Did U.S. Really Deemphasize the Communist Bugaboo?

The strong American role in the departure of Ferdinand E. Marcos from the Philippines has been hailed as a sign of maturity in U.S. foreign policy. Commentators have hailed the positive stance on Corazon Aquino’s assumption of power as an example of Washington’s willingness to support the democratic process at any price, despite concerns about possible communist incursion in the region.

This may be a misperception. It may be precisely because of concerns about communism that Washington was so willing to allow Marcos to depart. Moreover, Aquino’s government is likely to be one that will be far more under U.S. control than Marcos’ regime had been in recent years.

The true basis for U.S. actions on the foreign-policy scene has little to do with dictators and democracy. It has a lot to do with superpower politics and control. The United States first wants to make certain that Soviet influence is, as far as possible, kept in check everywhere. And it wants to make sure that it has firm control over the processes that keep the Soviet Union in check. This is best done by having an elite group of trustworthy “plumbers” in power on whom Washington can count to respond favorably to its requests and plans.

This policy is extremely narrow. It leaves out the wishes and desires of the mass populations of the nations of the world. Moreover, it does not always work. When mass populations bent on revolution support leaders whom the United States cannot control, Washington lends support to the bad old dictators whom it can control. When they are driven out of office by popular sentiment, hostile feelings toward America understandably remain among the broad base of the population. Washington has had to scramble to re-establish friendly relations in these situations, often without much success.

Most Americans remember the debacle that followed the departure of the shah from Iran. The United States looked with horror on the indomitable Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and held on to the hope that the shah would weather the storm of revolution and hold on to power, guaranteeing continued U.S. influence in that nation and the oil-rich Persian Gulf area. The inability of Washington to let go of the shah made Iranians suspicious that the United States was working to restore his regime.

The situation in the Philippines is different. Marcos’ departure has resulted in, if anything, stronger and more positive feelings toward the United States. This is fortunate, for it could easily have turned out differently.

The United States was lucky that Marcos’ opponent was a strong and attractive leader who harbored no intrinsic ill-will against the United States. Aquino comes close to being an ideal replacement for Marcos. She comes from one of the wealthiest, most elite families in the Philippines, a family that has been enmeshed in the power of that nation for decades. She is the wife of a martyred hero, and a powerfully charismatic figure in her own right. Her chances of establishing a stable government are excellent.

More important, her government may be the only chance that the United States has of turning back the insurgency growing in the countryside. Marcos, despite his rhetoric, was unable to control the rising pro-communist New People’s Army. His dictatorial regime drove many oppositionists into leftist positions as his unrelenting persecution of them continued. By last summer the NPA was estimated to have a strength equal to 25% of the Philippine army. Yet Marcos became increasingly difficult to deal with. He was reluctant to take Washington’s advice on the need to lighten his hand and control corruption.

The key to controlling the communists is Aquino’s appointment of Gen. Fidel V. Ramos as military chief of staff and Juan Ponce Enrile as defense minister. These men have strong connections to Washington, are avidly pro-American and will work relentlessly to combat communism in the countryside.

The rebellion of these senior military men started the events that brought the Marcos government down. Aquino had no choice but to bring them into her cabinet. Given their military skills, she might have chosen them anyway, but it is certain that Washington was relieved and happy when she did.

In today’s Chile, Lebanon and Iraq, just to name a few places, the opposition has yielded no persons with the trusty predictability of Aquino and her military chiefs. In these cases Washington continues with business as usual, as in the shah’s Iran, on the principle that the devils it knows are far better than the devils it doesn’t know.