Risky Business at the MTA

In October 1996, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority signed a federal court consent decree, ostensibly to avoid a protracted legal battle over its woefully overcrowded and unreliable bus service. Riders dependent on buses as their primary form of transportation had filed a lawsuit claiming that MTA bus service had been sacrificed to fund a rail system that served few riders by comparison.

Settlement was a good idea for the MTA because the lawsuit’s argument was so compelling. Although bus riders accounted for more than 90% of MTA passengers, billions of dollars were poured into one of the nation’s shortest and most expensive subways.

Under the deal, the MTA agreed to bus service improvements, a working group to jointly develop bus expansion and overcrowding remedies, and load factor deadlines to greatly reduce the number of bus riders who couldn’t find seats. The MTA and its board also recognized the authority of Special Master Donald T. Bliss--when they thought it might help their argument.

Meanwhile, the MTA put forth what it described publicly as a major commitment to better bus service: 2,095 new bus purchases and supporting personnel and infrastructure. It promised to make the buses run on time and more reliably. But the special master, having heard both sides, said that it wasn’t enough, and he ordered the purchase of still more buses.

Now, however, the MTA has decided on pit-bull tactics. The agency says it has largely solved bus overcrowding, a statement with which bus rider advocates flatly disagree. Now, MTA lawyers argue that Bliss doesn’t have the power to order the MTA to do anything, and they are openly challenging the authority of the federal judge in the case, Terry Hatter Jr., by saying they will go to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals if Hatter rules against them.

Here are some of the MTA’s many problems. First, it agreed to this process. Second, Bliss has taken the MTA at its word on several points, such as improvements in on-time bus pullouts and increasing reliability. Third, the MTA and its board would have us believe that--2 1/2 years into the process--they suddenly realized the scope of bus improvement costs and decided that the standard was impossible.

What the MTA should do is comply with the order, even if, as it claims, this means running one less car on a rail line, longer waits between trains and delays in freeway improvements.

The MTA has now decided to carry its fight to the court, a decision it could have made years ago. In so doing, it leaves itself open to a variety of charges: that its acquiescence has been a stalling tactic; that it considers spending taxpayers’ money on legal fees the cost of doing business in the manner it prefers.

It’s a risky game that the MTA is playing, and it’s playing that game with your money.