The Last Seconds and Aftermath of Flight 498

Aug. 31, 1986

Aeromexico Flight 498, which began in Mexico City with stops at Guadalajara, Loreto and Tijuana, descended over Orange County in preparation for a landing at Los Angeles International Airport. The DC-9 jetliner was under the guidance of the Federal Aviation Administration’s Terminal Radar Approach Control facility (TRACON) at LAX. The plane was carrying a crew of six and 58 passengers.

Piper PA-28-181, a light plane piloted by businessman William K. Kramer, 53, was climbing after takeoff from Torrance Municipal Airport on a flight to Big Bear Lake. Kramer was not under FAA air traffic control. Kramer’s wife and daughter were with him.

11:47:28 a.m. Flight 498 contacted the L.A. TRACON, where controllers use radar to observe the planes from a windowless hangar.

11:47:40 Controller Walter R. C. White, 35, responded, making sure the pilot knew which runway to use.

11:47:46 Flight 498 answered affirmatively.

11:50:46 White warned Flight 498 of “traffic” (another light plane, not Kramer’s).

11:50:50 Flight 498 acknowledged the call.

11:51:04 White: “Aeromexico 498. Reduce speed to one niner zero, then descend and maintain 6,000 (feet).”

11:51:07 Flight 498: “One niner zero, and then descend and maintain 6,000.”

11:51:45 White: “Aeromexico 498, maintain your present speed.”

11:52:00 Flight 498 responded: “All right. We’ll maintain one niner zero.”

11:52:10 “Oh (expletive deleted), this can’t be!” Flight 498 pilot Capt. Arturo Valdez-Prom, 46, or co-pilot Jose Hector Valencia, 26, shouted as the jet and Kramer’s plane collided at approximately right angles over Cerritos at an altitude of about 6,500 feet.

11:52:18 White radioed runway approach instructions to Flight 498. No response.

11:52:32 Flight 498 slammed into the ground in a residential neighborhood in Cerritos, killing all those aboard. Fifteen people on the ground died in the inferno of flaming jet fuel. The wreckage of the light plane landed in a schoolyard a few blocks away. All three aboard Kramer’s plane were killed.

11:55:26 White made the last of nine futile attempts to reach Flight 498 by radio.

11:56:05 White called American Airlines Flight 333, the plane that had been following Aeromexico 498. White said, “Let me know if you see anything.”

11:56:26 AA Flight 333: “I see a, uh, very large smoke screen . . . emanating from the ground. . . . There’s another smoke column vertically overhead. It looks like . . . something smoked up ahead and then went down in. . . .”

9 p.m. National Transportation Safety Board investigators began arriving.

Sept. 1, 1986 NTSB investigators concluded that Kramer’s plane entered the restricted airspace around LAX--known as a Terminal Control Area, or TCA--without authorization and without an on-board transmitter that would have enabled a controller to read its altitude. White told investigators that he did not see the small plane on his screen.

Feb. 2, 1987 Another Aeromexico Flight 498 reported almost colliding with another light plane over Cerritos.

Feb. 12, 1987 The FAA announced that it had begun cracking down on pilots who stray into the TCA.

Feb. 25, 1987 The FAA said air traffic controllers in the Far West would undergo special “reinforcement” training to help them spot planes that may be headed for collision.

March 3, 1987 The FAA announced new routes for airliners approaching LAX that are designed to increase the separation between commercial traffic and light planes.

July 7, 1987 The NTSB concluded that the chief cause of the Aeromexico accident was the failure of the nation’s air traffic control system to adequately protect aircraft from collisions.

Aug. 12, 1987 A day after another near-collision--between an American Airlines jetliner and a private plane over Santa Monica--the FAA issued an emergency order dramatically curtailing freedom of small planes flying over the Los Angeles area.

Aug. 26, 1987 In its final report on the Aeromexico accident, the NTSB restated its conclusion that the “limitations of the air traffic control system to provide collision protection”--rather than the actions of any individuals--were the “probable cause” of the accident. The board concluded that although White did not see the small plane on his screen, its image did appear there. The board said distractions, White’s possibly unconscious assumption that the Piper was out of harm’s way or the lack of a strong, “primary” image on his screen--as opposed to the secondary, smaller, image that appeared there--may have caused White to “overlook” the Piper.