U.S. Insists on Control of Its Troops

In the case of Somalia, the Pentagon once again has won a fight to ensure that an American commands United Nations troops sent into a hostile environment. But America’s insistence on exercising full control of such operations is running into growing international opposition.

With Washington hoping to scale back its role as the world’s policeman and with U.N. peacekeeping actions now on the rise, the United Nations is facing increasing pressure from developing nations that want more control over peacekeeping efforts.

If these Third World governments ever prevail, the United States might face a decision on whether to commit some American troops to combat under a foreign general or admiral--a prospect that historically has been anathema to U.S. commanders.

American military authorities have consistently maintained that the United States ought to command such operations because it traditionally contributes the bulk of the troops and has by far the best command structure, intelligence, air power and logistics apparatus.

“The principle is, whoever provides the bulk of the force should have command,” says Don Snider, an expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “We’re providing the force, so it’s reasonable and politically prudent that we should retain command as well.”

But some Third World governments are uncomfortable with the political implications of U.S. command. To many, Washington represents Western colonialism. To have the United States send troops to a developing country seems a slap at the sovereignty of all Third World countries.

Already, there has been an erosion of Washington’s ability to demand absolute control of multinational operations involving its troops, as it has in every such effort since World War II.

The U.N. Somalia mandate approved earlier this month gives the Security Council political oversight of the military operation. It also enables the council to say when the second wave of U.N. peacekeeping forces comes in, which in turn determines when U.S. forces leave.

Although authorities concede that the council’s restrictions are largely symbolic, diplomats say they set an important precedent: For the first time, they give the Security Council direct political oversight of the actions of the U.S.-led force.

In the wake of the council moves, experts predict that it will be increasingly difficult for the United Nations to give any country the kind of sweeping power to wage war that the United States had during the Persian Gulf operation.

Paul B. Stares, a Brookings Institution analyst, says absolute American command may become less commonplace as peacekeeping operations increase. “There’s a growing acknowledgment,” he says, “(that) to gain legitimacy . . . you need a multinational command.”

“I think we’re at a turning point,” Stares contends, “but I’m not sure the U.S. military has really considered this.” When the reality sinks in, he predicts, it could be a wrenching experience for the military bureaucracy and for American pride.

To be sure, American military leaders have had sound reasons for wanting such multinational operations placed under U.S. command. To begin with, the United States has contributed the lion’s share of the troops to most such ventures in the past. It also has had the best intelligence-gathering network among the Western allies, the most effective air cover and naval support, the only massive sea-lift and airlift capability and, perhaps most important, the most effective command.

There also is a firm belief held within the Pentagon, and privately by many U.S. allies, that the United States is the only country with the wherewithal to do the job quickly, aggressively and with the fewest lives lost. “We would clearly prefer to have U.S. command and control,” Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams said recently.

Some critics, however, say they detect a touch of arrogance in the Pentagon’s demands. Ever since World War II, American military leaders have assumed that the United States should take control of multinational operations. “It’s kind of a cultural mind-set,” one critic asserts.

There are two basic reasons why Third World governments--such as Zimbabwe and China--increasingly are wary of the United States taking full command of peacekeeping missions.

The first is a longstanding apprehension about any big power sending troops into a developing country--a blow to the pride that Third World leaders find politically impossible to accept.

Second, under Operation Desert Storm, President Bush essentially ignored the Security Council once he obtained the authority that he wanted from it, humiliating even some Western diplomats and making some council members suspicious that he might do so again.

Indeed, just as Security Council members were trying to work out an eleventh-hour settlement with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in late 1990, Bush issued an ultimatum that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait within 24 hours. The result: the U.N. talks fell through, and the Gulf War began.

In reality, however, few countries besides the United States are capable of mounting a significant multinational operation. Germany and Japan both are limited by constitutional restrictions. That leaves Britain and France, neither of which is sending a very large force to Somalia.

Also, experience with European leadership sometimes has been disappointing to U.S. leaders. At the Europeans’ request, Washington let them take the lead in dealing with the Yugoslav civil war, only to see the opportunity pass for early, perhaps less costly action.

Military experts say that even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which has developed a detailed command structure over its 40 years in existence, still doesn’t know if the structure would hold up under combat conditions. “It’s never been tested in battle,” one analyst says.

Critics warn that future solutions might be even more difficult, particularly if Washington doesn’t want to provide the bulk of the ground troops, as it is doing in the Somalia operation. “In the Gulf War, the issue was fuzzed because it was . . . dressed to look like a coalition operation,” Stares says.

One problem is that the United Nations itself has no command-and-control structure and lacks even the theoretical ability that NATO has to exercise command of military operations. The Security Council has a Military Staff Committee, which was intended to help coordinate such operations, but it is moribund and even in its heyday was never more than a shell.

William J. Durch, an associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, says that in smaller, noncombat operations where the United States is not taking part, the United Nations chooses a force commander from a country and puts the entire operation in his hands.

The headquarters staff is drawn from officers who very likely have never before even seen each other. Setting up logistics and vital communications links is left to civilians. The United Nations is only now setting up a 24-hour operations center.

And units from participating countries, each of which traditionally is assigned a specific zone to patrol, generally remain to themselves and are commanded solely by their own officers.

“They almost never have a chance to practice or train,” Durch says. In combat, he points out, that could be a disaster.

Augustus Richard Norton, a professor at the U.S. Military Academy, believes that the United Nations needs to develop its own command apparatus, to be used for coordinating individual units and keeping U.N. headquarters involved in key decisions.