Advertisement

Israel’s Isolation Eases, but Recognition Seems No Closer

Share
<i> Dominique Moisi is associate director of the French Institute for International Relations and editor of Politique Etrangere</i>

The recent encounter between King Hassan II of Morocco and Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and the future meeting in Helsinki between Israelis and Soviet negotiators on the resumption of consular relations have much in common. Both events, though spectacular, are not surprising, and are the result of a long, steady and laborious process. But these two encounters may also prove to be illusory. Though the recent meetings seem to allude to the possibility of a breakthrough in the dangerous Middle East stalemate, they should be greeted with prudent expectations.

For Israel, the two meetings signal a new and definitely more positive diplomatic configuration. The process of isolation, sometimes self-isolation, in which Israel found itself in the 1970s and early 1980s is slowly reverting--though Israel’s quest for legitimacy with its Arab neighbors has not progressed significantly since the 1979 peace accord with Egypt.

One of the dramas of the Middle East conflict has been the fact that regional politics and East-West relations were never favorable at the same time. Recent East-West relations have been evolving more favorably, with the Soviet Union willing to include an opening for Israel in its global diplomatic game. But a very different evolution is going on with regional Arab problems. The summit meeting in Morocco highlighted the convergence of Hassan’s fears and Peres’ hopes.

Advertisement

Hassan, taking a calculated risk in meeting with Peres, knew that he could count on the sympathy of Western powers, and also on the discreet and tacit understanding of moderate Arab regimes. Whatever the nature of their public statements, these countries are more preoccupied today with threats from within the Arab world (terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism) than with the potential danger stemming from “the Zionist aggression.”

In the 1950s and ‘60s the manifestation of the Arab identity crisis, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Pan-Arabism, could lead only to a fixation on Israel--a foreign “thorn” in Arab land and the best proof and symbol of Arab decay. Now the present manifestation of the same cultural identity quest, manifested as Islamic fundamentalism, ironically transcends the boundaries of the Arab world and divides the regimes of the region according to moderate or radical identities. Islamic fundamentalism may be ultimately dangerous for Israel, but it is also a source of division within the Arab world and can be very useful to Israel; it reinforces other positive developments such as the sharp decline in the capacity of the Arab world to use oil as a political weapon, the endless continuation of the Iran-Iraq war and the weakening of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Israel should not bask in this current favorable turn of events and assume that it can perpetuate its territorial annexations of the 1967 war. Such a stance would be a tragic error. One does not know on which side the time factor plays, and the situation is too volatile and too complex to allow predictions. In its regional environment, Israel has benefited from the weakening of its main opponents--Palestinians, Iraqis, Syrians, Libyans--but has also suffered from the growing fragility of its few cards in the Arab world. For Israel the future stability of its only Arab partner, Egypt, the risk of an Iranian victory over Iraq and the always-present danger of a Syrian military adventure represent the negative side of the current Arab crisis.

For Peres, who has undoubtedly found in the exercise of power a new sense of confidence, there will be a price to be imposed if Israel wants to turn the recent spectacular developments into lasting events. The current openings to Hassan and the Soviets are crucial to show the Israelis that there is a way out of the present stalemate. It is evident that a majority of Israelis are willing to risk exchanging the possibility of peace for the reality of control over the West Bank territories. For Israelis, who are enjoying the political game of leadership rotation and indulging in a narcissistic manner on themselves and on the meaning of democracy in a country confronted with the growth of intolerance and religious fanaticism, one conviction must prevail: L’enfer c’est les autres-- “Hell is the surrounding others, not the Israelis themselves.”

The key Israeli problem remains the absence of recognition within the Arab world, and it would be illusory to believe that the Palestinian problem can be eradicated, circumvented or neglected. In the long run, for Israel the risks of the present status quo are stronger than its comforts. The West should not draw false lessons from the Ifrane meeting. In a world dominated by passion and not reason, the alliance between moderates against radicals will not transcend the divisions between Israelis and Arabs.

Advertisement