Bush Team Talks Cold War Tactics as Gorbachev Tries a New Contest

There are already disquieting indications that the review of U.S.-Soviet relations being conducted by the Bush Administration is based on a fundamental failure to understand the policies and goals of Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. It is apparent that the conventional wisdom in Washington has not grasped the historical transformation represented by Gorbachev’s revolutionary “new thinking”--especially as it relates to foreign policy. The opportunity to end the Cold War and stabilize U.S.-Soviet relations may be lost if Gorbachev fails and is replaced. Therefore, we should decide now to take measures within our power that can support his survival and success.

Leaders in the Bush Administration manifest a strange reluctance to give up the Cold War. They maintain that we should continue existing national securities policies--and treat Gorbachev’s initiatives with prudent skepticism. Caution is the watchword. The official U.S. analysis of recent developments in the Soviet Union asserts that Gorbachev has been temporarily forced to give up expansionist ambitions only because of the Reagan military buildup and the disastrous condition of the Soviet economy. It is observed that, while buying time, Gorbachev has mounted a vast “peace offensive,” to lull the West into lowering its guard. Soviet policies are viewed as tactical maneuvers.

If we “hang tough,” claims everyone from Secretary of State James A. Baker III to Democratic Sen. Bill Bradley of New Jersey, Gorbachev will be forced to make continuing concessions. The Bush team advocates a deliberate approach to future arms-control negotiations, especially those that might result in significant disarmament. The defense budget recently submitted to Congress contains no important changes from the Reagan budget. The major new weapon systems will continue to be produced and deployed. Discussions with North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies are not focused on plans for balanced mutual disarmament but, rather, weapons modernization and defense burden-sharing.

Bush Administration representatives tell our NATO allies they should not “rock the boat” with respect to trade and disarmament negotiations. But the boat is already rocking because NATO members, especially West Germany, have a different view of Gorbachev’s intentions and conduct. In fact, if the United States does not soon correct its course we may miss the boat entirely--both in Europe and the Soviet Union--with devastating repercussions.

An important failing in the U.S. estimate stems from insufficient attention to the roots of the “new thinking.” Gorbachev and his supporters reached the conclusion that Soviet society was being destroyed by the totalitarian structure of government created during the terror and tyranny of Josef Stalin and perpetuated by the corrupt, stagnant regime of Leonid I. Brezhnev. Soviet “new thinkers” are therefore determined to dismantle Stalinism in all its manifestations. The pursuit of this goal has already had far-reaching impact on Soviet action in foreign affairs, defense and human rights.

Gorbachev has ruled out war as a means of achieving political objectives. He has proposed an end of the Cold War based on joint measures to demilitarize our competition--including a first-phase 50% cut in nuclear and conventional forces implemented by intrusive on-site inspection to verify compliance. He has announced a unilateral 14% cut in defense spending and a reduction of 500,000 troops and 10,000 tanks to be completed in two years. Gorbachev has renounced schemes for Soviet expansionism based on military intervention and subversion. He advocates a joint ban on direct and indirect military intervention, including the use of proxy covert paramilitary forces, in Third World disputes.

Gorbachev has withdrawn Soviet forces from Afghanistan and has supported an agreement in Southern Africa that will result in 50,000 Cuban troops leaving Angola. He has backed an agreement to withdraw Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and initiated diplomatic action in the Middle East to promote a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. Soviet officials have proposed joint action with the United States to expose and block terrorism.

Gorbachev acknowledges that competition between different social systems is inevitable, but he says such competition should be limited to economic, political and ideological measures.

There have also been dramatic changes in Soviet human rights: Andrei D. Sakharov has become a free man, a champion of human liberty who sometimes criticizes Gorbachev but nonetheless supports him; almost all the political prisoners have been freed; Jewish immigration has increased substantially; religious freedom has grown with openings of churches, church schools, rabbinical training centers, freedom to study Hebrew and an end to harassment of churchgoers; divided families have been reunited; radio jamming has been terminated for all foreign broadcasts; there is greater freedom of travel to and from the Soviet Union; the legal system is being revised to protect citizens from arbitrary arrest and prosecution; the veil of secrecy has been lifted from many sectors of society, and glasnost has provided some genuine manifestations of press freedom.

All this represents a basic shift in Soviet policy that fulfills the goals set forth in the U.S. containment doctrine pursued throughout the Cold War. George F. Kennan, the doctrine’s author, recently wrote: “The last vestiges of the unique and nightmarish system of rule known as Stalinism are now disappearing. What we have before us is in many respects the freest period Russia has ever known . . . . Our first concern should be to remove, insofar as it lies within our power to do so, those features of American policy and practice that have their origins and their continuing rationale in outdated Cold War assumptions.”

Gorbachev is confronted with gigantic problems at home, including: an encrusted, decadent bureaucracy; a Communist Party weighted down with neo-Stalinists; an apathetic populace with limited incentive to work because the centralized economy produces so little to buy; growing restiveness among non-Russian nationalities and peoples of Eastern Europe, and members of the KGB and military who oppose policies of liberalization because they seem a threat to Soviet security. If Gorbachev stumbles there is a strong possibility that more conservative forces will move to replace him.

How can the United States help? First, President George Bush should adopt a more affirmative position with respect to Gorbachev’s overtures. The United States can provide some limited assistance by improving the terms of trade, by removing the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the trade bill and granting most-favored-nation tariff status (granted to China in 1980) and by approving export licenses for non-military advanced technology needed for Soviet consumer production.

But Gorbachev’s most pressing immediate need is to cut his defense budget by 50%. This would free about $140 billion and 2 million men for consumer production. In a few years, that should prime the pump of perestroika . But the United States would have to reciprocate with similar cuts. A matching $140 billion cut in the U.S. defense budget over four or five years would go a long way toward wiping out the federal deficit. It may turn out that the best way to accomplish this will be through reciprocal, verified unilateral cuts in military forces.

It is essential for us to recognize that the survival and success of Gorbachev is in the U.S. national interest and that those measures the Bush Administration can take to help him will, at the same time, also help advance U.S. security and prosperity.