Joseph Prueher

Just seven months after retiring from a distinguished 35-year naval career, former Adm. Joseph W. Prueher sailed into one of the most delicate relationships in U.S. diplomacy today: ties with the People’s Republic of China.

As President Bill Clinton’s handpicked ambassador, Prueher took up the difficult post in December that others had turned down. Sino-U.S. ties had swung wildly within half a year, from the May 1999 low of the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the high of a Sino-U.S. agreement in November on Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization.

Prueher’s new job is a logical extension of his interest in Asia. From 1996 until his retirement in February last year, he served as commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command. One of his first acts was to dispatch U.S. aircraft carriers into waters off Taiwan to protect the island from missiles being lobbed from mainland China, which considers Taiwan part of its rightful territory.

After that crisis, Prueher worked to develop contacts with leaders of the People’s Liberation Army. He made several trips to Beijing, becoming one of the more widely recognized U.S. officials in Chinese-government circles.

This month, Sino-U.S. ties enter a sensitive period, with the anniversary of the NATO bombing, the inauguration Saturday of Chen Shui-bian as Taiwan’s new president and the showdown in Congress over establishing permanent normal trade relations with China to pave the way for its accession to the WTO.

A native Tennessean with a light Southern drawl and a ramrod military bearing, Prueher was interviewed in the U.S. ambassador’s office in the Chinese capital.

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Question: It has been a year since the Chinese Embassy was hit by NATO bombs in Belgrade. Does the incident still affect your dealings with the Chinese government?

Answer: Yes. The tendency of most people, certainly in our country, is to say, “Let’s put it behind us.” I have a different slant on events like this, that you don’t ever really put them behind you. It becomes a part of the relationship. . . . We can’t forget what they did to our facilities here [in rioting after the bombing], and they can’t forget that we bombed their embassy. It’s a big deal; to put it behind us is to trivialize it. It’s part of the level of mistrust that they have for us, and their reaction [is] part of the mistrust that we have for them. We have to face it, we have to talk about it, we have to air it and we can move forward.

Q: How would you characterize Sino-U.S. relations right now?

A: I’m very optimistic . . . but not confident. I think that’s probably a healthy way to be. The need for us to have a workable relationship is very important. That we have good relations with China doesn’t transcend all our other national interests, and it certainly doesn’t transcend theirs, either. . . . Our common interests are trade, the security of the region, de-tuning the strains on the Korean peninsula, the strength of Southeast Asia, the Asian economy. We also have global interests: the environment . . . [and] nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. . . . In order to [manage] these things in a workable way, it does not mean that the U.S. and China need to completely embrace each other, but we do need to appreciate each other’s culture, each other’s civilization.

Q: There’s going to be a change of U.S. administration in January. Do you feel that the U.S. can have an effective China policy in the interim, and can you, as ambassador, be effective in both U.S. and Chinese eyes?

A: One of the reasons President Clinton and the administration asked me to do this is that I don’t have strong political affiliations party-wise; I’ve been apolitical in the military for 35 years. If I had a very strong affiliation with the Clinton administration, other than a professional one in that he’s my boss, probably I would have had more difficulty in getting confirmed. . . . I’m hoping that [U.S.] interests [in China] bridge the change of administration, and I look forward to working with the new administration . . . until it can get its own person in this job. I also hope the role of the ambassador will help smooth out the perturbations that might otherwise occur [in Sino-U.S. relations] during the election period and keep a steady pace forward--not too fast, but a steady pace forward--during this period.

Q: How often have you traveled to Washington, and do you plan to go back to speak to policymakers?

A: My predecessor, Jim Sasser, advised me . . . to spend a lot of time back there. About 50% of my work is in trying to stay in good communication with the people at home, the voters as well as the people in Congress. . . . That’s a very important aspect of the job, trying to articulate the best I can . . . to our Congress and to educational groups and to people who are interested in Asia--but even more important, people who aren’t interested in Asia--what’s going on here in China.

Q: Do you have the necessary access to people in Congress and in the administration?

A: Owing to my background and work on Asia issues, I spent a lot of my time in Congress with the people on the armed forces committees and the appropriations committees . . . and I like to consider a lot of them my friends. . . . [But] we should not be trying to convince members of Congress about some of these issues. . . . I know their time is scarce, and coming over here is a long way to come, but it’s important, and I would encourage them to come and spend a little time here in China and see it for themselves. It’s critically important for understanding the issues.

Q: This Saturday, former independence advocate Chen Shui-bian will be inaugurated as Taiwan’s new president. China has demanded that he acknowledge the “one-China” principle, and Clinton has reiterated U.S. support for one China. Do you think Chen ought to explicitly express his support for one China, which he has not done?

A: Chen is a democratically elected president-elect. He has a constituency whom he represents. He’s a good politician, and he’s trying to represent them accurately. . . . I think Chen has been doing what he can to reach out to the mainland, and I hope that the mainland can also reach out to him in the [spirit] of trying to get a solution. . . . Chen . . . can only do so much in one [inauguration] speech. He could do something that would be very offensive to the mainland, or he could do something that would be very positive to the mainland, or, more likely, he has to do something and say some things that are in between. But he will make his own decisions on that.

Q: What is the proper U.S. role in China-Taiwan relations?

A: Sen. [Jesse] Helms [R-N.C.], in my confirmation hearings, made a statement that I use a lot, because it’s plain language: “You go tell the leadership in China that we in the U.S. like and want to get along with the Chinese people--we just don’t want Taiwan to get kicked around.”. . . In my view, that’s engagement. . . . The rub comes in [trying to] do it in a way that answers U.S. interests and the interests of the region. . . . The U.S. role is in creating a climate . . . in which cross-strait differences can occur. We should evaluate the things we do in terms of [whether] they exacerbate the differences or allow a climate in which the differences can be bridged. . . .

Q: Does the U.S. underestimate Beijing’s will on Taiwan and vice versa?

A: We would be making a mistake if we underestimated the mainland’s commitment on the Taiwan issue. I think the [Taiwan] Strait crisis in ’96 was useful in that it indicated to China that the U.S. was committed to upholding its obligations with respect to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act; likewise, it highlighted for the U.S. how important this core sovereignty issue is to China.

Q: Does China have an accurate perception of U.S. military strength?

A: I don’t think they exactly do. . . . The strength of a military is indicated by hardware, which is what most people use as they count airplanes and ships and tanks and numbers of people. That’s the simplest measure, but it does not in any way tell the tale. There’s also the level of training, the quality of the people in the military, the level of tactics . . . [and] the political will of the nation they represent. . . . The Chinese tend to look more at counting [our] hardware and . . . they try to assess the political will of our nation, as well. We need to not mislead them on any of those factors. Likewise, we need to not be misled by them on any of those factors.

Q: Do we have a good take on China’s military?

A: Pretty good. But it requires steady work to keep that view of the military current. We can count their people and hardware pretty well; we’ve got a fair view of their level of training and their level of tactics. . . . Where the military is an extension of the political arm, that’s a part where we need to be smart, and we spend a lot of time thinking about it.

Q: Are the arms sales to Taiwan recently approved by the White House adequate for Taiwan’s defense?

A: Taiwan’s security is enhanced not by a single weapons system but by the relationship between Taiwan and China, which is influenced by the relationship between the U.S. and mainland China. . . . [The sales are] a symbol of the U.S. commitment to making sure that Taiwan’s security is adequate so that they don’t get kicked around, and yet not excessive so that it taints or degrades the relationship between the mainland and the U.S. I think what [the administration did] . . . struck that balance in a very good way.

Q: In the debate over granting permanent normal trade relations to China, and then Chinese accession to the WTO, how do you respond to critics who say that it is greed triumphing over morality?

A: I understand the point . . . but I disagree quite strongly with it. The WTO accession for China has economic aspects to it, and these economic aspects are, in my vernacular, a no-brainer. It opens China’s markets . . . and it gives U.S. companies a fair chance to compete in China in a global sense. You can put that in the greed category. The other thing that the WTO does, as China opens commercially to the outside world, [is that it] allows other democratic countries and countries that value the rights of individuals more to work in China. . . . Already, U.S. companies and the companies of some other nations are raising labor standards in China. People want to work in U.S. factories because U.S. standards are brought here. Their lives are cared for. There are programs that guarantee food, clothing and shelter. The wage rates are a piece of that. . . .

If we don’t grant [normal trade relations], it creates a problem not only in China but in Asia of looking at the U.S. and saying, “What sort of partner is the U.S.? We’ve got an agreement, and yet we can’t bring this to bear.” So the reliability of the U.S. as a partner in China and in Asia is something we should consider.

Q: Would an annual U.S. legislative review of China’s human-rights situation be an effective way of dealing with the issue in China?

A: We need to never back off from the core values of our country in providing a great example to other nations. We should continually make our standards and international standards known to other nations. . . . But just proclaiming our judgments about China makes it more difficult sometimes. It induces a push back instead of inducing solutions.

Q: What has been the biggest surprise for you as ambassador?

A: One of the pleasures is the delight my wife and I get in dealing with the Chinese people of all walks of life: their disposition, their dignity, their sense of humor, their entrepreneurial spirit. What is not a [pleasant] surprise to me is the difficulty of dealing with the [Chinese] government. . . . That’s a little harder than I thought it would be.

Q: Have you had much interaction with the two-thirds of the Chinese population who live in the countryside?

A: A lot less than I would like.. . . You don’t have to go very far from Beijing to see some of this, and I’ve had a chance to do that a few times. But I’m hoping . . . to travel around and see some of the other provinces. I’ve been to a few, but not [enough] to really get a feel for it. *