Giants’ Fassel Misses the Point in Close Loss

If Coach Jim Fassel of the New York Giants finds himself without a job next season, he won’t have to work hard at figuring what went wrong.

He can look back on Sunday’s must-win game against the Tennessee Titans, which the Giants lost in overtime, 32-29.

For reasons that remain unexplained, Fassel suffered severe brain lock. With 14:15 left in the fourth quarter, Tiki Barber scored, boosting the Giants’ lead to 26-14. Fassel checked his two-point conversion chart, then decided against kicking the extra point.

That decision may haunt him for the rest of his coaching career. Quarterback Kerry Collins threw incomplete on a sloppy pass play, leaving the window open for Tennessee’s comeback.

Titan quarterback Steve McNair tied the score with nine seconds left in regulation by running for two after throwing a nine-yard scoring strike to Frank Wycheck.

The Giants did not lose the game because of that failed two-point conversion play but Fassel’s mental error made things much easier for the Titans. Matt Bryant kicked a field goal with 2:21 left in the fourth quarter, which gave the Giants an eight-point, instead of nine-point, lead, meaning the Titans needed only one possession to tie the score.

“If I had your guys’ perspective, then I would say, ‘Yeah, I should have kicked it,’ ” Fassel told reporters Monday. “Fortunately or unfortunately, I am not a hindsight person. I am a decision-maker.”

Now you understand why NFL coaches, who never like to be second-guessed, were against the two-point conversion when it was adopted in 1994. They didn’t want the pressure, which is why so many rely on the conversion chart.

This season, teams have made 46% -- 34 of 74 -- of their two-pointers. According to STATS Inc., the rate since the league put in the rule is 43.2% -- 371 of 858. Teams successful on two-point attempts have won more than 50% of their games this season -- 18-14-1 -- so going for two is not always a bad thing. But when is the right time?

When to go for two: Dick Vermeil was the offensive coordinator at UCLA in 1970 when he and Coach Tommy Prothro came up with a chart to answer that question. If you’re bad at math, the chart works for you. But you always have to consider the game situation first.

Going for two at any time other than very late in the game usually is risky, because it is impossible to anticipate how the scoring will go and a missed point often becomes costly. With a 98% conversion rate on kicks, it’s always smart to take the “automatic” point instead of taking the chance for two.

But if you have to go for two, the key is to have a play that will work. Usually it’s something that hasn’t been used before to catch the opponent off guard.

It also helps if the offense knows in advance that it will be going for two. The quicker a team can get in and out of the huddle after a touchdown, the better. Fassel failed to do that Sunday.

He told reporters that he normally informs his players they will be going for two before they start a drive, but ...

That’s why there was so much confusion after Barber’s touchdown run had given the Giants a 12-point lead.

Fassel’s next mistake was not having a solid play to use. Collins was pressured and threw a poor pass, intended for tight end Jeremy Shockey, into the end zone.

When not to go for two: Coaches sometimes go for two prematurely, as did Fassel against Tennessee.

Unless a team has a poor kicker, an offense should never go for two before the fourth quarter and never when ahead by more than six points. Coaches tend to lose their players’ trust when they coach scared.

Fassel went for two knowing the Titans would have the wind at their backs in the fourth quarter. He figured, with nearly a quarter to go, that a 14-point lead would be better than 13.

Fassel thus showed little confidence in his offense, assuming that the Giants would not score for the rest of the game because they were going into the wind.

But the Giants had already been successful going in that direction. They had scored in the second quarter and would score again in the fourth.

In fact, New York actually lost the game when it drove to the Titans’ one-yard line late in the quarter. With a five-point lead, the Giants couldn’t get into the end zone on three poorly executed plays and had to settle for a field goal. The rest is history.

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Two-Point Conversion Chart

Coach Tommy Prothro and offensive coordinator Dick Vermeil developed this guide at UCLA in 1970.

*--* Lead By Decision Trail By Decision 1 point Go for 2 1 point Go for 2 2 points Go for 1 2 points Go for 2 3 points Go for 1 3 points Go for 1 4 points Go for 2 4 points Go for 1 or 2 5 points Go for 2 5 points Go for 2 6 points Go for 1 6 points Go for 1 7 points Go for 1 7 points Go for 1 8 points Go for 1 8 points Go for 1 9 points Go for 1 9 points Go for 2 10 points Go for 1 10 points Go for 1 11 points Go for 1 11 points Go for 2 12 points Go for 2 12 points Go for 2 13 points Go for 1 13 points Go for 1 14 points Go for 1 14 points Go for 1 15 points Go for 2 15 points Go for 1 16 points Go for 1 16 points Go for 2 17 points Go for 1 17 points Go for 1 18 points Go for 1 18 points Go for 1 19 points Go for 2 19 points Go for 2 20 points Go for 1 20 points Go for 1

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