Fighting governments and guerrillas

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Larry,

America has an awful track record of studying history, predicting future patterns in warfare and then developing a military that will be ready for the next war. Perhaps the only example I can readily think of is the Persian Gulf War, in which a U.S. military built to fight the Soviet Union in Europe turned out to be pretty good at desert warfare too, not least because the Army's premier training center sits in the California desert. For nearly every other conflict -- both world wars, Korea, Vietnam, Bosnia and now Iraq -- we incorrectly judged the future of warfare and then sent the wrong kind of military to fight.

Within the Army and the broader defense community, there is a debate raging today over two basic questions: What the next war will look like? And how should the military train, equip and organize itself to fight it?

I am going to punt on the first question, partly because I don't feel qualified to answer it, and partly because I think the world is such an uncertain place that we cannot predict (at least, not with any fidelity) what future wars will look like. Pentagon strategy documents chart every current and emerging threat out there, from rising peer competitors such as China to global terror networks to natural disasters and the scarcity of resources. The only common denominator these scenarios share is uncertainty.

Assuming that uncertainty, how then should the military prepare? As someone who has served and who continues to work on military manpower and procurement issues, this is the more interesting debate for me.

Historically, the Army has trained for big wars and thought of small wars as lesser kinds of conflict, hoping that the skills for major combat operations would trickle down well to things such as counterinsurgency. Our fighting in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, particularly during their first few years, illustrates the folly of this idea. To paraphrase Army Lt. Col. John Nagl, one of this generation's leading defense intellectuals, counterinsurgency is the graduate level of warfare. It involves a fundamentally different approach, in which the use of force is highly constrained and the support of the local population is the objective (as opposed to the capture of terrain or destruction of the enemy). A military trained for combat operations cannot easily adjust to this modus operandi. The military must rethink its approach to training, organizing and equipping for warfare, and abandon the one-size-fits-all approach.

I think the answer is to develop a "full spectrum" capability -- and not just for the military, but more broadly for the United States government. A great deal of attention has been paid to the Army's new counterinsurgency manual and its new doctrine, which gives equal weight to the importance of counterinsurgency and major combat operations. But the Army cannot go it alone -- it needs support from the other military services and government agencies, including the departments of State, Justice and Homeland Security and the Central Intelligence Agency. We need to develop an integrated vision for how the United States (not just the Army or Marines) will act in future wars, and then develop the doctrine and organizations to do so.

Critical here will be developing flexible organizations that can handle situations on the spectrum ranging from peace to war. In the procurement arena, this means investing in the kinds of "dual-use" or "multi-use" gear that support both counterinsurgency and combat operations. The Army and Marines will still need armored vehicles, but it may not need as many artillery cannons. Similarly, the Air Force will still need fighter aircraft to maintain air superiority, but it may need a lot more transport aircraft to deliver troops and supplies, as well as air and space surveillance capabilities that enable commanders to see whatever is facing them.

There is some risk in overlearning the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan. Some critics compare the U.S. military with the Israeli military, charging that the latter overlearned from its experiences patrolling the West Bank and Gaza Strip, leaving itself unprepared to launch an offensive campaign against Hezbollah in 2006. There are serious problems (PDF) with this argument, but I think it's worthwhile asking how we should balance readiness for counterinsurgency with readiness for war against a large nation such as China. The only way to ensure that we're ready for the next war is to build a military that can flexibly respond to different kinds of conflict.

Phillip Carter practices government contracts law with McKenna Long & Aldridge in New York City. He previously served as an Army officer for nine years, deploying to Iraq in 2005-06 as an embedded advisor with the Iraqi police in Baqubah.

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After five years of war in Iraq and six-plus in Afghanistan, the United States military is facing a crisis not seen since the end of the Vietnam War. Equipment shortages, manpower shortfalls, recruiting and retention problems and misplaced budget priorities have resulted in a military barely able to meet the challenges America faces today and dangerously ill-prepared to handle the challenges of the future.

As operations in Iraq eventually draw to a close, we must plot a new strategic direction for our nation's military. Maj. Gen. Robert Scales, former head of the Army War College, has noted that the current crisis in Iraq presents the "opportunity to transform ourselves as we rebuild." As Phil points out, we have an awful track record of getting it right.

Moving forward, we must keep four things in mind.