Why Are We in the Persian Gulf? : U.S. is there for one reason and one reason only

An anonymous Defense Department source is widely quoted as saying that contingency plans for the Persian Gulf “could result in the insertion of up to 200,000 to 250,000 (U.S.) ground forces before it’s all done.” He goes on to warn that if American troops must do battle, it could lead to “warfare on a scale we haven’t seen since World War II.” These are sobering, not to say mind-boggling thoughts. Before they gain too much currency, it would be a good idea to freeze the frame and take a clear and realistic look at just what’s being talked about.

No doubt Pentagon files do contain contingency plans for intervention on such a massive scale, probably dating back to President Carter’s promise in 1979 to defend the Persian Gulf’s oil supplies against outside--at that time meaning Soviet--aggression. But a contingency plan is just that, something the Pentagon routinely prepares in anticipation of plausible military requirements. A contingency plan is not a policy.

Predictions about world events are best avoided, especially in an area as volatile as the gulf, but here’s one anyway: Hundreds of thousands of American fighting men are not going to be put into the ferociously hostile environment of Saudi Arabia. That won’t happen because (1) Congress would refuse to approve such a commitment; (2) the American people wouldn’t support it; (3) the Saudis would not invite or tolerate it; (4) probably no senior military official would propose it, and finally, (5) President Bush, if for no other reason than that he faces reelection in 1992, would not request it.

The President, for sound reasons, doesn’t want to reveal his military options to Iraq; keeping an opponent guessing is a tactic as old as warfare itself. But Bush, who has so far played this crisis well, also has to be concerned about retaining public understanding and support for what he is trying to do. That support can fade very quickly under the impact of horror stories suggesting that 250,000 American troops could be sent to fight a long and brutal desert war.

The President owes it to the American people to keep his policy clear, to explain it often and to prevent the challenge that is faced from being distorted. The Iraqi regime is ruthless and commands a large army with numerous weapons. But Iraq is not the military giant of popular impression. As one commentator put it so well, mowing down waves of suicidal Iranian teen-agers is one thing. Confronting a superpower like the United States is something else.

Bush and his advisers ought to be making clear that the Arabian oil fields can be defended without involving American troops in an open-ended land war in the Persian Gulf. The key to defending Saudi Arabia and nearby smaller states is air and naval power. The United States has undoubted superiority in both areas; add the contributions coming from Britain, France, Australia, Canada and other maritime countries, and that superiority becomes overwhelming. There should be no hesitation in using this power not just to deter and repel, but to relentlessly punish any new Iraqi attack that would threaten vital world oil supplies. There need be no reluctance to use it to enforce the U.N.-sanctioned embargo of Iraq until Baghdad ends its occupation of Kuwait.

Each day makes it more evident how disastrously Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein misjudged the consequences of his aggression. Now his political isolation seems to have deepened even further. A dozen states of the 21-member Arab League have agreed to send military forces, the nature of which have yet to be decided, to support Saudi Arabia. That expressed intention by itself represents something of a watershed in inter-Arab relations. If it is acted upon, it promises to be a political event of singular importance.