The Cost of Good Intentions : U.S. gave generously to Saddam, then reaped ‘benefit’: war

Throughout most of the 1980s the U.S. government was Iraq’s secret and generous patron, providing access to an abundance of aid and indirectly contributing to Saddam Hussein’s massive and threatening military buildup. As documents obtained by The Times make clear, George Bush, first as vice president in Ronald Reagan’s Administration and later as President, was a major participant in this process.

The national interest rationale underlying these pro-Iraq activities was the perceived need to forestall a victory by Iran in the eight-year-long Persian Gulf war. Many in the Reagan Administration were concerned that if Iran triumphed, it would become the dominant power in the Gulf for decades to come. In such a position it could put great pressures on the oil-producing states of the Arabian Peninsula to do its bidding, even as it moved to expand its anti-Western radical Islamic doctrine throughout the region. This was a proper strategic concern.

In responding to it by tilting toward Iraq with an excess of enthusiasm, however, the Reagan Administration heedlessly disregarded future political consequences. Documents obtained by The Times, and described in a three-part series by reporters Douglas Frantz and Murray Waas, indicate that Bush was often the eager point man in overriding certain objections within the Reagan Administration to the policy of all-out support for Iraq.

It seems by no means inconceivable, especially in light of what has since become known of Saddam Hussein’s meeting with U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie just a week before his invasion of Kuwait, that the Iraqi dictator may have interpreted these signs of American friendliness as an indication that Washington would do little to actively respond to the aggression he was planning.

The helpful hand extended to Iraq has been costly. Despite clear warnings about Iraq’s credit-worthiness and evidence of improprieties in Baghdad’s handling of commodity credits, the Reagan Administration pushed ahead with loan guarantees for purchases of American farm products. When Iraq halted payments on its commodities debt in August, 1990, U.S. taxpayers were stuck with a $2-billion bill.

The commodity loans allowed Hussein to use his cash reserves on a huge arms acquisition program, including the pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. The United States, by giving Iraq access to some dual-use high technology, also unintentionally aided the development of its nuclear and chemical weapons programs.

In the end, of course, this largess did nothing to restrain Hussein’s aggressiveness toward his neighbors, or temper his regime’s domestic brutalities.

In the aftermath of The Times’ series, the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee is preparing to hold hearings into U.S. policy toward Iraq in the 1980s. The issue demands a thorough airing. At the same time care must be taken not to compromise the seriousness of this inquiry with a lot of partisan baggage. The chief purpose of the hearings should be to identify where policy mistakes were made, and why. The chief goal should be to prevent them from recurring.