Renewal of Japanese Politics Needs Shifts Inside Parties

By voting against the Liberal Democratic Party in the recent upper house election, Japanese citizens confirmed that their nation is in fact a democracy. Whether or not this LDP defeat will lead to a transformation of the political system will depend on how political leaders act in the next several months. At least three scenarios are possible.

One outcome is a fundamental realignment of party politics. For this to happen, the Japan Socialist Party will need to change. Takako Doi’s party made impressive electoral gains by riding a wave of popular dissatisfaction with the Liberal Democrats and by mobilizing the support of women. To consolidate this support, Doi will have to demonstrate that her party is capable of governing. This would involve modifying its foreign-policy position of unarmed neutrality and recognizing the U.S.-Japanese alliance.

The Japan Socialist Party will also have to shed its Marxist doctrines and develop a more realistic approach to public-policy issues. While abolishing the consumption tax may be popular now, the party will have to develop a sensible tax reform plan that will cover the growing costs of social programs. Similarly, the party will have to go beyond simply opposing agricultural liberalization and develop its own strategy for dealing with the nation’s trade surplus.

These steps will be critical in forging a workable coalition with the centrist Democratic Socialist Party and Komeito, the Clean Government Party, whose cooperation will be necessary if the Socialists want to assume power.

Although skeptics will question the JSP’s ability to transform itself, the historic opening posed by the Liberal Democrats’ recent setback could compel the Socialists to make the change. Doi’s statements after the election indicate a flexible posture and a keen awareness of the task at hand. Her personal role in the party victory should increase her leverage against ideological die-hards within the party.

Furthermore, Rengo, the national federation of private-sector labor unions, will facilitate the process of Socialist transformation. It succeeded in electing 11 of the 12 candidates it fielded. The federation was formed in 1987 to overcome the fragmentation of the labor movement and to give workers a greater voice in the policy process. This fall Rengo plans to unite with the unions representing public employees. Its leadership is committed to bringing the opposition parties together to form a united progressive force.

Now that the Liberal Democratic Party has lost its majority in the upper house, a united opposition would force the party to dissolve the more powerful lower house later this year and hand the conservatives another electoral defeat. That would give birth to Japan’s first social democratic government since the late 1940s.

Another scenario is that the Socialists miss the current opportunity and the Liberal Democrats respond imaginatively instead. If the Socialists fail to change, the public will view them as irresponsible and unrealistic, and the current boom will soon fade. This would give the Liberal Democrats a chance to revitalize the party by putting forth an attractive leadership, by moving decisively on political reform and by adopting policies to distribute more widely and equitably the fruits of economic success. The probable selection of Toshiki Kaifu as party president and prime minister indicates that the Liberal Democrats are already moving in this direction. A reinvigorated LDP would then be able to sustain its control over the lower house during the next election.

Such a revival, however, would still mean that the Liberal Democrats would not recover a majority in the upper house for at least six years. Consequently, the party will have to work with the opposition. This may involve bringing one or more of the centrist parties into a coalition government or working with them in guiding legislation through the Diet. The Liberal Democrats already have had some experience with this. During the 1970s, a razor-thin majority in the Diet forced the LDP to cooperate with the opposition parties in getting the budget and major bills passed. And from 1983 to 1986, the party formed a coalition with the New Liberal Club.

Finally, there is the possibility that neither the left nor the right will respond decisively and Japan will become plagued by weak and unstable governments. Although this scenario cannot be ruled out, it is the least likely to happen. Ideological polarization has declined over the years, and social conflict is well within manageable bounds. The dynamism of the economy makes the task of political restructuring easier. At the same time, the challenges posed by the international environment are acute enough to persuade Japan’s political leaders of the need to overcome the current crisis as soon as possible.

What are the implications for U.S.-Japanese relations? While the concerns of American officials are understandable, the fluidity in Japanese politics could ultimately strengthen the trans-Pacific alliance. A government led by either a transformed Japan Socialist Party or a revitalized Liberal Democratic Party will be more supportive of consumer and worker interests. This will help alleviate bilateral economic tensions by restraining Japan’s export drive and by making less salient the issue of agricultural liberalization.