Drive to Save the MX Missile

I have cut out and plan to save your editorial (Feb. 28), “Bury the MX.” I am keeping it, not because I’m for or against the MX missile, but because, in a few years, I would like to remind you of it and ask that you please eat it!

A careful reading of the editorial’s last full paragraph reveals that you support development and deployment of the Midgetman ICBM. That’s interesting. I would like to wager money that before five years has passed you will publish editorials opposing deployment of the Midgetman for one, or both, of the following reasons.

First, you will oppose it for the same reason the mobile medium range ballistic missile was scuttled more than 20 years ago. Typically, you will be creeping along in your car in heavy traffic some morning or evening and realize that the innocent looking semi-trailer along side of you could well contain a Midgetman with a thermonuclear warhead. “Heavens!”, you will think, “We can’t have this!” Henceforth, your editorial policy will be in opposition to the Midgetman.

Secondly, you seem to oppose any system that has a chance of being a viable defense for the nation. If this is so, and this viewpoint is shared by a majority of the people, perhaps the question is really one of deciding whether or not we wish to defend ourselves at all.

In his latest book, “How Democracies Perish,” Jean-Francois Revel, the French philosopher, takes a rather dim view of the survivability of the existing democracies. He seems to think they’ll expire by the turn of the century by surrendering to the Soviet Union, but he thinks the reasons for this will come from the democracies themselves. You might say that he thinks they’ll self-destruct. He points out that a democratic form of government has not been a normal form of government for mankind and that it has occurred only twice during mankind’s recorded history.

I know I’m not alone in thinking that if we want to defend ourselves we’d better get our act together. Soon. Time is running out. We do not now have a credible defense. Shortly, our population will be hostage to the Soviets and we will then do whatever they wish us to do.

Doesn’t anyone remember that we had a close call 45 years ago? Does no one remember the uselessness and futility of the peace treaties of the 1920s and 1930s? Doesn’t anyone remember the paper hanger with the funny mustache who almost won Europe? Does no one remember the “Miracle at Midway” that prevented a run on bookstores that carried Japanese-English dictionaries? Deja vu . We repeat the same behavior over and over again.

Oh, but the atomic bomb changed everything, you counter. Well, that’s what was said about gunpowder. Does no one remember that more people were killed in each of several German cities (Dresden comes to mind) than were killed by either of our A-bombs? In fact, the A-bombs saved millions of lives, probably including my own. Is there no one to proclaim, “Give me liberty, or give me death”? Is no one willing to sacrifice his life for freedom? Revel does not seem to think so.

I’ll watch for your editorial, “Bury the Midgetman,” to appear. When it does, I’ll send you a copy of “Bury the MX.”

FRANK A. QUACKENBUSH

Anaheim

Your editorial should be commended for accurately and forcefully pointing out reasons why Congress should finally lay to rest the troubled missile. I agree with your conclusion that the MX lacks a clearly defined military need and “is of questionable value on the bargaining table” if it is ever actually put up for trade, which seems doubtful. I would, however, like to challenge some underlying assumptions of your argument leading to this conclusion.

You advise that the United States can “make do” with the existing Minuteman missiles until the sea-launched D-5 missiles are ready (presently scheduled to begin deployment in 1989 aboard Ohio-class nuclear submarines.) While noting this missile is “highly accurate,” the editorial fails to recognize the resulting strategic implications.

Deployment of survivable submarine-launched missiles does make much more sense than placing the MX in admittedly vulnerable Minuteman silos, but the D-5 remains an equally destabilizing weapon nonetheless. Its lethal accuracy and short flight time exceed the requirements for a second-strike capability and certainly would be viewed by the Soviets as fostering an offensive posture. As a recent Congressional Research Service study notes, the D-5 “is ideal for launching a first strike.”

Is this the type of nuclear deterrent American national security concerns dictate? Does the United States really need the D-5? The answer, in my opinion, is a resounding no. Existing C-4 missiles can continue to provide an effective, invulnerable deterrent without the provocative accuracy of the D-5. Deployment of extremely accurate, MIRVed missiles will only illicit dangerous Soviet countermeasures, such as a policy of launch-on-warning, but will not enhance American security.

Further, the military rationale for the MX, which the editorial criticizes, is similar to the thinking behind the D-5: to offer an accurate system threatening to hardened Soviet assets inducing “caution and restraint into Soviet geopolitical activities.” This was the view of a report recently submitted to Congress by the President on the need for the MX as a bargaining chip. It is not clear if the D-5 is intended as a bargaining chip but it would be safe to say at this point that is not likely.

In condemning the MX and endorsing the D-5 you fail to note the similarities of these first-strike weapons. As far as I can see, the primary reason for support of the D-5 is the survivability it derives from its sea-based mode. While this is important, survivability should not preclude other destabilizing elements of D-5 deployment. A strategy designed to remedy U.S. survivability problems by threatening Soviet strategic forces is not likely to enhance the prospects for arms control nor increase security.

Let us bury the Peacekeeper. But let’s not endorse equally dangerous weapons waiting in the wings as part of this process. We must not support weapon systems simply because they are the lesser of two evils. It is this sort of reasoning that will permit the mistake of the MX to be repeated.

GREGORY DALTON

Los Angeles

I take issue with a couple of points in your editorial. Would anything survive an “all-out Soviet attack?” you ask. The answer is “yes.” Silo vulnerability was one small part of the rationale for Peacekeeper. While silo vulnerability has some effect on the deterrence capability, that capability is actually based on a combination of ICBMs, U.S. bombers and sub-launched missiles. Even if the Soviets try the “all-out attack,” they stand to win the inning but lose the ball game.

Peacekeeper, in today’s world, is constantly referred to as an “arms control chip.” While currently treated in such a manner, the reason for Peacekeeper is to redress the strategic balance through increased capability and thus preserve the peace and freedom of the United States. According to my information, the Soviet Union now has more than 800 ICBMs, as large or larger, than Peacekeeper.

Inaccuracies, and lack of logic, are continued through your editorial suggestion for maintaining Minuteman, the sub-launched missiles and cruise missiles until the Trident II D-5 and the small ICBM are in the force.

You do not mention the effects that aging, relatively small payloads, accuracy, “clear” oceans, look-down radar, costs, or development, test and deployment times could have on existing and proposed systems and their usefulness as deterrent weapons or “arms control bargaining chips.”

EDWARD A. STEARN

Redlands

Stearn is national director and a member of the National Executive Committee of the Air Force Assn.