Gates Blasts ‘Lousy’ Job by Prosecution in King Beating Case : LAPD: D.A.’s office treated police ‘like the enemy,’ allowing defense to seize initiative, ex-chief says in new book chapter.

Former Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl F. Gates says in a new post-riot chapter added to his book that prosecutors did a “lousy job” in the Rodney G. King beating case against four of his officers, partly because they treated LAPD officials “like the enemy.”

Gates also claims in the new section that the city’s financial woes inhibited his ability to put the department on a full riot-ready footing before the spring unrest. He said the $1-million-per-day cost of such a mobilization would have appeared wasteful if there had been no disturbances.

He devotes much of the postscript to retelling his side of the handling of the riots. He spreads blame widely and shoulders some himself, notably for his presence at a Westside political fund-raiser as the riots broke out.

In his fullest explanation of that much-criticized excursion, he recounts moving along the freeway and growing “edgier and edgier” as news radio reports flashed the trouble near Florence and Normandie avenues. By car phone he ordered the elite Metro Division to move in. But he kept going. “It was a big mistake. . . . I shouldn’t have spent 20 seconds at that political meeting.”

In his criticism of the district attorney, he accuses prosecutors of mishandling the beating case by permitting the defense to seize the initiative on the key issue of proper use of force. It was not until after an LAPD expert hired by the defense gave strong testimony supporting the officers that prosecutors scrambled to find their own LAPD expert on the issue, Gates writes.

“Because of a tactical error of the part of the D.A., (the department was) put in the awkward position of having to make up lost ground,” Gates writes.

He also faults prosecutors for not being candid with the jury about King’s criminal background and activities prior to the beating. Such a tactic would have allowed them to forcefully stress that, despite those factors, “Rodney King should not have been beaten into compliance,” Gates writes.

Gates writes that he expected Officer Laurence M. Powell, who struck the most blows on King, to be convicted on assault charges. None of the officers were convicted.

“In my opinion, the prosecution did a lousy job,” writes Gates. “We had been trying for 14 months to assist the district attorney, and all they did was treat us like the enemy.”

At a news conference Tuesday at radio station KFI, where he hosts a talk show, Gates said, “I think the jury felt a little bit hoodwinked” by the prosecution.

The district attorney’s office, citing the officers’ pending trial in federal court, refused comment.

Gates also discloses in the new chapter, written for a just-released paperback edition, that three days into the civil disorder that followed the King verdicts his son was hospitalized--unconscious from an overdose. The son, Scott, had a history of drug-related problems.

“The day became a blur,” Gates writes. In poignant irony, he recalls fearing his son would die. Knowing he might be called away, he had to share the family crisis with his political arch-rival--a man he had not spoken with for more than a year prior to the riots. “The only other person I confided in was Tom Bradley,” Gates writes. “He was very sympathetic.”

Gates also reiterates his assertion that the LAPD had a riot plan.

But the LAPD was in “a sticky situation all around,” Gates writes, needing to gear up for a possible disturbance but fearful of giving the impression it was inciting unrest.

The fundamental error, Gates argues, was the failure to execute the LAPD’s longstanding emergency response plan. Apparently commanders were intimidated and indecisive after a 14-month barrage of criticism of the force, he writes.

Gates reserves some of his strongest jabs for Deputy Chief Matthew Hunt, top commander at the South Los Angeles command post on the first night of the riots. He recounts yelling at Hunt when he arrived at the command post and found officers not properly deployed hours after violence erupted.

“My talented deputy chief had suddenly turned ham-handed,” Gates writes.

Hunt said he had warned Gates “on several occasions prior to (the riots) that we were ill-prepared. He must be feeling very guilty. He’s trying to point the finger at anyone but himself.”

Gates said Tuesday that his sources claim that Hunt also was reluctant to mount a high-profile police presence during last month’s flare-up of violence at Florence and Normandie.

“What I heard from the street (was) that Matthew (Hunt) wanted to back off again,” Gates said, but relented after 77th Division and Metro Division field supervisors insisted on remaining.

“I don’t know if that’s true or not, but that’s the information I have received.”

Hunt strongly denied any such dispute arose in the Dec. 14 incident. “I think Gates continues to cast his very negative and controversial shadow over the organization, all for his own personal gain, which is promoting his book,” he said.