Inside the LAPD: Did Confusion Over Use of Force Lead to the King Beating? : Police: Ex-chief Daryl Gates weakened department standards to shore up officer morale in the short run. But that policy has backfired.

The sentencing of Sgt. Stacey C. Koon and Officer Lawrence M. Powell to prison for violating Rodney G. King’s civil rights sent another shock wave through the Los Angel es Police Department. Add to that the recent filing of a murder charge against an LAPD officer who shot a tow-truck driver while on duty a year ago. Will the setbacks ever stop?

Many cops see the department on hands and knees, surrounded by critics taking advantage of long-coveted opportunities to attack the department with relative impunity. That the officers feel this way is not surprising, since institutional paranoia has been fostered, to some degree, by each of the successive departmental administrations of the last 40 years.

The department and its officers are certainly vulnerable to such attacks. And the criticism will continue until the LAPD recognizes how little control it has over outside forces and looks inward for the reasons behind it. A look at the department’s history during the last 15 years offers insight into some of the reasons.

In March, 1978, the Board of Police Commissioners selected Daryl F. Gates to succeed Ed Davis as chief of police. Gates soon faced two critical events. His responses presaged a management philosophy and personal operating style that came to characterize his administration.

On June 6, 1978, California voters approved a tax-reform initiative that severely cut revenue going to local government. On that same day, the LAPD’s top brass met for their annual, three-day staff officers’ conference. The meeting that evening, after it was apparent that Proposition 13 would become law, opened with a discussion of its probable fiscal consequences for the department. Someone suggested a reduction in mid-level positions to save money. That idea was refined and expanded to include other management positions.

The discussion appeared to be gathering momentum when Gates, face crimson, voice raised and cracking with anger, interrupted. He accused those who had offered suggestions of “riding on the backs of others,” explaining that they were denying lower-ranking officers the promotional opportunities they themselves had enjoyed. He declared the meeting over and stalked out of the room. There was no further discussion of the effects of Proposition 13 at the conference--nor was there much future planning on how to cope with the new law.

The second critical event confronting the new chief was the shooting of Eulia Love. Two officers were dispatched to the home of the South Los Angeles woman after she had reportedly struck a gas-company employee who was shutting off her gas for failure to pay a $22.09 bill. She displayed a kitchen knife in a threatening manner when the officers arrived, and at one point, threw it in their direction. The officers fired several shots, fatally wounding her.

Officers who conducted an internal departmental review of the incident could not agree on whether all the shots fired complied with department policy. Gates, who was required to make a final judgment, determined that all shots were in compliance.

Public outcry over the shooting had forced the Police Commission to become deeply involved in the Love case. Some members argued for a finding that some of the shots fired were not in compliance with policy. The chief remained unmoved. The commission, characteristically, did not force the issue by exerting supervision and control over its subordinate, Gates.

Several years later, one commissioner told me of his attempts to persuade Gates to change his decision. He said the chief confided that it was a “terrible” shooting, but that he could not bring himself to change his judgment because of the likely adverse impact on officer morale.

This preoccupation with short-term morale issues at the cost of longer-range operating effectiveness characterized Gates’ administration. In particular, it set the tone for review of officer use-of-force incidents. Many subordinate command and staff officers followed Gates’ lead and, in their eagerness to please, even expanded on it. The result was an internal use-of-force review process that seemed to search for excuses to justify officers’ actions. A slow but inexorable erosion in department standards was under way.

This slippage presented a moving target to police officers trying to hit the policy bull’s-eye. It made it difficult for them to consistently tailor their actions to a known policy. It forced them to hope that their actions after the fact might be in line with a policy that found more and more instances of legitimate use of force.

Has a lack of understanding of the rules allowed some police officers to believe their actions were acceptable when they were not? Did the attempts to please officers at the expense of consistent leadership lull some into wrongdoing? Did the chief’s refusal to accept suggestions, advice and counsel lull him into a false sense that all was well?

My conversations with many officers indicate that LAPD street cops are unsure of what is an acceptable use of force. In part, this is due to inconsistent interpretations of departmental standards. The prosecutions of Koon, Powell and two other officers involved in the beating of King has further confused the issue. Experts, prosecutors and even the judge in the King civil-rights trial had markedly different opinions on what is an appropriate baton blow.

The circumstances surrounding the filing of the murder charge against Officer Douglas Iversen is no clearer. While it is inappropriate to draw conclusions about the case, his reported explanation appears indistinguishable from those offered by other officers in previous cases where the use of force was found to be justified.

What must be done? The proper role of police in our society, and how the LAPD’s mission fits within it, must become part of the working knowledge of every department employee, from chief on down. Such knowledge must be incorporated in all training, must be reflected in every administrative and operational decision. Supervisors and commanders must be held accountable for ensuring that their subordinates comply with its principles in day-to-day law enforcement. And use-of-force policy must be grounded in the criteria of necessity and reasonableness, must not be open to endless interpretation and must be applied consistently.

Anything less can only result in a repeat of past mistakes and a continuation of the trauma suffered by the department and its officers.