A Turning Point : U.S. and China Must Find New Common Ground

In just one month, Sino-American relations have gravely deteriorated. China has canceled all high-level official visits between the two, countries, summoned home its ambassador to Washington, reportedly resumed exporting missiles to Pakistan and Iran and delayed its approval of President Bill Clinton’s nominee to replace the departed U.S. Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy. The continuing dispute over Harry Wu, a Chinese American human rights activist detained by Chinese authorities on an espionage charge, has further soured relations.

Undoubtedly, Wu’s arrest is part of Beijing’s retaliation against Washington’s decision to allow Taiwanese President Lee Ten-hui to attend a college reunion in the United States. In all likelihood, China will hold Wu until sino-American relations warmup. but though Wu is an unwiting pawn in the uncreasingly complicated U.S.-Taiwan-China game, his case allows Beijing to assert its sovereignty at a particularly sensitive moment Obviously, the Chinese government wants to use the Wu episode to show the outside world that China will defend its sovereignty and punish whoever violates it.

But what has really shaken Sino-American relations to their foundations during the last two years is each side’s wait-and-see posture toward the other. As a consquence, the relationship is increasingly marked by suspicion and mutual district.

For its part, the Clinton Administration had wondered whether the United States should carry on any meaningful dialogue with the current Chinese leadership. Indeed, China has shown all the signs of being on the brink of an upheaval. Its rapid but unequal economic development has polarized Chinese society and spurred the rise of regionalism. Beijing disturbing and inconsistent behavior regarding arms sales, and inconsistent behavior regarding arms sales, m and its failure to whether the central leadership still have an effective control of the situation.

For these reasons, the White House has adjusted its China policy, apparently believing the time and opportunity will soon yield an more stable and credible leadership in Beijing. This is perhaps shy Washington has repeatedly turned aside Chinese overtures to hold a formal summit between Clinton and Deng Xiaoping’s designated successor, Jiang Zemin. Why should the Administration embrace someone who might only be a transitional figure in the power struggle to succeed Deng?

The Chinese, on the other hand, seem befuddled when deciding how to deal with a liberal Democrat after getting to know his more conservative Republican predecessors. The ongoing internal power struggle in Beijing further complicates China’s U.S. policy. In fact, China’s three-week delay in announcing Wu’s arrest is a measure of how uncertain its policy. In fact, China’s three-week delay in announcing Wu’s arrest is a measure of how uncertain its policy-makers were in calculation Washington’s anticipated protest.

Then there are Clinton’s perceived political liabilities. In Beijing’s eyes, the President seems little more than a punching bag for the Republican-dominated Congress. Clinton’s lack of initiative and credibility on a wide range of foreign-affairs issued has further diminished his stature. With the presidential election only a year away, Chinese officials may have decided to sit tight. some my even believe that a Republican willing to carry on the Nixon-Bush China legacy will be elected.

Unfortunately, both sides wait-and-see policy will only deepen Sino-American estrangement. It can also lead the U.S. China relationship into a dead end. The reason is simple.

While Jiang is everybody’s second choice, since there is evidently no first choice to succeed Deng, he is likely to remain the only choice of the post-Deng power structure. Jiang’s gradual disassociation from the hated hard-liners and his efforts to install his own supporters in the military have also boosted his popularity and strengthened his power base. Even skeptics of Jiang’s hold on power admit that he had performed better than they expected. All signs thus indicate that Jiang may have a good chance of surviving post-Deng Chinese politics and become the leader whom the White House must deal with.

Clinton, moreover, may end up in the White House for a second term, and Beijing’s assumption that a Republican President would care more about U.S. China relations may be wishful thinking. After all, it was pressure from the GOP--dominated Congress that forced the Administration to allow the Taiwanese president to visit; it was no accident that the three senators who met Lee were Republicans, and GOP congressmen are the most vocal in calling for tougher action in dealing with Beijing.

Similarly, Beijing silence on accepting former Sen. James Sasser as the new U.S. ambassador could be another Chinese miscalculation. True, by diplomatic tradition, China has the right to reject a foreign ambassador. But it would be foolish to refuse a political appointment such as Sasser’s, whose friendship with Clinton and Vice President Albert Gore would surely make him a more powerful ambassador than a career diplomat.

Even American businessmen, who normally are preoccupied with making money in China, are increasingly worried about how the deterioration U.S. China relationship will affect them. They fear they may be caught in the Beijing-Washington cross-fire and suffer losses in the lucrative Chinese market if the two countries remain estranged.

The question is how to set things right and get relations back on track? Although the current crisis is a result of an accumulation of miscalculations on both sides, it also highlights a new reality: The common ground on which Washington and Beijing used to build up relations has rapidly shrunk. Until recently, it was the threat from the former Soviet Union that bound Beijing and Washington in a strategic partnership. But with the collapse of the Soviet empire, the three joint communiques signed in 1971, 1978, and 1981 which formed the bedrock of U.S.-China relations for the past two decades are clearly outdated and have lost their significance. Meanwhile, the trade and economic interests shared by the two sides have not yet developed into solid bonds and are too fragile to weather much stress and strain.

It is in the sense that the U.S.-China relationship has come to a critical turning point. As such, Washington and Beijing must again lay out their expectations and redefine their common concerns to forge a new productive dialogue in a rapidly changing world.

Absent a common ground, U.S.-China tensions will continue to grow. That Washington and Beijing view things differently is not surprising. But even when they don’t always see eye to eye, the two countries should remain mindful of their mutual interests and remember that there are a variety of issues at stake. Only in this way can the U.S.-China relationship grow again.