Respect for a Historian’s Role

In late 1985 President Reagan invited Edmund Morris, the author of a distinguished biography of Theodore Roosevelt, to come to the White House as a kind of historian-in-residence. Morris was given a unique opportunity to observe the inner workings of the Reagan Administration. Eventually, after Reagan has left the presidency, Morrisis to publish his biography. Though it would be an insider’s view, done with official cooperation, Reagan would not have approval rights over the book. Historians generally applauded this effort toward what could be an unusually informed and candid study by a respected scholar.

It now appears that from his fly-on-the-wall vantage point Morris could have gained some information about Reagan’s role in the Iran-arms /contras affair. That at least is the surmise of some of those investigating the scandal, including the staff of the select Senate committee. Committee investigators are considering subpoenaing Morris and his notes. Sen. William S. Cohen (R-Me.), a committee member, says that calling Morris would be “relevant,” but “the question is whether it’s appropriate.” The answer, it seems to us, is that it would not be appropriate for Morris to be asked to testify to any investigative body about his White House tenure.

Morris is not an official member of the Administration, and so it is unlikely that the material to which he has had access is covered by executive privilege. But the nature of that material remains unknown. What Morris may have some knowledge of, then, could be determined only if he cooperated with one or another of the investigating bodies. There are, we think, strong reasons why he should not be asked to do so.

One of those reasons, notes attorney Floyd Abrams, an expert on the First Amendment, is that by preparing a book that will reveal “heretofore unknown and unknowable information of the highest order of interest” Morris is performing a major service to the public. The fulfillment of that project, and indeed the launching of any similar project in a future Administration, would be jeopardized and almost certainly ended if efforts were made to compel Morris to reveal information that he obtained in confidence. The arrangement between Morris and his publisher on one side and the White House on the other is that he will not publish anything until at least two years after Reagan leaves office. This agreement may not be a barrier to a subpoena. But it has been central to allowing Morris the special access that he has enjoyed, and it remains central to the eventual publication of a historical study of possibly great value.

Investigating bodies are frustrated because key participants in the Iran-arms affair have refused to testify about what they did and what they know. Investigators need to get at the facts, but Morris was not a participant in the scandal. He was at most an incidental or fortuitous observer, and whatever he may have learned came on the understanding that it would be held in confidence for at least several years after the Reagan presidency’s end. In this respect he is like a reporter who agrees to keep his sources of information confidential. The difference is that Morris was writing not for the next day’s paper but for history some years hence. That particular role, so important to the eventual preparation of an informed historical record andso important to historians and biographers who in the future might be granted similar contemporary access to a President, deserves to be respected.