Vytautas Landsbergis : Navigating Through Treacherous Shoals for Lithuania’s Independence

It is amateur time in Eastern Europe, and Vytautas Landsbergis, the 58-year-old puckish president of Lithuania, is no exception. His area of expertise is not administrative law but the music of turn-of-the-century Lithuanian composer Mikalojus Ciurlionis, and he has said that he is not happy in the corridors of power unless there is a piano nearby.

Dwarfed by stout bodyguards and aides, the former music professor often seemed lost in his crowded entourage as he pursued a hectic 10-day tour of the United States--encompassing everything from a meeting with President George Bush at the White House to breaking bread with adoring members of the Lithuanian exile community of Santa Monica.

But appearances aside, Landsbergis was born to the role of militant Lithuanian nationalist. His family genealogy is peppered with well-known opponents of both czarist and Soviet power over his nation of 3.7 million people, 80% of whom are Lithuanians. “He is guided by a single motivating idea--the freedom of Lithuania,” says his wife, Grazyna, ever at his side during this tour. Others have been more critical--including his former prime minister, Kazimiera Prunskiene, who broke with the president earlier this year, charging he was too inflexible in his dealings with the Kremlin and unwilling to support necessary economic reforms.

Landsbergis’ tough line has put Lithuania at the forefront of the independence movement at a time when a majority of the Soviet republics are moving toward a greater measure of unity. Yet recent elections have demonstrated that he remains highly popular within Lithuania, and there is every reason to expect Landsbergis to keep upping the ante in his battles with Moscow.

During a recent conversation, Landsbergis made it quite clear that he is for intensifying the pressure on the Soviet leadership to get out of Lithuania and indicated his obvious displeasure with what he judges to be Bush’s timid performance in this area. He punctuated this statement with a pull on his goatee, a professorial mannerism he frequently used for emphasis.

Question: You just met with the President. Has the Administration given you the backing you sought?

Answer: The major opportunity was missed unfortunately on March 11 of last year, when Lithuania declared its independence and the Administration of the United States remained passive.

Q: What should the U.S. have done?

A: Restore diplomatic relationships (with the Baltic Republics); instead the response was assistance to the Soviet Union.

Q: Clearly, there is a difference in perspective between you and the Bush Administration over how things are going with the Soviet Union. During your visit, President Bush paid tribute to Gorbachev as the creator of glasnost and perestroika.

A: Because they are used to Mr. Gorbachev, to the existing situation, and changes would require a significant adjustment--which they might not be prepared to make.

Q: Is it also possible that the agendas are not the same. That the United States has an interest in arms control and all kinds of negotiations with the Soviet Union going on in different areas and that they feel that they can deal with Gorbachev.

A: If the United States thinks that maintaining the Soviet communist empire is useful, then they are making a very large mistake.

Q: Did you tell President Bush this?

A: No. Perhaps he wouldn’t say that he wants to have the communists. But sometimes his is a reaction of those afraid of change. They would like to freeze change and revolution.

Q: But one problem always in the world is you have small countries and they have their agendas and you have big countries and they different ones. Is this not a classic situation in which your agenda is not the same as that of the United States?

A: It is not necessarily that they have their own plans or agendas but a different set of experiences. The U.S. has never been contested, was never forced to live not according to its own principals and has never sensed the oppression of a foreign force. That, of course, always makes it easier to determine the price of freedom. There was a time in the United States history, 200 years ago, which was very similar to the situation (in Lithuania) today. But now the United States is not fighting for freedom--they do business.

Q: Are we moving to a point where you expect to see more results from the U.S.?

A: Slowly cooperation between the United States and Lithuania is occurring now, so there is some positive movement. Those cooperations are not only occurring in the private sector but also with the sanctions of the government. But the government of the United States seems to be reluctant in such participation and they are very afraid as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. Although, there appear to be many different points of view in the United States with regard to the cooperation with the Soviet Union and politics to a certain extent. That it is very important to strongly put pressure on the Soviet Union--which was in fact done by President Reagan.

Q: Are you suggesting that President Bush is not as strong as Reagan on this?

A: I do not know whether President Bush really believes in what Mr. Gorbachev says, but his acceptance of Gorbachev’s promises suggest that he does.

Q: More so then President Reagan?

A: More so then President Reagan. I believe that President Reagan did not believe any promises made (by the Soviets). He was talking about that very openly, whereas President Bush is not saying that. When Gorbachev says to Bush that he will not use his army forces in Lithuania, President Bush seems to accept it as a given fact and believes that thereby he has defended the cause of the Lithuanians. But when Gorbachev breaks those words, those promises, the relation seems to get worse until the next promise. Then he says how nice it is that Gorbachev promised not to do this any more. Lithuania is one small country.

Q: You have said of President Bush that his support of Lithuania is very tough at first and then diminishes.

A: I have said that there are times when the United States gives a very strong statement against annexation--but these are false . . . . The United States must be consistent and act, do something.

Q: Recently, Gorbachev has been successful in working out an agreement with the leaders of nine republics including (Russian President Boris) Yeltsin. Does that leave the Baltic states, Georgia and Armenia a bit more isolated?

A: It may be that this way he has created a possibility for the Baltic countries to separate, to remain stable, to save face. Now the Soviet Union does as they want. It’s one of the possibilities.

Q: If there is a way out, and there is a new union of the nine, what kind of relations would the nine have to the others?

A: These relations would be the same as with foreign countries. It would be normal. But, we don’t trust very much. At the same time they (the Kremlin) are continuing the violent actions.

Q: So, in a way, this agreement has made it more difficult for you? If, however, there is a new union of the nine, do you envision a situation where Lithuania would have a special relation or would it just be another independent country?

A: It could be either way. It could be that the Soviet Union would like to retaliate and create economic hardships for these republics by this action, forcing them to regret their actions.

Q: Let me ask you about the economic situation. Your former prime minster, Kazimiera Prunskiene, who at the time had high approval ratings, introduced some economic reforms that were unpopular--price increases, so forth. Her argument at the time was that she took the unpopular but necessary step to raise prices and she was not supported by the group you led. She resigned in part over this.

A: The existing prime minister also raised the prices. That is always, in any country, an unpopular step. Her method was different though. Raising prices without implementing compensation was strange . . . . They knew that the Soviets were preparing for aggression and they wanted to exploit that unrest because they knew that the price raising would create a great deal of instability.

Q: She also criticized you for being too hard in your negotiating position vis-a-vis Gorbachev.

A: Right now the most difficult and the most responsible steps are being taken and are being made with my personal input. As far as flexibility and negotiating go with Gorbachev, we are frequently confronted with that situation. Their position is that we are a constituent republic and if we want to separate we must go the way that involves Soviet loyalty. The Soviets feel that annexation obligates us in their constitution. We adopted our own constitution and declarations and believe that no other constitution is valid. I think there seems to be the desire to create the opinion that I am not suitable as a negotiator with Gorbachev--but that is only talk.

Q: Who should Bush listen to? When you were in Washington, you came out against extending agricultural credits to the Soviet Union while, at the same time, (former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard) Shevardnadze was in Washington and he urged extending credits.

A: He is looking for benefit of the Soviet Union. That’s what Gorbachev wants. If he gets the credits without any conditions or obligations, then he will roll up his sleeves and start hitting us again.

Q: But if you are President Bush and you have advice from the president of Lithuania and from Shevardnadze--seen here now as a reformer, as a person who was willing to be critical of Soviet leadership--how do you decide who to listen to? What is your assessment of Shevardnadze? Do you see him concerned with Georgian independence or reform, a democrat?

A: Not too much. No, they cannot be democrats.

Q: Who is the “they?”

A: The more progressive Gorbachev people who view themselves as now removed--they cannot be democrats.

Q: Why?

A: Because they were brought up in a system that was essentially undemocratic.

Q: So was Yeltsin.

A: So far, Yeltsin is able do that, and we are hopeful that he will remain with us.

Q: But you don’t see Shevardnadze playing a similar role?

A: No.

Q: Why not?

A: Because he has a completely different position and a completely different function. He is not fighting, he is not struggling, he’s helping Gorbachev.

Q: So you’re saying even a Yeltsin has to be looked upon with some suspicion because he is of the old system.

A: That is true, but you have to remember that the same system was trampling on him. The situation is really more complicated than it may appear from the outside. It is true that many participated and grew within the communist system and the party has had marks on the thinking of these people today. But it depends on the values of the individual. For example, my three top advisers were members of the Communist Party, but I trust them. They are not Communists in their thinking, in their ideology.

Q: Is there any last word for the President, what would you like him to do in the next month?

A: He should call Gorbachev and tell him the time has come to take the armies out of the occupied countries. That is all.