U.S. Sailing Into Perilous Waters in Gulf Reflagging

Sometime this month, a small flotilla of Kuwaiti oil tankers--”Philadelphia” freshly painted on their sterns and new American flags snapping from their masts--will steam toward the narrow Strait of Hormuz, escorted by battle-ready U.S. warships, and into the range of Iranian missiles and artillery.

The convoy, which is expected to be duplicated 10 or more times each month, will raise the U.S. military profile to new heights in the war-torn Persian Gulf, making American ships potential targets for Iranian gunners.

This dangerous situation, despite almost a year of U.S. planning, seems to be an outcome that no one in the Reagan Administration wanted or fully anticipated. Originally envisioned as a political gesture to repair relations with Kuwait and its Arab neighbors after the sale of U.S. arms to Iran, the program was blown out of proportion after a series of unexpected developments--most notably the attack on the Navy frigate Stark. The Stark was hit May 17 by two missiles fired from an Iraqi warplane, disabling the vessel and killing 37 sailors. Iraq apologized for the attack, calling it an accident.

“We’re in a position now where we never intended to be, in terms of profile,” an Administration official conceded recently.

Nevertheless, even critics of the policy concede that it has gone so far already that stopping it now might do more damage to national security than going ahead with it. The plan has taken on such symbolic importance that Washington would suffer a humiliating blow if it were to pull back.

Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has been scathing in his criticism of the Administration for its handling of the situation but conceded, “If the Administration abandons its commitment to Kuwait, U.S. credibility in the region . . . will suffer.”

The picture of the Kuwaiti reflagging program that emerges from interviews with Administration officials, congressional sources and non-government experts is one of repeated miscalculations touching all aspects of the plan. Like a gambler who doubles his bet after each loss in the hopes of getting even on the next throw of the dice, the Administration has responded to each setback by increasing the stakes.

Congress’ Reaction

Congress, which showed little interest in the plan before the attack on the Stark, responded to that incident in apocalyptic terms. Administration officials complain that the emotional reaction on Capitol Hill scuttled what otherwise would have been a low-risk success for U.S. military diplomacy. In response, lawmakers maintain that the Administration tried to hide from them the full scope of the program.

Under the plan, as it now stands, 11 Kuwaiti-owned ships will be re-registered as American ships and given American names. On paper, the vessels will be sold by Kuwait Oil Tanker Co. to Chesapeake Shipping Co. However, despite its American-sounding name and Dover, Del., address, all of the stock of Chesapeake is controlled by Kuwait through its ownership of its parent company, Santa Fe International Corp.

Although none of the tankers is ever expected to call at an American port, the documentation will show that their “home port” is Philadelphia, and the stern of each of the ships will carry the name of the Pennsylvania metropolis--which, coincidentally, was the ancient Greek name for Amman, Jordan.

Once the ships are flying the American flag, they will be entitled to the protection of the U.S. Navy. In anticipation of that task, the Navy has assembled an impressive task force, including the aircraft carrier Constellation, in and around the gulf. The refurbished World War II battleship Missouri is reportedly preparing to leave the West Coast for Persian Gulf duty.

Kuwait has been seeking some sort of protection for its oil shipments since last September, when Iran began to target Kuwaiti shipping in retaliation for Kuwait’s support for Iraq in the nearly seven-year-old Iran-Iraq War.

The danger to Kuwaiti vessels was real but not too severe. Since Iraq touched off a “tanker war” in 1984 by attacking Iranian ships, less than 1% of an estimated 26,000 voyages through the gulf have come under attack. Although ships have been hit and lives have been lost on both sides, not a single large merchant vessel has been sunk.

The Soviet Factor

Still, Kuwait appealed to the United States and the Soviet Union for help. Administration officials concede that one reason Washington agreed to protect Kuwaiti shipping was to prevent Moscow from becoming the tiny Arab nation’s only superpower patron. The Soviet Union allowed Kuwait to rent three Soviet tankers, accompanied by Soviet naval protection.

A State Department official said Kuwait asked last November to charter a few ships already flying the American flag, but suitable vessels were not available from U.S. companies. So, last December, Kuwait suggested reflagging ships it already owned.

A Pentagon official said Kuwait’s request was considered at the time to be “a simple, harmless thing” that could be handled without any increase in U.S. naval presence in the region. A State Department official said the Kuwaitis were told that, if their vessels were re-registered under the U.S. flag, the Navy would provide limited assistance, but “we can’t guarantee protection, and we certainly aren’t going to escort these ships.”

Moreover, the risk to the United States was considered to be slight. Richard W. Murphy, assistant secretary of state for Near East and South Asia affairs, said in May that it was impossible to know exactly what Iran will do but “there are numerous factors which suggest to us that they (Iranians) will not attack our naval ships or the American-flag ships.”

How Did It Escalate?

The “simple, harmless thing” of last winter became a perilous crisis by summer. How did it happen?

The story really starts with the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran--the first mistake, which may have made all of the others inevitable. When it was disclosed last November that Washington had supplied weapons to non-Arab Iran for use in its war against Arab Iraq, the impact on U.S. relations with such traditionally friendly Arab states as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and others was devastating.

In his first appearance on Capitol Hill after news of the Iran arms affair broke, Secretary of State George P. Shultz said Washington’s highest priority in the short run was to rebuild its credibility with its Arab friends.

Traditionally, the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and others was anchored by the sale of arms. But Congress, reacting to objections from Israel and its American supporters, has blocked several recent planned sales, including a proposed sale of Maverick missiles to Saudi Arabia that was withdrawn last month.

In Awkward Position

Given that background, Administration officials say, it would have been extremely awkward for the United States to turn down Kuwait’s request for tanker escorts.

“We recognized, we admitted, a mistake in dealing with Iran,” a senior Administration official said. “It hurt us in the gulf and made it harder to carry out our policy.”

A State Department official added that the gulf Arab states “were watching very closely to see if we had changed our policy (to favor Iran) or not.” He said it was important to reassure them that the policy was not changed.

Even so, when Kuwait first sought help from the United States, the Administration was noncommittal. It was only after it became clear that the Soviet Union was ready to participate that the United States made a firm offer.

Taken by Surprise

Some State Department officials believe that Kuwait miscalculated Moscow’s readiness to participate and was taken by surprise when the Soviets gave them an immediate “yes,” even offering to re-register up to five Kuwaiti tankers under the hammer-and-sickle flag.

These officials say Kuwait stopped short of accepting the full Soviet offer because it shared the concern of other gulf Arab states about giving Moscow a foothold in the region. Other experts believe that Kuwait, which often has tried to play one superpower off against the other, handled its end of the situation deftly.

As for the United States, however, there is little question that the Administration misjudged Soviet plans. Washington apparently was surprised when Kuwait turned to the Soviets and was surprised again when Moscow agreed. Once it was clear that the Soviets were firmly in the picture, the Administration changed its response to the Kuwaitis from “maybe” to “absolutely.”

A senior Arab diplomat said, “Once the Soviets agreed, there was no comeback for you (the United States) without abdicating your role as a superpower.” As one Pentagon official said, “It was clever of them (the Kuwaitis) to get the Soviets on board first.”

Key Tactical Error

The Administration seems to have committed another key tactical error by failing to take Congress and U.S. allies into its confidence at the outset. On the other hand, Congress and the allies were not much interested in the plan until the attack on the Stark dramatized the dangers facing warships in the gulf.

According to an official Administration chronology, the State Department did not notify the staff directors of the House and Senate Middle East subcommittees until March 12--well before the deal was final but two days after Kuwait had accepted in principle the U.S. offer to reflag the 11 ships. A week later, the State Department sent “classified talking points” concerning the deal to Capitol Hill.

Administration officials maintain that the congressional staff members thought the matter so insignificant that they failed to alert committee members. However, one Senate staffer said the March 19 talking points dealt with many aspects of the gulf situation but did not specifically raise the possibility of reflagging Kuwaiti ships.

A House staff member said the State Department “tried to put Congress to sleep.”

Misunderstandings Persist

Such Administration-Congress misunderstandings persist. Last Tuesday, Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, charged after a trip to the gulf that Kuwait was trying to expand the operation beyond the scope envisioned by the Administration.

Administration officials, insisting that there were no misunderstandings between the United States and Kuwait, disclosed details of the plan that had not previously been made public to support their rebuttal of Aspin. Although the new information did not change the situation substantially, the dispute showed that there are aspects of the plan that still have not been fully explained to Congress.

Regardless of which side was most at fault, the Administration’s failure to alert Congress of the full implications of the plan led directly to the often hysterical debate that followed the attack on the Stark.

Thomas McNaugher, a military analyst for the Brookings Institution in Washington, said the history of the Kuwaiti ship policy “can be divided into pre-Stark and post-Stark,” with the post-Stark phase titled “the impact of rhetoric on reality.”

Rhetoric Escalates

Faced by growing concern in Congress, the Administration escalated its rhetoric. President Reagan referred to the Strait of Hormuz, the tense passage at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, as the “choke point of the Free World’s oil flow,” and Murphy said the U.S. policy was designed to thwart “Iran’s hegemonistic plans for the gulf.” Other senior officials weighed in with similar remarks.

Administration officials said the U.S. policy was intended to defend the principle of free navigation and to ensure the continued flow of oil from the gulf region, though neither the freedom of the seas nor the petroleum trade was in much apparent danger.

Despite the tanker war, millions of barrels of oil are shipped through the gulf every day, and the United States imports only about 5.5% of its oil from the region. And the Chinese-made Silkworm anti-ship missiles Iran is ready to deploy at the Strait of Hormuz, often cited as a dangerous factor in the escort equation, have not been fired in anger.

Escape Route Cut Off

The inflated rhetoric could be written off as normal political hyperbole, were it not for the impact of the talk in the Middle East. By describing the situation in such graphic terms, Washington has virtually cut off its own escape route, should things deteriorate further. More important, however, the U.S. statements probably will make it more difficult for Iran to avoid a confrontation.

Despite its continuing hostility toward the United States, Iran has never attacked a ship flying the American flag, almost certainly because the cooler heads who usually control the Tehran government do not wish to pick a fight with the world’s largest navy. (On Thursday, an Iranian gunboat attacked an American-operated tanker with machine-gun fire and rocket-propelled grenades, but the ship was registered in Liberia.)

However, Washington’s own inflammatory language could strengthen the hand of radicals in Iran who are spoiling for a fight with the United States--”the great Satan,” in Iranian terms--even if they realize that Iran would ultimately get the worst of it.

“For some groups in Iran, it might be a godsend for the United States to attack Iran,” said Shireen T. Hunter, deputy director of the Middle East project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. Hunter, who was born in Iran, said radical factions would profit politically from a U.S.-Iran confrontation regardless of the military outcome.

Might Use Speedboat

“They might send the Revolutionary Guards in a speedboat loaded with explosives to hit an American ship or a Kuwaiti ship flying the American flag,” she said.

Other non-government specialists agreed that, although Iran lacks the conventional military punch to attack U.S. warships, there is a measurable danger from Iranian suicide attacks.

A senior Administration official said the Stark incident helped to focus Iran’s attention on the U.S. deal with Kuwait. He said Iran “had to take a tougher stand against U.S. involvement. At the same time, they’ve stated they see an opportunity as they did in Lebanon. Their incentive has increased.”

The official’s reference was to the suicide car-bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in October, 1983, which killed 241 Americans. Reagan ordered U.S. forces withdrawn from Lebanon shortly after the bombing. Radical factions in Iran have suggested that the United States might withdraw from the gulf--an outcome that virtually all parties in Iran say they support--if U.S. forces incurred major casualties.

Administration, congressional and non-government sources were virtually unanimous in their assessment that any Iranian retaliation against the United States would almost certainly come in the form of terrorist attacks, an arena in which Iran has the advantage, instead of frontal assaults on the enormously stronger U.S. Navy.

Staff writers James Gerstenzang, Michael Wines and Don Shannon contributed to this story.