AFTER AMERICA SENDS REGRETS

In the wake of the destruction of Iran Air Flight 655, the situation in the Persian Gulf seems likely to deteriorate in the coming weeks and months. What, if anything, can the United States do to prevent such a development and advance its own interests in this region? Does U.S. policy sometimes provoke the very violence and instability it is supposed to deter? Moreover, given America’s earlier failures in the Middle East, even if a sensible policy is promulgated, is the U.S. government capable of implementing it in a coherent, disciplined fashion?

The United States has vital interests in the gulf that must be protected and advanced: access to oil supplies; the independence and territorial integrity of the gulf states; an end to the Iran-Iraq War without victor or vanquished, and preventing expansion of Soviet influence.

Since the fall of the shah, Washington has pursued these interests through a variety of diplomatic, military and economic means. Regardless of the apparent logic of each policy initiative at the time, none has met the central challenge to U.S. interests: the virulent anti-Americanism of the leaders of the Iranian Revolution.

Iranian hostility toward the United States has been politically and culturally institutionalized in the first decade of the Islamic Republic’s revolution. This hostility has been further reinforced by America’s gulf policy over the past year, culminating with the tragic deaths of 290 people aboard Iran Air Flight 655. Though the defensive action taken by the U.S. cruiser Vincennes was justified, the short-term result is a further escalation of tension between Washington and Tehran--which Iran’s most radical leaders will exploit to strengthen their domestic positions and achieve one of the revolution’s fundamental goals: eradication of U.S. influence in the gulf.

Tehran has pursued this objective indirectly and directly. For the past 10 years, the Arab states of the gulf have experienced Iranian-inspired terrorism, subversion, religious demonstrations and riots and attacks from Silkworm missiles and heavily armed speedboats. To date, Arab leaders have not been intimidated, due in part to a U.S. willingness to act militarily and assist in confronting Iranian threats.

Recently, signals emanating from Tehran suggest that the internal debate over the future of Iran’s foreign policy has intensified. This debate appears linked to Iran’s recent setbacks in the war with Iraq and renewed political maneuvering in anticipation of a succession struggle. Notwithstanding the initial strident calls for revenge issued by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and others, the ever-pragmatic Speaker of the Assembly, Ali Akhbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, seems intent on pursuing a diplomatic course aimed at reducing Iran’s international isolation while conducting a political offensive against the United States. The Iranians will probably use every available multilateral forum to generate pressure on Washington to withdraw from the gulf. Possible venues include the U.N. Security Council, the Islamic Conference and perhaps the Nonaligned Movement. While recognizing the futility of such efforts, Tehran can use the process to garner sympathy and break out of its international isolation.

Unable to confront the U.S. fleet directly, Tehran and its allies--Syria, Libya and the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah--will seek to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities through unconventional means. Based on bitter experience in 1980 and 1984, Americans must assume that the Iranian leadership will exploit the media and political divisions surrounding the U.S. presidential election and, as in Lebanon in 1984, prompt a unilateral withdrawal.

Whatever course the United States pursues, it is essential that America not allow itself to be forced out of the gulf. The fundamental coin of influence in the Middle East, for better or for worse, is the perceived willingness to use military means to protect national interests and the political endurance necessary to sustain a commitment. The loss of respect and the damage to vital interests that would result from a failure to sustain the military component of America’s gulf policy is immeasurable.

In light of this military reality, and faced with Iranian hostility, is it possible to promulgate a policy that advances U.S. interests while also undertaking initiatives designed to reduce tensions and eventually lead to a resumption of U.S.-Iranian relations? These objectives appear mutually exclusive. But living with contradictions is the rule in the Middle East, not the exception. It is therefore crucial for the United States to fashion a policy that engages Iran on the basis of mutual respect and shared interests--without betraying political or military weakness.

The essential ingredient missing from current policy is a diplomatic component to overcome Iranian hostility. Its geostrategic location (adjacent to both the Soviet Union and the gulf), large population (40 million people), oil and gas reserves and political influence argue for some form of relationship between Iran and the United States. Washington should use the tragedy of Flight 655 to reach out to Iran and try to begin a process that replaces hostility with a measure of understanding.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz recently acknowledged that Iran has asked for an authoritative dialogue and the U.S. government is prepared to talk. However, now is not the time to engage in a bilateral debate over the Iran-Iraq War or Tehran’s sponsorship of terrorism. Once current tensions subside, these subjects will be addressed. Instead, the first objective should be humanitarian: to reach agreement on means to prevent future accidental deaths of noncombatants.

To demonstrate its seriousness, the Reagan Administration should extend an apology, offer to pay compensation to the families of the victims of Flight 655 and propose an independent investigation to be conducted by a mutually acceptable international body. To the extent other subjects are addressed, Washington should express a genuine interest in understanding the Iranian revolution and the course of social change that has occurred. The United States must demonstrate an interest in the Iranian people, not just Iranian policy, however abhorrent, misguided or unfathomable Americans find it.

Washington’s next bilateral step should be to adopt a policy of genuine neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War. It is crucial to recall that the “tanker war” was initiated by Iraq, not Iran, to bring Western pressure to bear on Tehran to agree to end the war. Since the United States initiated its current policy in spring of 1987, the number of anti-ship attacks has increased substantially and neither side has been deterred from conducting attacks against neutral shipping.

Indeed, the Navy’s presence has enabled Iraq to escalate its campaign against Iranian shipping by shielding Iraqi shipping interests in the upper gulf. Iranian attacks on shipping in the lower gulf represent Tehran’s response to this strategy. U.S. naval officers have been entrusted with a straightforward military mission, protecting the right of innocent passage, in an environment rife with ambiguity. While maintaining the U.S. naval presence in the gulf, a different strategy for protecting the right of innocent passage must be devised.

Genuine neutrality might accomplish this objective if it included a determined effort to pressure Iraq as well as Iran to cease its attacks on gulf shipping. The United States alone, however, probably cannot achieve such a result; nor should it act unilaterally. The Soviet Union, European and Arab states can bring much influence to bear in Baghdad if they so choose.

A concerted effort by the United States to organize such a diplomatic campaign in the context of renewed efforts to end the war is likely to increase Iranian interest in opening dialogue. In this context, the United States should reassess the value of its policy that seeks to impose an international arms embargo on Iran, a quixotic effort that has failed to staunch the flow of arms to Iran, while reinforcing Iranian perceptions of U.S. support for Iraq.

The United States should begin working with the Security Council’s other permanent members to fashion an intensified international effort to end the war. This might include reinvigorating the secretary general’s mandate to engineer a cease-fire and initiate a diplomatic dialogue between the parties.

Finding a mechanism to settle the war peacefully may prove impossible. However, given the inclination of many U.N. members for an international conference to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, a comparable approach to settle the gulf war should be considered. The starting point should be reaffirmation of the parties’ interest in a cease-fire in return for an independent investigation of the causes of the war. Iran agreed to such a proposal in February and, given recent military setbacks, might be interested today.

The United States should pay special attention to the possible contribution the Soviet Union might make to any multilateral diplomacy. Moscow’s diplomatic inroads in the gulf are expanding. What better place to test Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s new-found interest in responsible international behavior? Though it may contradict a basic axiom of U.S. foreign policy, it appears to make sense to take advantage of Moscow’s influence in Iraq and Kuwait. Washington should offer to cooperate politically with the Soviet Union, encouraging its stake in a negotiated settlement war.

With only six months remaining of the Reagan presidency, many will be tempted to dismiss the feasibility of Ronald Reagan implementing this two-tiered policy. Yet the coming months are crucial to protecting U.S. interests in the gulf, and a decision to hand this problem over to the next Administration is not a realistic option.

As a result of a human tragedy, there is an obligation, not just an opportunity, for the U.S. government to reach out to the people of Iran and build a new relationship. Even if some pragmatists in Iran want a new relationship, the more radical elements can be counted upon to do all they can to undermine such an effort. It will therefore be incumbent on U.S. diplomats to tread carefully so as not to make more difficult what will already be a dangerous departure for those Iranians willing to talk directly with the United States.

The delicacy and timeliness of an U.S. initiative in the gulf cannot be exaggerated. Nor can its importance.