Coordination, Training Faulted in ’93 Fire Fight : Report: County and Rand Corp. point out problems in the response to devastating Calabasas/Malibu blaze but defend effort in face of difficulties.

Communications failures, undertrained firefighters and a lack of coordination may have contributed to the devastation of the 1993 Calabasas/Malibu fire that killed three people, injured hundreds and destroyed 16,000 acres and almost 400 homes, according to a new report.

But the lengthy report prepared by the Los Angeles County Fire Department and the independent Rand Corp. defended the response of 7,000 firefighters from 485 agencies to whipping winds, 200-foot flames and inaccessible terrain spread over thousands of densely vegetated acres.

“I for one would never take away from the job done by the firefighters. They gave it their all,” said County Fire Chief P. Michael Freeman in an interview. “There are things in terms of the systems that support the firefighters that need to be improved.”

The report rejected allegations that resources were unfairly concentrated in wealthy or influential areas. Although those complaints pointed to heavy deployment in exclusive Malibu Colony and along the Pacific Coast Highway, the report found those tactics justified.

In addition to the three deaths, 21 civilians and 565 firefighters were injured in the firestorms that began Nov. 2, 1993. Damage to private property totaled $208 million. Public property losses were put at more than $10.8 million.

The 166-page, glossy book with color photographs and extensive diagrams and maps was developed from interviews, Fire Department documents, commander and general staff memos and the separate Rand report.

Perhaps the biggest problems stemmed from poor communication and coordination, which, according to the study, hampered operations, interfered with command, endangered firefighters and might have contributed to the losses.

In some areas, firefighters who suffered injuries and significant losses were surprised by the direction of the flames, in part because of difficulty in receiving radio transmissions and delays in broadcasts, Freeman said.

In other areas, out-of-town firefighters sent to Rambla Pacifico and upper Tuna Canyon worked from maps with erroneous escape routes that trapped them in their positions, according to the report.

Analysts also found that deployment information “was not always available and accurate” and that information about water availability was either not known or not shared. By 5 p.m. on Nov. 2, large fires were burning in about 15 areas and keeping track of the volume of information was nearly impossible, the report said.

Analysts noted a pressing need to update information and communication systems--ideas that Freeman endorses.

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To make improvements, the report recommended that for all brush areas, the county gather and distribute basic information about roads, escape routes, private and public water sources, building locations and the condition of the brush. Freeman said the department has prepared color-coded maps of the county’s brush areas to correct the problem.

The department is exploring satellite and other new technology to upgrade communication, Freeman said.

And trying to smoothly integrate the massive assistance provided by outside agencies in an emergency, Freeman said, will always cause some problems and missteps.

“There are brush fires and then there is a fire like this,” Freeman said. “I’m not sure you can train someone to be comfortable in something like this--we had veteran firefighters who said they had never seen anything like it.”

In terms of deployment, the Rand report found the initial dispatch to have been “appropriately massive.”

“This early, massive deployment frequently worked and allowed aggressive firefighting which saved a substantial number of homes without incurring substantial injuries to firefighters,” the Rand Corp. said.

That type of deployment was not as successful in mid-Rambla Pacifico and La Costa, where firefighters, some inexperienced, could not compete against low water availability and windy and narrow roads with significant brush canopy.

Some of the more dramatic criticisms in the report:

* Requests for water drops either went unheard or unheeded. One team protecting the Serra Retreat area reported no way to communicate the need for water drops when the area’s hydrants failed. In the mid-Rambla Pacifico area, firefighters first requested water at 4:09 p.m., 90 minutes after some team members had been overrun. A county fire pilot recounted hearing requests for water, but without enough data to determine where the drops were needed.

* The mid-Rambla Pacifico area, in which 63% of the single-family residences were destroyed and several men were injured, was being guarded by firefighters with little experience in battling brush fires. Many firefighters who responded from outside Los Angeles were also unfamiliar with the area and lost contact with their division supervisor.

* One division chief believed he had sent a strike team into the La Costa neighborhood, but the team reported to PCH. The strike team leader went to La Costa about 7 p.m., after the fire fight, for mop-up operations. “The devastation in La Costa was enormous,” the report states, “with 87 structures destroyed.”

* The division chief in Sweetwater Canyon, where four homes were lost, said he was unable to communicate with his commander or nearby teams from other agencies. While dismissing reports of uncooperative firefighters, the report concluded that it is probable that a few acted improperly “whether due to exhaustion, lack of commitment to their profession or due to lack of training in wildfires.”

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Some of the complaints were based on misinformation, according to the report. For example, homes on Villa Costera in La Costa were saved with the help of two Fire Department strike teams, rather than just residents.

“In some other accounts there seemed to be a lack of citizen appreciation of the priority that needs to be given to safety and the need to conserve both water and strength, so both can be used when effective,” the report states. “It is also important to place the three reported incidents of lack of cooperation in the context of the tremendous dedication shown by most firefighters.”

Freeman said there was an “expectation that the firefighters should be able to stop a fire like this. From my personal experience, they did everything they could possibly do.’

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1993 Firestorm 1993 Firestorm A recent report by the Los Angeles County Fire Department and Rand Corp. details the damage and resources for the Calabasas / Malibu fire in November, 1993. Point of Orgin: 2695 Old Topanga Canyon Road. Cause: Arson Firefighting personnel: 7,000- plus. Acres burned: 16,500 Fatalities: 3. Injuries: Civilian, 21; firefighter, 565. Structures lost: 388. Property loss: $208,484, 786, (estimate includes contents.) Public property loss: $10,815,000. Sources: Los Angeles County Fire Department, Rand Corporation