Despite the Battering, SDI Deserves a Determined Effort

The Strategic Defense Initiative was developed to find out if emerging technologies could be used as a way of eliminating or significantly reducing the threat posed by nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. The plan was, and still is, to develop enough of a factual basis concerning the cost and effectiveness of a defense system to make an informed decision about whether to proceed with the next logical step--engineering development.

So why are we being inundated with editorial opinions expressing the point of view that SDI can’t work and will bankrupt us in the process? Granted, the program managers are thinking and talking about the initial phases of a possible evolutionary deployment. But isn’t it common sense to keep your eyes on your nearest destination even when you are planning a long trip? Analyzing the utility and difficulty of the early phase of an evolutionary process is logical, although admittedly difficult and even painful; compromises will be forced, priorities will be defined and inevitably additional abuse will be heaped on the program from the opponents as it gets closer to reality. The SDI management knew that, even before the teams of experts working on the program could complete their studies and make the detailed comparisons, the outside “experts” would pounce on any early concepts and declare them to be impossible or useless. They knew, however, that analyzing the possible evolution of any system was not only the responsible way to manage the program, but was absolutely necessary as well.

The most vigorous and persistent criticism has come from the group of “concerned” Soviet scientists who claim that their analysis has already shown the futility of the SDI, its potential for escalation of the arms race and its debilitating effect on the U.S. economy. We might believe that these Soviet scientists are truly concerned for the health and wealth of U.S. society and that their new-found altruism is just another manifestation of glasnost . A more likely possibility, however, is that they are rather happy with the status quo and rather uncomfortable about change--particularly change that might be spurred on by American advances in technology.

At a time when the United States is reluctant to match Moscow’s commitment to strategic offense, the Soviets continue to make large investments in developing and deploying means to protect themselves from air and missile attack. With no U.S.-deployed missile defense, the future possibility of Soviet strategic superiority is of increasing concern.

Yet SDI critics point to the 1972 anti-ballistic-missile treaty as a symbol of our commitment to deterrence, not through protection but through retaliation at lowered levels of offense. But the treaty has never provided the reductions in offensive forces that were fundamental to its acceptance. It is becoming less clear that our retaliatory forces and the ABM treaty will continue to deter lesser nuclear attacks, or non-nuclear forms of aggression, or the threats of the same.

Would it not be safer to create defenses to deny the military value of a preemptive strike, as well as provide us more protection than we now have? Would it not be wiser to create real doubt in the mind of an attacker as to the utility of an attack as well as to retain our emphasis on instilling fear of certain and effective retaliation?

Obviously this vision of deterrence based on a combination of offense and increasing defense applies to both the United States and the Soviet Union. If we agree to put aside the nuclear threat and move to greater reliance on protection, it is possible that the Soviets’ numerical advantage in conventional weapons could leave them with other military advantages. Here again we must call on our advancing technology to redress the conventional imbalance and allow us to shift to deterrence based on defense rather than means of retaliation or offense. Here again, SDI is providing rapidly emerging technology related to warning, information handling and computerized assistance in decision-making so vital to managing crises and maintaining peacetime conditions.

But why would Moscow negotiate mutually beneficial and verifiable agreements? There is no guarantee on this one, but history shows that the Soviets are far more reasonable when the United States is dealing from strength rather than weakness. What greater strength does the West have than that of its vigorous and rapidly changing technology driven by an open and competitive free world?

But does this technology really offer the leverage, or is it just a fanciful projection that might exist only in the distant future? Predicting the future of technology is often hardest for the people who are closest to the problem, because they see immediate barriers and tend to miss the answers that come unexpectedly from new directions. The recent advances in high-temperature superconductors are a splendid example of this. For SDI, many of these surprises have already happened since President Reagan’s speech in 1983, but the surprises have come not from beam weapons or missiles but out of the field of computers--the brains of any deployed SDI system--and the sensors--the eyes of the system. Indeed, the information revolution that began many years ago is propelling all of us into a new world of exponentiating and increasingly widespread knowledge. The key to a safer and more secure tomorrow is to harness the power of this knowledge to restore our long-term destiny to our own control.

I can’t predict with accuracy the outcome of the critical SDI experiments now under way, but I have to greet the predictions of definitive limitations with a high degree of skepticism. Many of the necessary elements of a defense system have already been shown to be feasible, and I am convinced that we can resolve the outstanding issues one way or the other with a vigorous program.

Obviously that comprehensive program will be expensive and will take time, but it will only cost more and take longer if we can’t develop a national consensus to pursue the program objectives in an orderly and consistent manner. SDI deserves a determined effort. It is the only logical thing to do.