If Defendant Concedes Guilt, Why Delay Death Penalty?

When Steven Livaditis was arraigned on charges of murdering three people during a bungled robbery at a Beverly Hills jewelry store recently, he entered a plea of not guilty after conferring with his court-appointed public defender. In an earlier newspaper interview Livaditis expressed a remorseful desire to plead guilty and accept the penalty of death.

For some, this bizarre turn of events offers another example of the folly of our criminal-justice system. Can a criminal-defense lawyer insist on an expensive and time-consuming trial when the defendant is prepared to concede his guilt and accept the ultimate punishment?

The courts have provided two different answers to this question, depending on whether the case involves a penalty of death. In a non-capital case, a “competent” defendant can give up the right to a trial and even request the maximum punishment. If his lawyer objects, the defendant can discharge his lawyer and represent himself.

The qualification that the defendant be “competent” is an important limitation, however. The ends of justice are hardly served if a defendant who is incapable of understanding the charges or the consequences of his decision is allowed to give up the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. If the defense lawyer, or even the prosecutor or judge, has reason to question the competence of the defendant, a psychiatric evaluation is required before the defendant is even allowed to enter a plea.

In a death-penalty case, a different rule is applied. While a competent defendant can still insist on a guilty plea, a sentence of death cannot be imposed without a hearing in which his lawyer is required to present the available mitigating evidence. Sometimes this imposes conflicting roles on defense counsel. Ordinarily a lawyer’s obligation is to vigorously pursue the wishes of his client, subject only to the ethical limitations imposed by the law. (Counsel cannot knowingly present perjured testimony of alibi witnesses, for example, even if his client insists on it.) But in a death-penalty case the lawyer is required to perform a role assigned by the state to assure the reliability of the penalty determination. Even if his own client objects, the lawyer must present mitigating evidence.

This conflict was presented dramatically in one of the 13 death-penalty cases decided by the California Supreme Court last Dec. 31. Ronald Lee Deere had entered a plea of guilty to the murders of a father and two young children, relatives of a girlfriend who broke off her relationship with him. A psychiatric evaluation confirmed Deere’s competence. At the time of sentencing, Deere’s lawyer reluctantly complied with his desire that no mitigating evidence be presented, although friends and relatives were willing to testify on his behalf. With simple eloquence, Deere explained to the court, “I know what I done was wrong. I always believed an eye for an eye. I feel I should die for the crimes I done.” The trial judge granted his wish, and sentenced Deere to die.

In a 5-1 decision that was authored by Justice Stanley Mosk, the California Supreme Court upheld Deere’s guilty plea but reversed the death penalty, requiring a new sentencing hearing at which the mitigating evidence would be presented. The opinion offers compelling reasons that should be considered in evaluating the case of Steven Livaditis.

A defendant who actively seeks the death penalty simply is enlisting the aid of the state in his suicide. A persuasive argument can be made that the state should not interfere with a person’s decision to end his or her own life. The case of Elizabeth Bouvia offers a poignant example. But in seeking the death penalty a defendant is doing more than simply electing to atone for his crimes. He is enlisting the active participation of the state in his death. The state has a vital interest of its own to ensure that a determination to take someone’s life be balanced, reliable and fair.

The state must be equally concerned with the appearance of fairness so that public perceptions confirm the validity of the result. Those who argue that the state should accommodate the death wishes of criminals forget how close that position is to advocating that the state cooperate in the death wish of any person who decides that death is a more attractive alternative than a life of illness and despair.

Before the state carries out an execution, we must insist that all of the justifications for life, as well as the arguments for death, be weighed in the balance. Ultimately we may determine that both Ronald Deere and Steven Livaditis deserve to die for their crimes. If we let them make that determination, however, their executions would simply be acts of state-assisted suicide, rather than acts of public justice.