With Its Strategy in Jeopardy, the White House Should Wait It Out : Policy: Bush blunders by ordering more troops to the gulf. The nation now must debate what our aim there should be.

By ordering an additional 200,000 troops to the Saudi desert, President Bush has committed his first major blunder in the Persian Gulf crisis. But he has also done the nation a favor. It must now debate, and it should reject, the folly of making war against Iraq.

Until now, Bush’s strategy has been almost letter-perfect. U.S. military forces have vitiated the possibility of further Iraqi aggression. The current U.S. military buildup has shown Iraq that the United States means business and shown potential violators of the blockade that Washington could pursue a military alternative. And the remarkable coalition of states that Bush has cobbled together has blunted Saddam Hussein’s attempt to redefine the crisis from “Iraq against the world” to “Arab champion against ‘imperialists and Zionists.’ ”

Bush’s strategy reflects the most concentrated effort at psychological warfare in U.S. history. But his decision to deploy more troops has put the strategy in jeopardy.

This is not the Cold War, when U.S. debates on the use of military power were in fact limited to the tactics of implementing a settled policy of containment. Now the American people rightly question basic goals and worry that the true “peace dividend”--lowered tensions--will disappear in a conflict that does not seem critical to their lives.

Actually, the U.S. goal of reversing Iraq’s aggression is sound. If Iraq prevails, it will be politically pre-eminent in the Persian Gulf, U.S. credibility in the region will suffer and the rest of the world will be less confident about either the price or the supply of oil. But for the American people, nurtured on principle, not Realpolitik, this is not the stuff of which major wars are made,

By taking the nation beyond the bounds of its inherent trust of presidential judgment, Bush is undermining his most precious asset in the crisis--firm bipartisan support. This act is especially questionable because, given time, Iraq will be defeated by the embargo. It is totally surrounded by countries that do not wish it well. It is denied the $3 billion a month on which its economy depends. And the efforts of any nation to evade the embargo could be countered with sea and air power by the United States, acting on its own.

There are only two reasons to question the blockade’s eventual success: the impact of high oil prices on the world economy, which could weaken the resolve of other nations, and uncertainty about U.S. patience. Yet the price of oil has now peaked and should turn downward. Saudi Arabia and other producers have virtually made up the shortfall from the loss of Iraqi and Kuwaiti exports and the price is only being sustained by panic buying--fueled by war fears--that has led to unprecedented global stockpiling.

Doubts about U.S. patience also have little foundation. A nation that out-waited the Soviet Union for more than 40 years, at extraordinary cost, can surely be patient for 40 weeks or so--if it takes that long--until the dictator of a small state sues for terms. If the morale of U.S. troops is at issue, they can be reduced, at no risk to the blockade. Indeed, Bush can now rescind his order to increase troops; he would be politically embarrassed, but eventual U.S. success would in no way be blunted.

The costs of war must also be counted. Proponents of limiting conflict to U.S. air strikes cannot explain how Iraqi forces, which fought eight years against Iran, will collapse without the United States’ engaging in ground combat and taking heavy casualties. The U.S. war party assumes that Saddam Hussein will sit placidly by as the United States pounds his country, instead of taking actions to shatter the anti-Iraq coalition. These could include a provocation at Mecca--and Hussein has already claimed that U.S. forces occupy that holiest Muslim city--or dragging Israel into the war, even without attacking it directly.

Indeed, a Sarajevo is waiting to happen, and Jordan’s King Hussein is the obvious Archduke Ferdinand. His death would be likely to plunge Jordan into civil war, pulling in an Israel that cannot countenance a hostile power on its eastern flank.

The U.S. war party has only one valid argument against waiting for the embargo, inevitably, to work: that Saddam Hussein will somehow slip away and continue developing his weapons of mass destruction. The goal of keeping Iraq from getting nuclear arms is not in doubt, only the wisdom of war and the deaths of young Americans to achieve it.

There is also precedent: If war is the only means to prevent the spread of the bomb, then there will be little hope for peace in much of the world.

Trammeling the Iraqi arsenal should instead be part of the embargo strategy, as well as a key element of a major, comprehensive effort to move the Middle East decisively beyond its endemic conflicts and instability. In the process, if preventing the development of an Iraqi bomb also means bargaining away an Israeli bomb, so be it--provided that Israel’s legitimate security fears are also resolved and its place, at peace, in the Middle East is assured.

Because of confusion, U.S. debate about war has often degenerated into partisan controversy. There is no excuse this time because three propositions are clear: Eventually, the blockade will force Iraq out of Kuwait; war will bring more costs than benefits, and a combination of pressures and diplomacy can stop the spread of the bomb--provided the world does not again ignore the imperatives of Middle East security.

This is the message that President Bush must present to the American people, instead of ambiguities and uncertainties that are polarizing the nation.