How debate is to unfold, and its voices

Today’s progress report to the United Nations Security Council by chief weapons inspectors Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei marks the beginning of the end of efforts to disarm Iraq though inspections, diplomats say.

The U.S. and Britain are prepared to present a second resolution as early as Saturday declaring Iraq in “material breach” of U.N. resolutions and authorizing military force, but they are more likely to do so early next week after a final round of lobbying of council members.

On Tuesday, the Security Council will allow delegates from the U.N.’s 191 members to express their views on whether Iraq has failed the tests of Security Council Resolution 1441, which was passed in November, requiring it to declare any weapons of mass destruction and to cooperate with inspectors to destroy them. The session, supported by Germany, which holds the presidency of the Security Council this month, amounts to a diplomatic filibuster and could continue through Wednesday.

“Under the present circumstances, we believe that the Security Council should support the inspectors,” Russian Ambassador Sergei V. Lavrov said Thursday. “They are getting cooperation, and we are not getting any proof that Iraq is a threat.”

The inspectors are expected to report that while Iraq has shown more cooperation in recent days, it is still not enough for inspections to be effective. Blix might also describe Iraq’s refusal to destroy Al-Samoud 2 ballistic missiles that a panel of international experts found to exceed a U.N.-imposed limit of a 93-mile range as a violation of Resolution 1441.

Since Blix’s negative report two weeks ago, Iraq has scrambled to show more cooperation. Iraqi authorities will allow inspectors to drill for soil samples at sites where chemical or biological weapons were reportedly destroyed, and they have handed over 24 new documents -- about 150 pages -- to answer inspectors’ questions.

But Iraq’s new steps have not been full ones. Three scientists have agreed to private interviews with inspectors in the last two weeks, but four more refused; the interviews then took place in hotel rooms that inspectors assume are bugged.

Iraqi authorities agreed to surveillance flights, but only with advance notification of when and where planes would be flying, as inspectors had done in the past. Long-outstanding legislation banning weapons of mass destruction and paving the way for extended monitoring by inspectors has been promised by Baghdad, but not yet passed.

Even with the new documents, Blix said that “several hundred questions are still unresolved.”

Here are profiles of the key players in the debate on Iraq:

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Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix

The Swedish diplomat knows that what he says, and especially what he doesn’t say, will be seized on by proponents of both war and peace. Hans Blix probably won’t ask for more time for inspectors, but he also won’t say inspections have failed. He probably will not say that Iraq is in material breach of the U.N. resolution, an assessment that could lead to military action. “I leave those conclusions to the Security Council,” he said. “I just deal in the facts.” U.S. national security advisor Condoleezza Rice visited him Tuesday to press the inspector to strengthen his message to the council, as she did before his last report, which was broadly negative. Blix, scrupulously neutral, bridles at the suggestion that anyone can influence him. “I am not in anybody’s pocket,” he says. “I tailored my report for no one. I tailored my report for the truth.”

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U.S. Ambassador John D. Negroponte

John D. Negroponte, a plain-spoken, multilingual career diplomat, plays the heavy in the Security Council. He reminds council members at every opportunity of President Bush’s challenge to the United Nations on Sept. 12: Act on Iraq or become irrelevant. But he does it quietly. A former deputy to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, he is regarded as methodical and cautious, but firm. The U.S. is betting that through a combination of persuasion and pressure, it can win at least nine of 15 council votes and avoid a veto by any of the three permanent members who oppose action: France, China and Russia. Negroponte says that council members knew that war was possible when they passed Resolution 1441 unanimously in November, and that now is the time to act. “Inspections are a poor substitute for compliance,” he said. “Without Iraqi cooperation, it’s very hard to see how inspections can work.”

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British Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock

As Washington pounds the U.S. message home, Jeremy Greenstock uses careful persuasion to make the case that Iraq cannot be contained only by inspections. He arranges special sessions with the 10 nonpermanent members of the Security Council to keep them from feeling out of the loop. His friends on the council call him “the headmaster” for his professorial bearing; Britain’s foes call him “the American spokesman.” Mounting antiwar sentiment in Britain makes it difficult for the government to support military action without United Nations backing. While the United States also prefers U.N. approval, Britain seems to be willing to wait longer and work harder to win it.

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French Ambassador Jean-Marc de la Sabliere

To the French ambassador, the Iraq debate has an element of deja vu -- he was France’s deputy ambassador to the United Nations in 1991 during the Persian Gulf War. Jean-Marc de la Sabliere plays his diplomatic cards very close to the vest, which makes other council members believe he either is holding his veto ready to use or doesn’t believe he has a strong hand to play. The French are leading the resistance to military action and have proposed that the U.N. send more inspectors to Iraq and install full-time monitors. Paris argues that military action would destabilize the region, take a heavy civilian toll and spark retaliatory attacks around the world. France, Russia and, to a lesser extent, China have had deep economic ties to Iraq and have become opponents of extended sanctions on Baghdad.

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Russian Ambassador Sergei V. Lavrov

He is known as a canny tactician who, diplomats say only half in jest, gives instructions to Moscow instead of the other way around. “We don’t see any reason at all to start a war without council authority,” Sergei V. Lavrov says. “The inspections must go on.” When asked if Russia was willing to use its veto to stop military action, he gave a curt nod -- and almost a smile. Often seen with a smoldering cigarette, a strong espresso and a glass of whiskey on the table at the same time, Lavrov is able to juggle the diplomatic tools of pressure, persuasion and petulance to get what Russia wants. Moscow blocked U.N. approval of military action on Kosovo, forcing the U.S. and Britain to organize a NATO-led “coalition of the willing” in 1999. While the French haven’t used their veto alone since a dispute over Suez in 1956, other council diplomats say that France is more likely than Russia to use a veto this time.