A backlash builds in Egypt

To the extent that the Obama administration has responded to the ouster of Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first freely elected president, it has largely accepted the shake-up as a necessary, if not fully legitimate, response to the bumbling incompetence and growing authoritarianism of his government. President Obama is “deeply concerned” by the military’s decision to remove Morsi, but he has not described it as a “coup” — a designation that might have imperiled the $1.3 billion in U.S. aid Egypt receives annually — or called for Morsi’s reinstatement. If anything, the White House has exuded a sense of relief that the military was back in charge.

Then, as if on cue, Egyptian troops on Monday massacred more than 51 pro-Morsi demonstrators outside the Cairo headquarters of the Republican Guard. The bloodletting puts the White House in an awkward position and lays bare the folly of embracing the supposedly pro-American military over the supposedly anti-American popularly elected government.

Let’s face it, the United States wields very little influence over anyone in Egypt — military brass included. Now, the United States is stuck with a partner in Cairo that pockets U.S. aid money — which then-U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Margaret Scobey described in a leaked 2009 embassy cable as “untouchable compensation” for upholding its end of Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel — and then does pretty much what it wants.

TIMELINE: Revolution in Egypt

This time, the military’s actions could be disastrous. Egypt’s armed forces have not only brought the 2011 uprising to an ignominious end but invited a vengeful extremist backlash in the process.

Those who celebrate Morsi’s ouster seem to think the Muslim Brotherhood — and the millions of Egyptians who are sympathetic to its cause — will suddenly and magically disappear.

This is indeed a fantasy. Even if Egypt’s fractious liberals had anything approaching a coherent plan for governing Egypt, they would not be able to defuse the ticking time bomb that is Egypt’s sizable minority of now-disenfranchised radical-leaning Islamists. These people might have been lousy democrats, but they were at least willing to embrace the process. (That they hoarded power is a pretty baseless U.S. criticism given what passes for bipartisanship in Washington now.)

This was not always the case. For most of Egypt’s modern history, banned Islamist organizations waged low-level warfare against the state. Anwar Sadat was killed by Islamist militants in 1981, and Mubarak survived at least six assassination attempts.

Now, the coup-makers would push the Islamists back underground, where their alienation, in some corridors, will almost certainly turn violent. Armed jihadist groups have already launched multiple small-scale attacks against government targets, including the El Arish airport, a Central Security facility on the border with Gaza and five other military outposts.

Islamists elsewhere in the Sinai announced the formation of Ansar al Sharia in Egypt, an armed group committed to the imposition of strict Islamic law. In a statement posted online, it called Morsi’s deposition a “war declared against Islam in Egypt” and vowed to “preserve the religion and empower the Sharia of the Lord.”

Extremist groups have operated in the Sinai for decades, a response mainly to Egypt’s heavy-handed Central Security services there and to neglect from the government in Cairo. Ultimately, however, few mainstream Islamists were sympathetic to their radical agenda.

Morsi’s ouster could very well tip the balance in favor of radicals. His mention in Ansar al Sharia in Egypt’s manifesto speaks to the power of the new recruiting tool extremists have just been handed: Even if they eschew violence and embrace democracy , there is a convincing case to be made that Islamists will never be accepted as legitimate political actors. This, no doubt, is the message that Islamists across the Arab world are drawing from events in Egypt.

The fear is not that the Brotherhood’s leadership will suddenly endorse the outright use of violence but that the failure of Egypt’s experiment with Islamic democracy will enhance the appeal of more radical players.

And for what? Egypt is now back under the stewardship of the same military that detained, tortured and killed its own citizens for the 18 months it was in charge after Mubarak’s ouster. Those who are lending a civilian face to the transition, moreover, have hardly inspired confidence with their tacit approval of the military’s harsh tactics — detaining Brotherhood members, shuttering Islamist media.

Former U.N. diplomat Mohamed ElBaradei, the most visible member of the liberal opposition, has repeatedly defended the military’s tactics. “I would be the first one to shout loud and clearly if I see any sign of regression in terms of democracy,” he told the New York Times as the crackdown was underway. To his credit, ElBaradei condemned Monday’s massacre on Twitter, but he remains committed to a military-led transition. One wonders what, exactly, would prompt ElBaradei to “shout loud and clearly.”

Ty McCormick, an associate editor at Foreign Policy magazine, was based in Egypt from 2010 to 2012. Twitter: @TyMcCormick.