U.S. Interest Lies With Oil, Not Kurds in Iraq’s North

The Kurdish faction that has become Saddam Hussein’s surrogate in northern Iraq is expanding its control over the area, routing rival forces, creating thousands of refugees and clearing the way for the return of Baghdad’s dreaded secret police agents. In southern Iraq, meanwhile, Hussein is already at work rebuilding parts of the air defense system that were weakened by U.S. missile strikes last week. In both north and south Iraq, Washington sees a challenge to U.N. resolutions that seek to protect Iraqi minorities and limit Hussein’s power. But only in southern Iraq does the United States have a strategic stake to be defended, by military force if need be.

Washington tried for years to persuade the feuding Kurdish groups to form a united front against Hussein. That effort having failed, the U.S. interest in northern Iraq now is simply to avoid getting entangled in the Kurdish civil war.

However, every effort should be made to rescue the several hundred or so Kurds and Iraqi Arab dissidents who have cooperated with U.S. intelligence operations and who are now threatened with capture by Hussein’s Kurdish allies. But that’s where the American obligation stops. The United States has no vital interest in the Kurds’ internecine conflict, and nothing to gain by taking sides.

Southern Iraq is another matter. Defending the enormous oil reserves of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other Persian Gulf states from takeover by Iraq--whether by invasion or through political coercion to dictate production and prices--is very much a U.S. strategic interest. That requires making sure that the skies over southern Iraq are open and safe for reconnaissance and, if need be, for combat missions. Last week’s missile attacks were meant to support that need. Further attacks, U.S. officials warn, could follow if Iraq tries to restore its antiaircraft capabilities.

Once again, though, the United States finds itself having to act largely on its own, except for welcome support from Britain. The Arab states that six years ago enlisted in the anti-Iraq coalition now question or oppose U.S. actions. Most of the European allies, who depend far more heavily on Persian Gulf oil than the United States, are unenthusiastic or critical about U.S. actions. It’s uncertain how heavily Washington lobbied its friends for support in this latest confrontation. What’s clear is that precious little support has been given, a fact that could loom steadily larger if this confrontation deepens.