Opening Air Assault Is Limited in Scope, Weapons

The U.S. airstrikes against Afghanistan used only a limited number of aircraft and cruise missiles, yet the attack appears to have had easily enough punch to knock out most of the country’s strategic targets in a single night.

The strike opened with a fusillade of cruise missiles to destroy air defenses, communications nodes and other large fixed sites, then followed with precision munitions and gravity bombs to destroy smaller and more dispersed targets.

Because the Taliban regime has a small and mostly decrepit military, the 40 attack planes and 50 cruise missiles were concentrated on only a few dozen targets: air bases, air-defense sites, command-and-control sites and terrorist camps among them.

The attacks probably destroyed most of these targets, immediately diminishing the Taliban’s ability to fight back, according to Pentagon officials and outside analysts. There has been no independent confirmation of damage caused by the strikes.

The Pentagon intended the strikes to give the United States control of the skies over Afghanistan and to ensure that the Taliban will be hard pressed to shoot down the helicopter-borne special operations forces that might have already begun searching the rugged terrain for Osama bin Laden and members of his Al Qaeda terrorist network.

But the Bush administration had important indirect goals.

It hoped the strikes, by demonstrating U.S. military power, would provoke divisions within the Taliban. The administration also wanted to slow operations by the terrorists, throw them off balance and perhaps flush them into the open.

And it wanted to strengthen the hand of the anti-Taliban opposition and force the Taliban to concentrate its 50,000-man force in a way that will make them vulnerable to coming U.S. strikes.

Reports from Afghanistan indicated that U.S. strikes hit the compound in Kandahar that is home to Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar. But defense officials and outside experts said the Pentagon probably went to some lengths to avoid civilian casualties, in order to maintain international support.

Strike Reveals Material Weakness of Campaign

Although the strikes apparently took out the lights in Kabul, the capital, analysts speculated that the military probably dropped “soft kill” munitions that short-circuit power plants but don’t take them out permanently. This approach was used in the 1999 air campaign on behalf of the Yugoslav province of Kosovo to limit injuries to the civilian population.

Daniel Goure, an analyst at Lexington Institute, a Virginia defense think tank, said the Bush administration might have chosen to hit office buildings in Kabul at night partly in hopes that such a strategy would limit casualties.

With international opinion so important to this campaign, he said, “There has to be tremendous sensitivity to civilian casualties.”

The strikes revealed one important weakness in the U.S. position.

To avoid domestic political problems for U.S. allies in the region, none of the attack planes were flown from the soil of the Islamic countries nearby.

The airplanes flew either from U.S. and British ships in the region, the British-controlled island of Diego Garcia or, in the case of the B-2 Stealth bomber, from the United States.

This approach appeared to cause no problems Sunday. But over time, the limited access to basing in neighboring countries could strain the military effort.

Military officers and outside analysts said the approach was similar to those the United States has used in recent years in the Balkans and against Iraq.

The cruise missiles were launched from Navy surface ships and British submarines in the Arabian Sea, and perhaps also from B-52 bombers. Because the missiles have a range of up to 1,000 miles and fly too low for radar detection, they are customarily used against air defenses.

Navy F-14 and F-18 fighters from the carriers Carl Vinson and Enterprise followed up with laser-guided bombs.

Approach Follows Familiar Pattern

B-2 Stealth bombers, flying from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, were used to drop the satellite-guided bombs called Joint Direct Attack Munitions. These bombs can be delivered with great precision even when cloud cover would throw off laser-guided bombs.

In addition, the B-1 and B-52 bombers followed up by using so-called gravity bombs for the carpet bombing of larger areas. This approach was used to hit terrorist training camps, airfields and perhaps also military depots containing trucks and tanks.

One senior defense official acknowledged that the strikes followed a familiar approach, saying it was chosen because it is known to be effective in such circumstances.

“We have a good plan, and we use it,” he said.

This official said that Sunday’s effort was as large as the airstrikes that opened a three-day bombing campaign against Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in December 1998. That operation was in response to Iraq’s refusal to allow United Nations weapons inspectors access to various sites.

After Sunday’s attack, one question that remains unanswered is how well the Taliban--which had nearly a month’s notice of the U.S.’ intent--was able to hide some of its military equipment.

The Afghan regime might have hidden some mobile surface-to-air missiles that are a threat to U.S. aircraft, as well as mobile military communications equipment.

During the Persian Gulf War, Iraq concealed some of its aircraft in hardened bunkers. But some analysts are skeptical that the Taliban has the resources to do that.

The Pentagon will be using surveillance flights in the next few days to determine the attack’s success.

“We’ll probably find out we hit some and missed some others,” said Gordon Adams, head of the Security Policy Studies program at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

Typically, the military will send attack planes back to strike targets again on subsequent days if it finds it did not destroy them on the first try.

Analysts stressed that whatever the success of the strikes, such bombing can be only a first step in this campaign.

“It’s not sustainable to treat this like Kosovo. You can’t get terrorists from 35,000 feet over the long term,” said Daniel Benjamin, a Mideast expert and a staffer at the National Security Council in the Clinton administration.

“What they can get perhaps is upheaval in the Taliban. That would certainly be an enormous stride forward. But I think this has to be looked at as a first step, but not a modus operandi for a long term.”

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Operation Briefing The Attack

Fifty cruise missiles, followed by precision munitions and gravity bombs.

Forty U.S. attack planes, which took off from Britain’s base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, aircraft carriers in the region and the U.S. mainland.

The Goals

To give the U.S. control of the skies over Afghanistan, and thus to protect Allied pilots in the future.

To sow division within the Taliban.

To disrupt terrorists’ operations and perhaps flush them out.

To bolster the Taliban’s foes.

To force the Taliban to concentrate its 50,000-man force, thus making it more vulnerable in future attacks.

To inspire fear in other nations who harbor terrorists.

The Humanitarian Effort

Food and medicine packets dropped for civilians.

Leaflets and radio broadcasts explaining the purpose of the U.S. assaults and offering a reward for information on the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden and his confederates.

The Diplomacy

President Bush notifies allies, calling Russian President Vladimir V. Putin himself.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell plans a visit to Pakistan and India at the end of the week.

The Future

More days of bombing and continued efforts to keep the U.S. coalition intact.

Bin Laden’s Reaction

“I swear to God that America will not live in peace before peace reigns in Palestine, and before all the army of infidels depart the land of Muhammad, peace be upon him.”