U.S. Must Do More Than Wait

For more than three years, the United States has labored to persuade suspicious Arabs, especially Syrians and Palestinians, that major differences divide the main political parties in Israel, and, specifically, that the election of Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu would be a blow to prospects for peace. It took many months and the assassination of an Israeli prime minister to drive home this point. Now that Netanyahu is the prime minister-elect, every player in the Mideast peace game will have to adjust, but repackaging Netanyahu as the Israeli most likely to deliver peace with the Arabs, just as Richard M. Nixon revolutionized U.S. relations with China, will prove difficult in the short term. A new American approach will be needed.

To be sure, Israel’s Arab partners in the peace negotiations, especially the Palestinians, have little choice but to pretend that the consequences of Netanyahu in power will be limited. Yasser Arafat has put all his eggs in the peace basket; he has no military option, and he cannot pack up and move back to Tunis. His tone since the Israeli elections has been conciliatory--even hopeful. He will no doubt continue to send his negotiators to the table he shares with Israel, even as Palestinian hardships continue. But is there any objective reason for Arafat to hope and, if his hope is unjustified, can he keep his constituents on board?

True, Netanyahu’s ideological outlook is unknown. But it is equally true that his party’s commitment to keeping the West Bank in Israel’s orbit is not solely dependent on security arguments, but is deeply tied to religious and ideological claims. In the past, other Likud leaders have been willing to pay a high price to consolidate Israeli control over the region. For Netanyahu, the Nixon-in-China analogy is not inconceivable on any issue--including Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights--except that of the West Bank.

Still, a number of factors suggest that the new Israeli leader may be unpredictable. Above all, Netanyahu cannot ignore the Oslo agreements, which have gone too far to be reversed. Even the Israeli public is unlikely to support any reoccupation of Palestinian cities. In any case, the current situation in the Palestinian territories is not sustainable, either economically or politically, so the old Likud annexation view would, at a minimum, have to be altered. Moreover, the same public mood in Israel that helped elect Netanyahu strongly desires Palestinian-Israeli separation. Building more Jewish settlements on the West Bank would make separation more difficult.

What makes Netanyahu’s personal views particularly central in the shaping of Israeli foreign policy is that he is the first directly elected prime minister of Israel, which gives him more personal clout than other Israeli leaders have had. Moreover, his own party, the Likud, did rather poorly in the elections, winning only a little more than one-fourth of the seats in the Knesset--fewer than the number gained by Labor. The first hints of his foreign-policy instinct will become evident when he forms the new government. He faces two consequential choices: forming a right-wing government of mostly Likud and the religious parties, or assembling a national unity government that would include Labor and embark on a centrist course.

A narrow right-wing government would instantly define Netanyahu’s ideology, even if he personally lacks one. Key ministries affecting settlement policy (defense, foreign affairs, housing, finance) would probably go to individuals who have clear ideological commitments on the West Bank. And key constituents, such as Jewish settlers, may seek confrontation even if the prime minister prefers to avoid one. One early casualty could be the indefinite postponement of the Israeli withdrawal from Hebron.

In order to reduce the chance of violence, and thus confrontation with the United States, Netanyahu may strive to improve the economic conditions of the Palestinians to the extent that this objective would not conflict with his political ambitions. Even so, it is doubtful that Arafat can pacify his public if it looks like Palestinian political hopes are being irreversibly dashed. A new cycle of violence could result.

The Clinton administration thus faces a major task. Although U.S.-Israeli relations have been at a high point since Bill Clinton arrived in office, and the president is regarded as a strong supporter of Israel, at least some of this good will was due to the Labor-led government in power just before Clinton’s inauguration. The administration’s Middle East objectives--trading occupied territory for peace, normalizing relations between Israel and the Arab world, discouraging Jewish settlement on the West Bank--were largely shared by the Labor Party. Indeed, the degree of cooperation between the two governments on peace issues was so close that it bordered on collaboration. In such an environment, the United States found it inappropriate to distance itself from Israel on almost any issue, including the controversial Israeli operations in Lebanon in March.

The trick for the administration is to avoid a confrontation with the new Israeli government, especially in an election year, while also preventing the collapse of the peace process that the administration has made a top foreign-policy priority. Certainly, Netanyahu must be given a chance to define himself before any judgment is made. But it is a mistake to signal that the administration will “adapt” to any outlook put forth by the new Israeli leadership, a term used by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, but later explained away as a slip.

Instead, Washington must reiterate America’s long-standing positions on Middle East peace, especially regarding settlements, before Netanyahu forms a government, in part because the new prime minister places great value on good relations with the United States. Some of the smaller parties--the Third Way, for example--that he will need to form a government, even one narrowly right wing, insist on honoring commitments already made to the Palestinians. Others, such as the new immigrant party, prefer a national unity government. What the United States says and does during the negotiations to produce a new government in Israel matters a great deal.

The unprecedented global interest in the Israeli elections is a clear indication of the remarkable influence that Israel has gained over the years, so much so that the personal views of a newly elected prime minister appear key to the future of Middle East politics. No person or government can avoid existing constraints, but the demise of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Iraq have helped make Israel powerful enough to make some critical choices: With the help of the United States, it can make peace, but it can also make war. U.S. foreign policy must remain focused on making sure that peace is the choice.*