Debating Legislative Term Limits

Atty. Gen. John Van de Kamp has placed a new issue on California’s political reform agenda. Last month, Van de Kamp announced he would sponsor an initiative that would, among other things, limit statewide elected officials to two consecutive terms and state legislators to 12 years of consecutive service in each house.

In advocating term limits, Van de Kamp argued that “our system of government had hardened into a gridlock of caution, incumbency protection and the servicing of special interests.” He concluded that the “drastic step” was necessary because “what we’re doing now isn’t working.”

The term-limitation idea is not really drastic or new. We limit Presidents, and 26 states limit governors, to two terms.

But no state limits terms of state legislators. Nor does the federal Constitution limit congressional terms. Thus, the Van de Kamp proposal is, in this respect at least, a radical one. Nevertheless, given certain conditions in California politics today, a reasonable case can be made for the imposition of such limits.

At the heart of that case is the reality that political competition is virtually extinct at the state level. In the last three legislative campaigns (1982, 1984, 1986), only three incumbents seeking reelection lost, and 273 incumbents won.

Reductions in electoral competition in turn yield reductions in legislative turnover. Electoral safety not only enables incumbents to stay where they are, it also discourages them from challenging other equally secure incumbents in other offices. While 49 new members entered the Assembly between 1978-82, only 21 of the current 80 members have been elected in the last six years. Turnover rates are even lower in the Senate.

Such low levels of competition and turnover may result in a loss of electoral and legislative vitality and the responsiveness of the Legislature to new ideas and changing political styles.

In addition to the natural advantages (name identification, connections, etc.) held by incumbents, there would appear to be two main causes of today’s low levels of legislative competition and turnover. The power of the Legislature to redraw legislative district boundaries generally results in safer seats for large numbers--if not the majority--of incumbents. During the last 10 to 20 years, most parts of the state have grown increasingly competitive. Gerrymandered district lines can insulate the Legislature from this trend.

And incumbents, who are able to raise almost unlimited sums from special-interest groups, maintain nearly insurmountable fund-raising advantages over potential challengers. In the non-election year of 1987, legislative candidates raised more than $25 million, 98% of it going to incumbents. During the 1988 elections, incumbents outspent all other candidates combined by almost 5 to 1. Term limitations would address the incumbency-advantage problem. They would force more competition and turnover, especially since many incumbents would, as they approached their limit in one house, challenge incumbents in other races.

Term limits also have disadvantages. There is value to experience and expertise in public office, and limitations that force out numerous high-quality lawmakers at the peak of their effectiveness could have undesirable impacts on the legislative process. In addition, term limits may increase conflict-of-interest pressures on some legislators, especially if the limits imposed are too stringent.

Such a circumstance could reduce the productivity and energy of the Legislature, and it may expose many members to the influence of those--special interests and others--capable of easing a transition from public to private life.

The key element in the case against term limits hinges on the democratic right of the electorate to elect whom it chooses, including incumbents. This argument has obvious merit. It would be even more compelling in a truly competitive political environment. This is not the case in today’s California. The incumbent’s right to seek reelection amounts to a virtual guarantee of reelection. Thus, allowing incumbents the right to unlimited terms carries the heavy price tag of seriously diminishing opportunities for competition, debate and choice.

The most obvious alternative means of generating competition entail redrawing legislative district boundaries and reducing the enormous advantages now afforded incumbents by the current mechanisms of campaign financing. Reforms such as a ban on non-election-year fund-raising, which reduces incumbents’ advantages, or public financing, which increases challengers’ chances, would unquestionably stimulate more political competition. A redistricting plan drawn by some entity other than legislative incumbents could also dramatically alter the non-competitive environment.

In the absence of these reforms, term limitations seem more appealing. But such limits should allow for reasonably lengthy tenure in office and, and thus, for the development of adequate levels of experience and expertise. In addition, a term-limits proposal might be strengthened by the inclusion of certain ethics reforms, including revolving-door provisions and restrictions on outside earned income. These might reduce the conflict-of-interest dilemmas that term limitations can engender.