Democracy, Not Contras, Is the Issue in Central America

A meeting that began in the White House reconvened in my office on the evening of March 18, 1986, less than 48 hours before the House of Representatives was scheduled to vote on President Reagan’s request for $100 million to aid the contras in their fight against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua.

The meeting was not going well. Administration officials objected to almost every proposal made by a bipartisan congressional group to condition the release of military aid on a good-faith effort toward a negotiated settlement of the conflict. As we broke for a vote in the House, Lt. Col. Oliver L. North walked across the room. “What’s the matter?” he asked plaintively. “Don’t you guys trust us?”

Although I was the chairman of the House intelligence oversight subcommittee, I was not aware of the secret efforts to aid the contras that were under way. I was aware that nine months earlier--in June, 1985--the President had pledged to me, in a letter that was crucial to winning congressional approval of $27 million in non-military aid to the contras, that his Administration was “determined to pursue political, not military, solutions in Central America.”

By early 1986 the evidence strongly suggested otherwise. Nevertheless, by the end of the year the President had his $100 million, unencumbered by any meaningful conditions. Hopes for a bipartisan policy toward Central America seemed at an end.

Thus when talks began in earnest three weeks ago between White House officials and Speaker Jim Wright (D-Tex.), aimed at precisely this goal, I approached them with a high degree of skepticism.

But the Speaker’s determination, at great political risk, to try to bring peace to this shattered region persuaded me that the dynamics of the situation might have changed enough to finally enable the two branches of government to unite behind a diplomatic effort.

To what extent the Reagan-Wright initiative served as a catalyst for the agreement reached by the five Central American presidents in Guatemala last Friday is of historical interest. But the U.S. document itself is now irrelevant.

The regional treaty calls for cease-fires, peace talks and amnesties to end regional wars. It also calls for a cutoff of outside aid to rebels, regular elections, political pluralism, press freedom and civil-rights guarantees.

All these things are now on the table in the Guatemala agreement. This is how it should be. For too long, U.S. policy has focused on Nicaragua and the contras. The broad issue is not Nicaragua, but democracy in Central America. To promote it requires something other than arming dissatisfied Nicaraguans.

A year ago, after the first Central American summit, I returned from visits to each of the five presidents convinced of two things: Any solution to the region’s conflicts must come from the Central Americans themselves; it could not be imposed by the Contadora Group or any other outside powers. And U.S. support for the four Central American democracies--Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras--is the key to our long-term security interests in the region.

The prime mover behind the present peace plan, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez, warned that democracy is not accomplished simply by free elections. But the Costa Rican experience shows that when there is security, social justice can be maintained. The message was clear: We must help the democracies make democracy pay off in social and economic ways, as well as politically.

The $300 million of extra economic aid approved by Congress earlier this year still does not bring us up to the levels recommended three years ago by the Kissinger Commission. The economic situation in Central America is a tragedy. The region really hasn’t recovered from the post-1979 recession prompted by the increase in oil prices. In the 1981-86 period all five of the countries had sharply negative growth rates. And the lack of security has prompted a vast capital outflow.

Aid can’t do the trick alone. There is a pressing need for investment and trade opportunities. But aid is important. A little cash goes a long way in the small economies of Central America, and it tells the people of the democracies that we are putting our money where our mouth is; we are truly supporting the cause of pluralism in our hemisphere.

There has been a great deal of talk about the four democracies succumbing to Nicaraguan pressures, and fear expressed that they might sign a treaty allowing the Sandinistas to consolidate their power. In my view this is a wholly irrational fear. All of these presidents are impressive, intelligent, thoughtful democrats. These men aren’t just mouthing traditional sentiments when they speak of democracy. Many of them and their friends paid dearly in earlier years for their advocacy of democracy and pluralism in the face of repressive military regimes.

At this critical juncture it is incumbent on the United States, as well as Cuba and other countries, to demonstrate a sincere commitment to a negotiated solution to the conflicts in Central America. Change won’t come overnight.

“I feel this is the beginning of a long road,” Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo said last week. “And why not say so? It has been a long path of violence and confrontation.”