Iraq Colored the Debate Over How to Rein in Iran

The bruising diplomatic wars that preceded the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq three years ago cast a long shadow over the debate on whether to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council and slowed efforts to rein in Tehran’s nuclear program.

Many in Washington believed that Iran should have been referred to the Security Council when Tehran’s secret uranium enrichment program was discovered by the international community 2 1/2 years ago, but the Bush administration had to overcome skepticism from the international community after the way it handled Iraq. The U.S. finally won a measure of success Saturday, when the International Atomic Energy Agency’s board voted to send the matter on to the council.

American credibility on the issue of limiting weapons of mass destruction was damaged in Iraq, where the administration’s accusations of nuclear, chemical and biological programs proved groundless. Meanwhile, the war triggered in part by the search for those weapons grinds on with scant hope of ending soon.

The U.S. would be in a stronger position to argue for using collective international action against Iran if it had not short-circuited international deliberations in early 2003 before going into Iraq, argued Mark Brzezinski, a former National Security Council aide under President Clinton. “We’re reaping what we sowed here,” he said.

“You can understand why the concerns exist,” said Wayne White, a senior official in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research until last year. For many countries, some of the messages emanating from Washington still sound too much like what was said before the Iraqi invasion. President Bush’s strong words about Iran in last week’s State of the Union message might have “almost sounded like ‘axis of evil’ stuff,” he said.

Although U.S. diplomats are reluctant to make the comparison openly, there is a tacit acknowledgment that in the case of Iran they now see the wisdom of not pushing too hard, too fast.

“One of the things we know is that to be successful in dealing with the challenge that Iran places on us all [we must] work with the Europeans and others to bring them on board,” said one Western diplomat in Vienna who requested anonymity.

“The more we build up this coalition approach, the better chances we have of success to persuade what appears to be a very determined leadership in Tehran not to continue down the path they’ve been going.”

George Perkovich, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, said in this case there is no effective military option. “There’s recognition from [what happened with] Iraq that the U.S. cannot solve the Iran problem alone. Related to that, there is no military option that gives you high confidence that you’ve solved the nuclear issue, even for a short time, without creating consequences that are so bad that you can’t work with them.”

Military options are restrained in part because Iran could strike back at U.S. forces in Iraq. In addition, military experts say, Iranians are believed to be able to disperse their nuclear facilities among underground sites, making the success of even a long-term bombing campaign doubtful.

“Given that you don’t have a military option, you really can’t do it alone,” Perkovich added.

In the end the U.S. -- which cut diplomatic ties with Iran in 1980 after the hostage crisis -- had little choice but to let France, Germany and Britain take the lead in talks with Tehran. The European nations sought a freeze on Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for economic incentives. When those negotiations stalled late last year, it was the Europeans who declared a stalemate. In this way, the administration and its European allies united on Iran policy in a way that they never did on Iraq.

In the same vein, Washington showed patience in letting Moscow and Beijing explore ways to solve issues with Iran before they finally agreed to send the matter to the Security Council. That move so far has helped avert a split among the five permanent -- and veto-wielding -- members of that body.

The U.S., which had pressured Moscow to abandon its involvement in the construction of the Bushehr power plant on Iran’s southern coast, has even agreed in principle that Russia could process on Iran’s behalf lower-grade uranium for civilian use if it would help prevent Iran from acquiring the means to manufacture a nuclear weapon.

On Saturday, the Iranian ambassador to the IAEA said that reporting Iran to the Security Council merely set the stage for unjustified military action.

The Bush administration went out of its way to say that no military action was being contemplated and that the United States was not even asking for sanctions.

In the end, faced with widespread suspicions about Tehran’s intentions and a fair degree of unity among the major powers, Iran was able to rally to its side only three of the 35 member nations on the IAEA board: Cuba, Syria and Venezuela. Libya, South Africa, Algeria, Belarus and Indonesia abstained.

An Arab diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, said sour memories of Iraq were less influential in the region than the anxiety created by a prospect that Iran would become armed with a nuclear weapon.

“We all know that they are pushing their program as hard as they can.”