’t want him searched by the base’s Afghan guards, a Panetta aide said.

Balawi also was greeted by a group of people, instead of one or two, “to make him feel welcome,” Panetta said. That decision increased the death count. Security officers were about to search him when he set off the bomb, Panetta said.

“It would be easier to go after one person for causing this so everybody could go back to business as usual,” Panetta told a small group of reporters at CIA headquarters. “This is a case where there are some systemic failures, where all of us have responsibility, and all of us need to fix it.”

A retired CIA officer was highly critical of Panetta’s conclusions.

“I think this is one of the fundamental problems that the CIA has -- a lack of accountability,” said Charles Faddis, a retired CIA case officer who spent years overseas, including a stint during the Iraq war. “This review board has concluded what everybody who has ever run operations downrange knew after five minutes of reading the first accounts. These are not just mistakes, they are inexcusable. It’s gross negligence.”

Faddis said he conducted hundreds of meetings with potential agents in hostile environments, and it would have been unthinkable not to search each one, and unconscionable to then bring them in proximity to a group of CIA personnel.

“He could have been searched in the vehicle,” Faddis said. “That is an absolutely routine security measure. You don’t dispense with good tradecraft because you’re pursuing a high-profile case.”

A CIA task force made 23 recommendations in the wake of the review, all of which Panetta accepted. He also asked two outsiders, former Ambassador Thomas Pickering and former CIA official Charles Allen, to review the findings. Some of the recommendations are already being implemented, such as searching everyone who enters a CIA base.

Others include the establishment of a “war zone board” to review staffing, training and security in war zones. The chief of the Khowst base, an Al Qaeda expert and mother of three, did not have sufficient training and experience in combat areas, Panetta said.

The acknowledgment of mistakes marked a shift from Panetta’s stance in the aftermath of the attack, when he argued that criticism of security procedures or other tactics by the CIA in the attack was unfair.

Eleven days after the attack, Panetta wrote in a Washington Post opinion piece that “we have found no consolation ... in public commentary suggesting that those who gave their lives somehow brought it upon themselves because of ‘poor tradecraft.’ That’s like saying Marines who die in a firefight brought it upon themselves because they have poor war-fighting skills.”

Panetta said he stood by that sentiment Tuesday, but he also acknowledged a series of breakdowns. For example, he said, so many elements of CIA were involved in the mission to recruit Balawi that no one seemed to know who was in charge. And elements of the team used e-mail and instant message software to communicate instead of official cables, meaning key information wasn’t shared with everyone who needed to know.

“This is standard agency BS,” said Faddis, whose 2009 book calls for replacing the CIA with a more nimble spy organization. “The first line was nothing went wrong. Then when that became untenable, defensive position two is, some things went wrong but they were reasonable decisions, and we’ll learn some lessons. What that means is, so many of us are in this boat that we can’t hang one of us and not hang us all.”

Panetta and his aides disclosed new details about Balawi and about the bombing. For example, they said, in the weeks leading up to the meeting, Balawi sent back information about Al Qaeda from the tribal areas of Pakistan the CIA was able to corroborate, adding to his veneer of credibility. The CIA continues to believe that he did have contact with Zawahiri, the director said.

President Obama had been briefed on the mission to recruit Balawi but not on the meeting, Panetta said.

The director said that the CIA has killed some of those who masterminded the attack. “We have also gone after the others who were involved in the planning of this and have taken many of them out too,” he said.

ken.dilanian@latimes.com