Advertisement

Promise Replaces the Siege Mentality : Botha, in Meeting With Mandela, Gave Right the Cold Shoulder

Share
<i> Willem de Klerk is a professor of communications at Rand Afrikaans University. He also is the elder brother of South Africa's National Party leader Frederik W. de Klerk</i>

The reaction to the meeting between South African President Pieter W. Botha and jailed black leader Nelson Mandela can be measured four ways--suspicion, reservation, hope and exaggerated expectation.

Some are suspicious of the meeting because they see it as Botha’s revenge on the National Party and its leader, Frederik W. de Klerk, a way to complicate matters for them with white conservatives in the September national election. These critics believe that Botha is on an ego trip to regain prestige before his retirement.

The other suspicion is that the meeting is a political trick to win more support from the left for Botha’s National Party to appease the outside world, to stop sanctions and to make a meeting possible between President Bush and De Klerk.

Advertisement

There is also widespread suspicion that it is a trap for Mandela, designed to estrange him from his support and thus cause discord in the ranks of the African National Congress. Political agendas are always motivated by some self-interest. But I am convinced that all of the ulterior motives that I have summarized do not apply in this case.

The matter is too serious, Mandela is too strong and his position is so internationalized that the meeting did not take place by happenstance. Botha planned it with a positive purpose in mind.

The second reaction to the Mandela-Botha meeting is reservation. What was the precise content of the discussion? Was it purely formal courtesy? Has continuity been built into the discussion? Has progress really been made, and did Botha and Mandela interpret each other correctly? What mandate did they have? And what pressure can be expected from their respective power bases?

At this stage there are no precise answers. By all indications, however, the answers will be positive.

The third reaction, which is the dominant one, is that this meeting has created hope that a breakthrough can be achieved in the racial cul-de-sac in South Africa.

The eventual possibilities are promising: Further discussions with Mandela; contact with the ANC to discuss his release; inclusion of Mandela in pre-negotiations directed toward a post-apartheid political system; the lift of the ban on the ANC and the release of other political detainees; a lift of the state of emergency, and finally, the assurance that discussions will include leaders of all interested black factions.

Advertisement

The first step in the process has been taken, but exaggerated expectations are not appropriate. Expectations that Mandela will be released within weeks are euphoric and boil down to wishful thinking.

Dramatic movement will depend mainly on two things: The National Party’s purposefulness and the rate at which it moves ahead and stays on its course; and the ANC’s willingness to make compromises and participate in the process of transitional politics.

I am not surprised that the meeting took place. It was an essential component of the strategy to bring about negotiation. It was also a component of the new spirit of reconciliation in southern Africa.

Progress has indeed been made. The meeting will have a moderating impact on the national elections. The government now can hardly cite the ANC as enemy No. 1. As a result of this meeting, rightist movements in politics have finally received the cold shoulder from the government. The election agenda can now revolve around important and essential issues instead of the siege mentality once promoted by Botha.

Blacks and whites interested in the social and political health of South Africa would be very wise to help promote the peaceful process that has started.

Advertisement