Lipping Off About Libya

This has not been a good week for clarity of thought and precision of expression in American foreign policy. Early on the Reagan Administration leaked word that it had fresh evidence of planned Libyan troublemaking, and hinted that preemptive military strikes against Col. Moammar Kadafi’s regime were not to be ruled out. Almost immediately, though, whatever sense of danger the Administration meant to convey became lost in a fog of denials and contradictions. Remarks taken as authoritative one day were disclaimedthe next. The interpretations of one spokesman were promptly reinterpreted by another. The Administration began the week with an apparent effort to show its prescience and firmness.

It ended the week by looking internally torn and confused.

One officially inspired line has it that Washington is up to nothing more complex than trying to agitate Kadafi, maybe--heh, heh, heh--to push him into some crazy act that would justify giving Libya another military thumping. Another idea is that the United States simply is trying to encourage its European allies to do more to increase Libya’s economic and political isolation. The Europeans, though, right now seem to be more alarmed than inspired. Their response to reports of threatened U.S. military action against Libya recalls the response of the Duke of Wellington as he surveyed his ragtag army. I don’t know if they’ll frighten the enemy, said the duke, but by God they frighten me.

Rattling the Europeans may indeed have been what the Administration had in mind, the rather crude message being that if they don’t get tougher with Kadafi the United States will again put its bombers into the air. To accept this interpretation is not, of course, to dismiss the claims that Kadafi, faithful to his nature and his ideology, continues to plot terrorism against Europe and the United States. But is that plotting any more advanced or worrisome now than it was before the April 15 attack on Tripoli sent Kadafi scurrying into the desert? Some in Washington say that it is. Others, typically, aren’t so sure.

If the evidence is in fact solid, the thing to do is share it quickly and quietly with allied political leaders and intelligence services so that concerted steps can be taken to stop whatever nastiness Kadafi has in mind, before it occurs. If the evidence is soft, there’s no point in talking about it, because there’s no point in unnecessarily raising tensions and inviting doubts about U.S. credibility. Whatever the quality of the evidence that the Administration may have, it seems indisputable that it did a lousy job of flaunting it this week. It set out to look informed and tough. It succeeded only in looking uncertain and inept.