Pick, Move Becoming Draft-Day Routine

Used to be, NBA teams were built through the draft. They took their turns, selected their players and kept them a few years to see what hatched.

Now the draft is just a busy day before the lockout when teams get ready for the next season, which might or might not entail taking on youngsters. Since 1992, there hasn’t been a year when even all the lottery picks made it to camp with the teams that drafted them.

Trades are now common, and this one has a chance with teams shopping such players as Nick Van Exel, Elden Campbell, Terrell Brandon, Nick Anderson, Doug Christie, Tim Thomas and, of course, anyone on Rick Pitino’s Boston Celtic roster.

What happened?

The 1995 labor deal made it easier for veterans to become free agents and more important for teams to save room under the salary cap.

Take the Detroit Pistons, who have their hearts set on Tom Gugliotta. If they exercise their No. 11 pick, they must allocate $1.1 million to their draftee under the rookie scale. That’s $1.1 million less they can offer Gugliotta. They’re looking to trade down, or out.

Draftees, meanwhile, are arriving younger and three years away from free agency, giving them so much leverage, teams are recalculating the risk-reward equation.

Indiana Pacer President Donnie Walsh has. “You used to get older players and you used to sign them for longer term,” he said, “so you were more convinced you could develop them.

“Now, you get a guy, he doesn’t play his first year with a lot of teams. Second year, plays a little. By that time, he’s ready to sign.”

By “that time,” he might be only 21 and might require a commitment like $120 million, which is what the Minnesota Timberwolves made to Kevin Garnett.

Because not every prospect is Garnett-level, you get the pattern that has developed in the ‘90s: teams with premium picks showing more inclination to opt out.

Here’s how it has gone.

JUNE 30, 1993

Orlando trades No. 1 pick Chris Webber to Golden State, for No. 3 pick Penny Hardaway and three future No. 1s.

The situation: This was a straight, position-driven, rookie-for-rookie swap, with the Magic, which had Shaquille O’Neal, using its leverage to get something from a team that would pay to choose between Webber or Shawn Bradley.

The Warriors, run by Don Nelson, bit. It looked like a great deal for all concerned at the time, rather than the trade that almost finished off both franchises.

The winner (?): The Magic reached the NBA finals with Hardaway in 1995 but let O’Neal leave in 1996. Hardaway has played only 68 games since, was shopped last season, has a tenuous relationship with Coach Chuck Daly and will need a major comeback simply to stay where he is.

The loser (!): Of course, that’s a lot better than the Warriors did.

Webber bristled at Nelson’s yelling, held out before his second season and demanded the trade that sent him to Washington. Nelson was fired shortly after making the deal. The Warriors went into a hole, from which they’ve never emerged. In four seasons, Webber led the Bullets/Wizards to one postseason appearance (they went 0-3), several after-dark incidents and was recently traded to Sacramento. He reportedly told the Kings he doesn’t want to be there, either.

JULY 18, 1994

Two weeks after the draft, Seattle trades No. 11 pick Carlos Rogers, Ricky Pierce and two future No. 2s to Golden State for Sarunas Marciulionis and Byron Houston.

The situation: The SuperSonics wanted veterans. The Warriors were intrigued by the 6-10 Rogers’ all-around game.

The winner: This deal was so inconsequential, it’s silly to pick one. It keeps the traded-lottery-pick streak alive, though, doesn’t it?

The losers: Marciulionis and Houston lasted one season in Seattle, each. The blabby Rogers became part and parcel of the youth rebellion in Golden State after Nelson traded Webber. Rogers has since been traded to the Hornets and Raptors.

JUNE 28, 1995

The Clippers trade No. 2 pick Antonio McDyess, Randy Wood and Elmore Spencer to Denver for No. 15 pick Brent Barry, Brian Williams and Rodney Rogers. (The Williams-Spencer segment was announced after the salary cap went up.)

The situation: The Clippers, coming off a 17-win season, opted for help in depth, additionally getting the Nuggets to eat Woods’ long-term contract. The Nuggets got McDyess, who was considered a prodigy.

This was the first class of rookies who would be free agents in three years. Because the Clippers had a historic problem in retaining players, an alternative may have looked even more enticing.

The winner (?): The Clippers got one season out of it, anyway, the first, when Williams averaged a career-high 16 points, Barry made a dazzling debut, Rogers did OK and they improved by 12 wins.

Only Rogers remains, and he’s a free agent in a year. They got nothing for Williams and had to take Ike Austin, another free agent, for Barry.

The loser: Nuggets. McDyess developed slowly, let them know he’d be asking for $100 million or so and was traded to the Phoenix Suns for two future No. 1s.

Of course, if Austin and Rogers leave, two No. 1s will be more than the Clippers retain from this transaction.

JUNE 21, 1996

Five days before the draft, Boston trades Eric Montross and its No. 9 pick to Dallas for the Mavericks’ No. 6 pick and their first pick in 1997.

The situation: The Celtics moved up to draft Antoine Walker. The Mavericks wanted a big man to go with their three Js, Jason Kidd, Jamal Mashburn and Jim Jackson.

The winner (?): Celtics. M.L. Carr had few bright moments, but he not only got Walker, he came up with the sixth pick the next spring after the Mavericks unloaded all three Js and went south. No. 6 turned out to be the promising Ron Mercer.

The loser: Before the season was over, the Mavericks traded Montross to the New Jersey Nets, who sent him to the Philadelphia 76ers, who shipped him to Detroit where he awaits further developments. The player they got at No. 9, Samaki Walker, has been OK.

JUNE 26, 1996

Milwaukee trades No. 4 pick Stephon Marbury to Minnesota for No. 5 pick Ray Allen and Andrew Lang.

The situation: The Bucks needed a point guard, but they also needed a center and a shooting guard. They might also have been unnerved by reports the Brooklyn-born Marbury didn’t want to be there and preferred Minnesota to play with Garnett.

The winner (?): Timberwolves. Marbury helped them to their first two postseason appearances in his first two seasons. But he didn’t turn out to be that close to Garnett, announcing he’d require a contract as large as Garnett’s if he decides to stay, which he might not, since he doesn’t like wintry, rustic Minnesota. Owner Glen Taylor says he can’t re-sign both Marbury and Gugliotta. This is winning?

The loser (so far): Bucks. Allen, who slipped in his last season at Connecticut, is back on track for something big, averaging 19.5 points in his second season. Lang has been of little help, however, and they’re still also-rans.

Of course, if Marbury splits, the Bucks will have been geniuses.

JUNE 27, 1997

Philadelphia trades No. 2 pick Keith Van Horn, Michael Cage, Lucious Harris and Don MacLean to New Jersey for No. 7 pick Tim Thomas, No. 21 pick Anthony Parker, Jackson and Montross.

The situation: Larry Brown needed help at several positions and was probably put off by Van Horn’s refusal to work out for the 76ers. Van Horn had a sensational workout for the Nets, who fell so in love with him, they gave up two starters, Jackson and Montross, and agreed to eat $6.3 million in annual salary in the contracts of MacLean, Harris and Cage.

The winner: Nets. Van Horn turned out to be a big-time prospect, leading them in scoring at 19.7 a game, despite an injury that kept him out for the first month.

The loser: It was a disaster for the 76ers, who traded Jackson to the Warriors for Joe Smith, who looked bad and wants a lot of money. Thomas was promising but was reportedly just offered to the Grizzlies for their pick. Montross went to the Pistons for Theo Ratliff, who played well. Parker played little.