Air Safety Panel Cites Turbulence in Santa Ana Crash

Stopping short of casting blame, a National Transportation Safety Board report released in Washington on Thursday suggests that a fatal plane crash in Santa Ana last year might have been prevented if the pilot or air traffic controllers had kept an adequate safety cushion between the aircraft and a Boeing 757 jetliner ahead of it.

The report focused on the hazards posed by wake turbulence created by B-757s and underscored a series of recommendations adopted by the board last month.

Although a separate report on the Dec. 15 Santa Ana crash will be forthcoming, Thursday’s document cited the accident a number of times and the board continues to pressure the Federal Aviation Administration to change its rules on B-757 wake turbulence. The board, which does not have regulatory power, has made 19 safety recommendations to the FAA, among them that the agency lengthen the minimum distances for smaller aircraft landing behind B-757s.

Board records show that there were 51 instances of aircraft caught in wake turbulence over the last decade, resulting in the deaths of 27 people and damage to, or destruction of, 40 airplanes. The board found that a disproportionate number of incidents--five since December, 1992, resulting in 13 deaths--involved wake turbulence from B-757s.

The accident in Santa Ana occurred when a twin-engine Westwind corporate jet was on a landing approach to John Wayne Airport. The jet, which was 2.1 miles behind a B-757, slammed nose first into the ground near the Santa Ana Auto Mall. All five aboard, including the top two executives of the In-N-Out Burger chain, were killed.

In part because of the Santa Ana accident, the board unanimously recommended last month that similarly sized corporate jets be kept five miles behind B-757s on final approach.

The Santa Ana accident remains under investigation by the board, but the report released Thursday provides the first clues as to what aviation safety officials believe was the cause of the crash and how it might have been prevented.

“The only way the pilot of the Westwind could have maintained adequate separation was to execute significant maneuvers,” the report said. Similarly, it said that “to prevent compromise of the separation requirement, the controller would have had to take positive action to change the Westwind’s track.”