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The Wrong Message, the Wrong Time

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President Bush reportedly will announce--possibly as early as today--U.S. withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, which limits the testing and deployment of strategic missile defenses. The myriad arguments for and against missile defense aside, such action would be a mistake for one simple reason: It will yield absolutely no benefits in the short term while threatening key diplomatic relations at a time of military crisis.

The president argued Wednesday that the ABM treaty is restricting U.S. missile-defense testing and that we must withdraw because we need a missile defense to counter the threats of the 21st century. But testing that is compliant with the treaty can continue for years. Forcing the issue will only cripple our most pressing security initiative: the war on terrorism.

The ABM treaty permits testing of fixed, land-based antimissile systems like the one the U.S. successfully tested last week. The more exotic sea- and air-based technologies that the Bush administration wants to explore will not be ready for field testing for years. In other words, substantial advances must be made before the treaty would become an obstacle. As Philip Coyle, who headed the Pentagon’s testing office until earlier this year, testified to Congress in July, “In the near term, the ABM treaty hinders neither development nor testing.”

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There is literally nothing to be gained from leaving the treaty now. The United States can continue to pursue the land-based system and aggressively test other platforms. The Russians, who want to preserve the treaty, even are willing to consider amending it to allow the U.S. to conduct tests the treaty forbids--amendments that President Bush promised he would seek but now is refusing to consider.

The likely costs of pulling out of the treaty, however, are readily apparent. Even if one discounts the argument that Russia and China would react by building up their nuclear arsenals and blocking nonproliferation efforts, it should be patently obvious that antagonizing Moscow and Beijing at this time would only hinder our paramount foreign policy objective: winning the war on terrorism.

Exiting the treaty just as we have asked for international help in rooting out Al Qaeda and combating global terrorism would be nothing less than a slap in the face of the world community. It shows that despite the willingness of other states to take risks to help the United States and to cultivate long-term international stability, the U.S. will retain a narrow view of its own interests and ignore the legitimate security needs of its partners.

The obvious consequence is that others will feel free to act without regard to U.S. interests. Responding Tuesday to the prospect of U.S. withdrawal from the treaty, one former Russian official echoed the tone of President Vladimir V. Putin’s remarks in recent months, saying, “It is bad for the rest of the world. It is bad for Russia, but it’s your decision.”

That may sound like grudging acceptance, but expect to hear that same laissez-faire attitude turned against U.S. interests frequently in the coming months and years. For example, if the United States asks Russia to stem its nuclear technology transfers to Iran, a known sponsor of terrorism, the response could well be, “We understand that you think it is bad for the United States and the world, but it is our decision.”

In short, expect a world in which short-term, narrowly defined national interest trumps long-term nonproliferation efforts and stability, a world in which global cooperation will decrease at the exact moment we need it most to combat terror and ensure that weapons of mass destruction do not find their way to the likes of Al Qaeda.

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The ABM treaty will not impede U.S. testing for years, and withdrawing now will simply incur most of missile defense’s costs immediately while doing nothing to bring its still-theoretical benefits any closer. Withdrawal from the treaty at this particular moment is unnecessary and dangerous.

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J. Peter Scoblic is the editor of Arms Control Today.

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