Vernon Disputes Post-Riot Findings : Police: Ex-official’s book blames LAPD failures on intelligence gathering curbs and political enemies.

In a spirited defense of himself and his former boss, retired Assistant Police Chief Robert L. Vernon contends in a new book that the Los Angeles Police Department’s failures during the riots can be traced to intelligence gathering restrictions and efforts by enemies to bring the department under tighter political control.

Vernon, the commander who headed LAPD emergency operations under former Chief Daryl F. Gates, disputes key findings of the Webster Commission, which criticized the department’s response to the riots. Like Gates, Vernon strongly rejects the panel’s central conclusion--that there was little preparation for civil unrest before the verdicts in the Rodney G. King beating case.

The 37-year LAPD veteran, who was passed over as Gates’ successor and left office just days before the riots, writes that he ordered a series of steps to prepare the department for “the riot I thought was inevitable.”

They included quietly dispatching a deputy chief to New York to assess police handling of a major racial disturbance; directing area commanders to review and update emergency plans weeks before the verdicts, and ordering station inspections to ensure readiness.

The Times was provided an advance copy of “L.A. Justice: Lessons From the Firestorm,” which will be released next month by Focus on the Family Publishing, a Colorado-based Christian publishing company. Vernon is an evangelical Christian whose strong beliefs have stirred controversy over the years in the Police Department.

Laced with biblical references and Vernon’s concerns about hedonism and the decline of the traditional family, the 254-page book avoids criticizing LAPD commanders by name and breaks little new ground.

While the book’s primary focus is the riots--ranging from the department’s response to Vernon’s views on the underlying causes--it also touches on some of the controversies that plagued his tenure. Chief among those was his conflict with gays over his belief that homosexuality is sinful and that gays should not be hired on the force. Vernon writes in his book that he did let these beliefs influence his official actions.

As for the department’s performance during last year’s riots, Vernon contends that planning was hampered by restrictions that city officials had placed on LAPD intelligence gathering after spying scandals in the early 1980s.

“The infiltration of criminal gangs is now nearly impossible,” the book states.

“Prior to the riots, I felt starved” for information, Vernon said in an interview. “I think intelligence could have made our efforts more focused.”

There is some evidence that Molotov cocktails may have been prepared in advance by some groups--an activity that police might have been able to detect, Vernon said.

He said he advised the Webster Commission of his planning efforts, but the panel still concluded that riot preparations were inadequate.

The co-leaders of the Webster Commission, former FBI Director William H. Webster and Police Foundation President Hubert Williams, also dismissed the notion that intelligence weaknesses contributed to the lack of LAPD readiness.

“The department had all the information it needed,” Williams told The Times last year.

Williams and Webster have acknowledged that they scrapped a highly sensitive discussion of intelligence shortcomings from their panel’s final report. Webster said he feared that the section would create the erroneous impression that the commission felt “we needed more community spies.”

Much of Vernon’s book is framed by a familiar theory, popular among some veteran police officers and commanders. It holds that a series of events, including the Christopher Commission investigation of alleged LAPD racism and brutality and the process of selecting Gates’ successor, were evidence of a scheme to politicize the Police Department and strip it of independence.

Vernon blames longtime LAPD critics, such as Mayor Tom Bradley, Councilman Zev Yaroslavsky and the American Civil Liberties Union, for the effort. As with limits placed on intelligence gathering, Vernon argues that efforts to politically control the department contributed to the early mishandling of the riots.

LAPD commanders, reeling from media and politician bashing and sensing a new imperative of “political correctness,” failed to respond swiftly to the violence, sacrificing “sound tactical judgment,” Vernon wrote.

While short on revelations, Vernon’s book does provide fresh, behind-the-scenes details of his involvement in the crises over King’s beating.

Vernon was acting chief--with Gates out of town--when the Police Department was first sent a copy of the King beating videotape, hours before it was seen publicly. The local television station that purchased the tape from an amateur photographer offered the copy.

Seated in Gates’ Parker Center office, Vernon recounted his realization of what he was seeing on TV. He said his stomach felt as if it had been slugged and he slammed down his mug, spilling his coffee.

It was immediately clear that the effect would be enormous.

“If this is what it appears to be, this is what the chief’s enemies have been waiting for,” he said he told an aide. “This may be a thermonuclear bomb.”

Three weeks after the King beating, Vernon was one of the few among the LAPD top brass to appear on the podium--and speak--at a pro-Gates rally.

A year later, Vernon again offered his services--the night the riots ignited--but this time they were declined. Headed for retirement, Vernon had left Parker Center five days earlier. Technically, he remained on the city payroll.

On April 29, his plane landed at Los Angeles International Airport as the early fires spread across South-Central Los Angeles. He hurried home and volunteered to report in.

Gates indicated through another officer that it was unnecessary; he thought the situation was under control, Vernon wrote.