Sending a Nuclear-Export Signal

The Israeli government claims that it didn’t know that a Huntington Beach man was violating U.S. law by exporting devices to Israel that could be used in nuclear weapons. It says that the high-technology triggering devices, called krytrons, were not being used for nuclear-weapons purposes in any case, and it offers to return those that have not been used.

Unfortunately, such statements cannot be taken at face value, because Israel never signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, has never allowed outside inspection of a suspect reactor at Dimona and is widely believed to have components that are ready for assembly into as many as 20 nuclear weapons.

It is important that other countries in the Middle East not be given reason to believe that the United States is surreptitiously aiding the nuclear program in Israel while working to restrain suspect nuclear programs in Iraq and Pakistan.

By prosecuting the Huntington Beach man on charges of illegally exporting the devices to Israel without the required licenses, the Reagan Administration is sending an appropriate signal that it won’t wink at circumvention of nuclear-export controls even when the recipient country is friendly.

However, this case, together with similar incidents involving Pakistan, suggest that both U.S. and international controls over sensitive nuclear technology need tightening if the spread of nuclear weapons is to be prevented.

Krytrons, which have civilian as well as military uses, can be sold legally inside the United States. But a special license is required for sales to customers abroad.

According to the indictment that was returned by a federal grand jury last week, Richard Kelly Smyth bought 800 of the devices between 1980 and 1982 and shipped them to Israel without the required licenses. He is also accused of making false statements to the government in the matter.

Smyth’s guilt or innocence will be determined in court. But you can’t help wondering how many such transactions go undetected.

The Pakistanis, who are believed to be on the verge of nuclear-weapons capability, managed to buy relevant technology and equipment from Great Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland, among others.

The United States has led an international effort to control the traffic in sensitive technologies. But a Pakistani businessman pleaded guilty in Houston last fall of trying to export 50 high-speed switches that could be used to trigger nuclear bombs. In another case Pakistani representatives allegedly circumvented U.S. controls by purchasing key electrical components through Canada.

For years the State Department has been pressing Congress to increase the punishment for arms-export violations to a maximum of 10 years in prison and/or a $1-million fine. Rep. Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.) has proposed an amendment to the foreign-aid bill under which any nation illegally acquiring or trying to acquire material that could be used in making nuclear explosives would be cut off from American aid.

These proposals may need some fine-tuning, but there is no excuse for further procrastination.