Data Isn’t Always Pertinent to the Main Question: Can He Play?

Every NFL team has its draft pick from hell, the high-round choice that flops and flails for all to see.

The Rams will forever wince at the mention of Mike Schad and Donald Evans, the team’s first choices in 1986 and ‘87, respectively. Gaston Green, a No. 1 pick in ‘88, is threatening to make it a flop threesome.

Meanwhile, the Raiders went through a similar three-year period when they wasted No. 1 picks on Jessie Hester (1985), Bob Buczkowski (‘86) and John Clay (‘87). None of the three remains on the Raider roster today.

The Rams and Raiders aren’t alone. The Cincinnati Bengals picked Jason Buck in the first round of the 1987 draft. He bombed. Ted Gregory was the Denver Broncos’ first choice in 1988. Bombed. That same year, the New Orleans Saints used a No. 1 pick on Craig Heyward. Bombed.

Assessing NFL potential remains as fickle a process as it was at the draft’s beginning 54 years ago. The tools have become more sophisticated, but the problem is the same--mainly, whom to select?

The all-star games and scouting combine drills, those pseudo-scientific opportunities for study, were supposed to help solve the mysteries of draft day. For the most part, they do, giving coaches and scouts the perfect opportunity to watch players at close range.

But information overload isn’t always such a good thing. It can confuse rather than clarify. Perspective gets misplaced.

“I’m one of those way-backs that think the final has already taken place during the football season,” said George Young, general manager of the New York Giants. “Now you’ve got to be very careful. Doing drills and playing football are not the same thing. Being a good football player and being a good athlete are not the same thing.

“Running like a gazelle as an offensive lineman doesn’t mean anything if you won’t hit anybody.”

Said Jack Faulkner, Ram administrator of football operations: “Sometimes (we) get wrapped up on too much stuff, instead of concentrating to see if the son-of-a-gun can actually play in the National Football League.”

In the early 1960s, it was Faulkner, then with the Denver Broncos, who helped conceive the idea of a scouting combine. At the time, only three teams were involved, and the main purpose was to provide exact, detailed medical information on each pro prospect.

Since then, the combine has become a multi-purpose event, complete with agility drills, intelligence tests, weight and strength measurements and, on occasion, even something related to football. It is also where many a draft mistake is made.

“A great combine means a guy runs a fast time, on AstroTurf, indoors, with a track start, and the conditions are great,” Faulkner said. “But if (a scout) puts too much emphasis on it, that’s where you get screwed up. It’s only on a one-day basis. Plus, those other drills they do, I don’t know what they get out of them.”

Faulkner takes that back. He likes the vertical jump test, but thinks that whoever thought of a four-square cone test ought to stand in a corner and wear one of the cones.

“The trick is not to overanalyze too much,” he said. “Most of these guys in the combine you should have seen (on film or in person) during the last two years. If you make an evaluation just on (their combine drills in) Indianapolis, you can screw it up.”

There are other dangers, Faulkner said, including:

--Beware of the stopwatch. “Mistakes are made, especially when you rely on speed alone,” he said. “A (scout) gets overwhelmed when he sees a guy run a 4.45 (seconds in the 40-yard dash).”

--Statistics lie. “It all depends on the offense,” he said. “A guy might catch a jillion footballs. But if you go on that alone, you may be totally wrong.”

--Don’t always trust a college coach’s evaluation of one of his own players. “Sometimes they go overboard in their recommendations,” he said.

--Draft for talent, but also draft a player who fits your system. Faulkner wouldn’t say it, but this may be the reason Green has struggled so much.

--Never overestimate the ability of a small-college player to make the transition to the NFL. By the way, did someone mention Schad or Evans?

Faulkner will get little argument from Young, who said that if the combine were strictly used for medical exams, “I wouldn’t be one of the great complainers.” Young calls the exams “the most important thing--essential.”

Everything else is to be greeted with suspicion.

So wary is Young of a player’s all-star game or combine experience, that when Giant management first meets to discuss draft picks, no mention of the postseason play is permitted. “We grade on what a player does during the season and we don’t mix the (postseason) grades until later,” he said.

“Some players can be flashers,” he said. “They flash excellent skills (during an all-star game), but the problem is, they don’t have consistency. I want to know how he is over a long period of time.”