The Chimera of a United Spanish America : Latin America: If Europeans can trade their nationalist impulses for economic success, why can’t Latin Americans? Ask Simon Bolivar.

1992 is not just the magic number for Europe’s integration. At a meeting in Peru last month, seven Latin American presidents agreed that their region would have to achieve greater integration before 1992 if it is to achieve economic development.

Significantly, for the first time these leaders no longer placed all the blame for their problems on the United States and other industrialized nations. This was encouraging, for the habit of accusing outsiders impedes solving home-bred problems that stand in the way of development.

What remains uncertain is whether Latin America can integrate.

The yearning is not new. In 1830, Latin America’s most distinguished hero, Simon Bolivar, died realizing that his goal to unify Spanish America had been an absurd dream. Bolivar was ahead of his time. He understood that as long as Latin America remained divided by parochial concerns, its enemies would have all the advantages. The problem with revolutionary Spanish America, “The Liberator” observed, was that its politicians, blinded by self-interest, were unable to appreciate that to be independent they first had to unite.

Is Bolivar’s dream realizable all these years after his death? In the immediate future, no; in the long run, maybe.

Many thoughtful Latin Americans have fixed their attention on Europe, hoping that integration, the strategy that helped it regain its economic strength, offers a model for coping with their extraordinary burdens of debt, inflation, unemployment and tremendous disparity in the distribution of wealth. The dream is tempting, but it could turn into a nightmare if Latin America, in its enthusiasm to see parallels with Europe, forgets the distinctions.

Necessity is often a powerful stimulus. It is questionable that Western Europe would have attempted to abrade the many barriers that for centuries had divided its citizens if it had not experienced two world wars and a cold war. But not even necessity backed by desire will achieve change; the appropriate conditions must also be present.

The original members of the European Economic Community were pluralistic societies led by highly competent politicians and bureaucrats who believed that Western Europe’s way of life was special, and that in order to contain communism, leaders had to subordinate their differences. They also believed that integration would bring about mutual economic benefits.

In addition to the presence of the right conditions, integration must start with the right mechanism.

In 1950, France’s foreign minister, Robert Schuman, proposed the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. His choice was deliberate. Germany would no longer have superior strength in coal, steel and heavy industry to wage war on its neighbors--particularly France.

The success of that community had a spill-over effect, first in food and consumer goods. The Common Market was established in 1958, and the rest is history.

As 1992 approaches, we see a Western Europe better off and more united than ever before. But it is not the type of Europe envisioned originally by the fathers of integration. Its members have yet to concede to a common currency, central bank or security policy, or to a European Parliament with supranational power.

These shortcomings ought not to discourage Latin Americans, for they simply reflect ideals, and ideals are rarely within the grasp of humans. But the question remains: Can Latin America achieve some level of integration that would provide a better world to present and future generations?

What must be recognized first is that Latin America is not a region linked by a common set of cultural bonds. A porteno from Buenos Aires would scoff at the idea that he and his counterpart in Bogota have similar cultural roots. The Bolivian from the altiplano has a vision of reality that is totally foreign to a native of Brazil’s Amazon delta. Similar disparities become apparent if one compares a Guatemalan with a Peruvian, a Paraguayan with a Chilean, and so on.

These differences would not be exceedingly difficult to subdue if these countries had visionary leadership backed by competent political elites. The sad truth is that their leadership is preoccupied with political survival.

In the past few years we have seen Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Peru and Uruguay give democracy one more chance. But it is too early to conclude that democracy is here to stay. Furthermore, in none of these countries is the president backed by politicians and bureaucrats capable of viewing problems in a context other than their immediate parochial interests.

The difficulties are compounded in Central American states. With the exception of Costa Rica, these countries are light years away from being pluralistic societies. Their power elites are simply not capable of imagining what might be gained if they relinquished control to a supranational organization, even on a relatively innocuous matter.

On top of these barriers to integration, one must add the starkest of all problems: economic inequality.

Western Europe achieved what it did largely because each of the initial members of the Common Market could depend on a solid economic and social structure developed after years of industrialization. Latin America does not have this advantage.

The economies of many of its countries, particularly in Central America, are based on agriculture. And in those states where industrialization has flourished, such as Mexico and Brazil, and to a lesser extent, Chile, Colombia and Argentina, only a minority of the population has enjoyed the fruits of an industrial society.

It is wrong to measure one’s chances for success by focusing entirely on the past performances of others. Great things often happen when men and women decide not to be the prisoners of history. But the history of others can sometimes help one anticipate and overcome the obstacles ahead when one embarks on a new venture. Latin America in the 1980s does not resemble Western Europe in the 1950s.

Unless Latin America’s leaders acknowledge and compensate for the tremendous disadvantages that plague their countries, disintegration rather than integration could lie at the end of the tunnel. These leaders could find themselves asking, as Simon Bolivar did on his deathbed: Is there any way out of this labyrinth?