White House Denies Role in S. Korea Compromise

The Reagan Administration, stressing that a lasting solution to the South Korean crisis must be “made in Korea,” on Monday publicly denied suggestions that the United States stage-managed a compromise between President Chun Doo Hwan and his political opponents.

The Administration was responding to widespread speculation that it had a hand in manipulating the political process in the troubled nation, where Roh Tae Woo, chairman of the ruling Democratic Justice Party whom Chun had chosen earlier as his successor as president, proposed to yield to the opposition on all of its main demands, including election of Chun’s successor by direct popular vote.

Roh’s unexpected announcement put an end, at least for now, to three weeks of turmoil provoked by student-led demonstrations for government reform. The White House and State Department welcomed Roh’s move, but its out-of-the-blue timing raised suspicions of direct U.S. involvement in the decision.

Proposals Hailed

White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater hailed Roh’s proposals as “very positive and forward-looking” and said that the United States would endorse “any process putting South Korea on the road to full-blown democracy.”

Assistant Secretary of State Gaston J. Sigur, who visited Seoul last week for a hasty round of talks with Chun, Roh and key opposition leaders, denied in a television interview that the Administration advocates “any one particular thing” and said that Koreans must “work out the details (of Roh’s plan) themselves.”

Nevertheless, Sigur called Roh’s announcement a “breakthrough” for a nation that has known only military rule since 1961, when Gen. Park Chung Hee seized power in a coup.

While emphasizing that any new political system must be “made in Korea,” State Department spokesman Charles E. Redman made it clear that Washington hopes President Chun will support Roh’s initiative. “We believe now is a good opportunity to break what Koreans have described (as) a sad cycle of confrontation and violence associated with political change . . . ,” Redman said.

U.S. officials have carefully refrained from any public claims of guiding the outcome of the political conflict. In private, however, they acknowledged that Washington had leaned heavily on Chun to offer a compromise, rather than try to force the opposition into compliance.

Benefits Stressed

One official, who spoke on condition that he not be identified, said heavy emphasis was placed on the benefits that have accrued from the close political, economic and military ties between the United States and the Korean people since World War II.

“The main point of the messages to Chun delivered personally and indirectly was that he could become a liability for us as well as his own country if he called out the army to crush dissent,” the official said.

“The two major talking points were the possible risk to the prosperity which has brought Korea into the ranks of the industrialized nations and the possibility that domestic strife could jeopardize the holding of the 1988 (Summer) Olympic Games in Seoul, something the whole country regards as the crowning of their new status.”

The source said that U.S. officials pointed out to the ruling party that it could still salvage its position even if it yielded on the issue of direct presidential elections, a process widely believed to favor an opposition victory.

“The ruling party was reminded that they could still hold the high ground if they campaigned on their economic record and the Olympics,” the official said. “It’s not a bad position.”